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Abstract
The New World Order revives interest in the relationship between law and
politics in international relations. This relation has always been discussed. But,
with the considerable activism displayed by the Security Council over the last
years and its dynamic and selective application of its powers under Chapter VII of
the Charter, this relation has taken on a new dimension viewed from the
perspective of the United Nations. Such a dimension underlines a "constitutional"
approach to the United Nations framework: a quest for judicial review with the
International Court of Justice as the ultimate guardian of the United Nations. The
analysis ofjudicial review has generally been discussed in the light of the
experience of municipal constitutional courts, specifically, of the United States
Supreme Court. This constitutional approach should be viewed with caution. The
peculiarities of the international system and of the United Nations system
determine both a different scope and context for judicial review.
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Introduction
1 What is Judicial Review?
Judicial review is the power of courts to decide upon the constitutionality
of legislative and executive acts. Judicial control of the constitutionality of the
legislative and executive acts forms, nowadays, the most distinctive feature of
almost all constitutional systems in the world. All over the world, special
constitutional courts or ordinary courts have the powers to declare a law
unconstitutional by declaring it null and void or by annulling it, and as a result
refusing to enforce it.
The idea ofjudicial review stems from the notion of the State according to
the rule oflaw; i.e. not only State's powers are established by the laws but they
are limited by the law. According to this concept, the law becomes, as far as the
State is concerned, not only the instrument whereby attributions of its bodies and
officials are established, but also the instrument limiting the exercise of those
functions.
Therefore, judicial review simply means the power of a court or a system
of courts to examine an act of either a constitutional organ of government, or of a
statutory body or official, with a view to determine whether or not the act is
consistent with the provisions of the constitution, a statute or other sources of law
and/or whether the said act is void and thus incapable of producing any lawful
effect. 1 Where the Court is satisfied that the act is in violation of the law,
constitutional or otherwise, the decision of the court will have the effect of
nullifying the unlawful act; but direct formal annulment is not crucial to the
notion ofjudicial review? While it is conceded that this description is not by any
means complete, it is nonetheless useful insofar as it serves to identify the main
aspects of the doctrine ofjudicial review.
However, some reference is needed to the most significant features of
judicial review. In municipal legal systems, two different general spheres of the
law can be identified. One can find judicial review of the kind in which problems
of constitutional law are uppermost, while in other systems, one can find judicial
review in which principles of administrative and other spheres of the law are
primarily involved.' While in the first category, the validity of legislation, acts
and decisions are tested with reference to principles of constitutional law, in the
latter, the acts of the three branches of government are examined with reference to
ordinary legislation and principles of law.' This is a truism, as such a distinction is
not sharp and there can be an overlap between the two categories, as the points of
distinction between administrative law or other kind of law, on the one hand, and
the constitutional law on the other hand vary from one State to another. For
example, matters ofjudicial review concerning questions of fair trial, hearings,
and procedure could be part of ordinary legislation in one State while those very
questions could be matters of constitutional law in another. Thus, Article 103 of
the Basic Law of Germany provides that in court every individual is entitled to a
hearing in accordance with the law; and that no one maybe punished for the same
act more than once under criminal legislation. By contrast, guarantees and rights
I 1. Supperstone & J. Goudie, Judicial Review (1992) at 16
2 K. Kaikobad, The International Court ofJustice and Judicial Review (2000) at 11
3 See generally, A. R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (1989)
4 M. Shaprio, "The Success of Judicial Review" 193 at 197-203 in S. J. Kenney et al.,
Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective (1999)
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of this kind were traditionally part of the principles of common law in the United
Kingdom before they were reinforced and clarified by the 1998 Human Rights
Act.'
This kind of distinction will help us in understanding the different forms
ofjudicial review. In certain domestic systems, judicial review does not extend to
all actions of the different branches of the government. For instance, in France,
the 1958 constitution precludes constitutional review of parliamentary legislation,
but it provides a comprehensive system ofjudicial review of administrative and
judicial decisions. Moreover, Article 61 allows the Conseil Constitutionnel to
review the validity of legislative bills relating to organic law before they secure
the assent of the President of the Republic. A bill which fails this test cannot
become a statutory enactment. Therefore, the system in France is previewing as
opposed to reviewing the parliamentary, but not the executive, acts."
Another feature ofjudicial review is that different systems of
constitutional review prevail in various States today. Two systems ofjudicial
review exist; one centralised and the other decentralised. In the first system, the
power of judicial review is invested in one particular tribunal, normally called a
constitutional court. This particular court is precluded from dealing with cases
that do not involve constitutional issues. Ordinary or regular courts are precluded
from determining cases which involve questions of interpretation and application
of the constitution. This system ofjudicial review is mostly adopted in Europe,
5 M. Supperstone & J. Goudie, Judicial Review (1992) at 16- 23
6 Bell, French Constitutional Law (1992) at 30-33
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such as in Italy, Germany, Russia, Belgium, Cyprus, and Portugal, to name a
However, it is worth mentioning that though the French Republic does
not, as mentioned above, have a designated constitutional court, the Conseil
d'Etat, the supreme administrative court of France, has the power to review law
made by the executive under Article 37 of the French Constitution." The Conseil
d'Etat can, in fact, review all executive acts, decrees, and ordinances, and even
those legislative in nature, in adversary, party-initiated proceedings for
conformity with the Constitution or with the general principles of law, these
principles being derived from the Constitution and the Declaration of the Rights
of Man."
On the other end of the spectrum, one can find the decentralised system of
judicial review. As opposed to the centralised system, there is no appointed court
empowered exclusively to examine the validity of legislative and executive
actions, and judicial decisions involving constitutional law. These decisions and
other related questions can be determined by any court in the ordinary judicial
system." The United States, which was the first to implement the doctrine of
constitutional review as it is known and practised nowadays, constitutes a good
example of the decentralised system of judicial review. A law not in conformity
with the constitution may be set aside by the ordinary courts of the United States
7 See generally, A. R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (1989)
8 M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (1989) at 155. See also, K.
Kaikobad, The International Court ofJustice and Judicial Review (2000) at 19
9 See generally, Bell, French Constitutional Law (1992); M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the
Contemporary World (1989) at 16- 19; M. Shaprio, "The Success of Judicial Review" 193 in S. J.
Kenney et aI., Constitutional Dialogues in Comparative Perspective (1999)
\0 A. R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (1989)
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judicial system in accordance with the appropriate laws. It is worth mentioning
that although there is no specialist court appointed to review the validity of
legislation, cases which involve questions of repugnancy with the US Constitution
will, in most cases, be finally determined by way of appeal to the United States
Supreme Court. I I
By identifying the main features ofjudicial review in municipal systems, we
come to the point of questioning the importance ofjudicial review in any legal!
political system.
2 Why Judicial Review?
Having a system ofjudicial review will touch all aspects of public activity
of the society concerned. These include relatively ordinary acts carried out at the
local administrative level such as the grant or refusal of permits, licenses, and
writs by the authorities; but it also extends to more fundamental national issues,
for example, problems caused by unlawful administrative and legislative action,
including the violation of an individual's human rights and civil liberties. At
highest level, the notion ofjudicial review will extend to essential constitutional
matters involving the powers and functions of the various organs of the State.
These incidents are not, of course, exhaustive, but merely to provide an
illustration of some of the vast range of cases which can and do come before the
courts in domestic legal systems by way of judicial review. A glance of these
activities provides an understanding of the various significance and importance of
judicial review, which can be identified in two aspects.
In the first place, the role of the court as a guardian of the legality of all
kind of governmental acts and decisions is perhaps the most familiar face the
II See below chapter II for detailed discussion on judicial review in the United States.
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judiciary has acquired. Without an effective judicial review system, there would
be no way of providing a check against the abuse of power. Where the executive
organs of a State act in a manner not in conformity with their given competences;
where the legislature makes laws which infringe constitutionally- protected civil
liberties and human rights; or where courts and tribunals deliver judgments
tainted by errors of law and procedure, judicial review may be used to provide
relief to the aggrieved parties, such as natural and legal individuals, and statutory
and administrative bodies.
Secondly, the judiciary might play the role of final arbiter in resolving
constitutional disputes among various organs of the government. This role of the
judiciary might extend to nullify laws incompatible with the constitution in
concrete issues, particularly issues dealing with provisions based in the doctrine
of separation of powers, or might extend to provide statements of law in abstract
legal terms to resolve differences between various branches of administration.
By way of recapitulation, the observations made above with respect to
judicial review in municipal law are intended to provide a general background for
this work. It is appropriate to examine the doctrine ofjudicial review in the
context of international law.
3 Judicial Review in the International Legal System?
As the world enters the twenty-first century, one of the greatest
uncertainties facing international law scholars is the future of the international
system. With the demise of the cold war, many commentators began to speak of
the emergence of the "New World Order". The concept expressed a hope that the
6
international system was becoming more peaceful and just." One institution that
has figured prominently in the literature on the New World Order has been the
United Nations. In the wake of recent developments, this organisation, which
during most of the Cold War had played a relatively minor role in high politics,
was suddenly at the centre of global affairs. In such a system, many assumed the
beginning of an era of the rule oflaw in the United Nations in managing and
solving international conflicts.
But, with the UN handling of the Gulf War, Somalia, Balkans and
Lockerbie, the expectations for a better international system seemed premature. 13
The Security Council, in particular, was accused of acting unconstitutionally in
dealing with these international situations. It was accused of overstepping its
constitutional limitations enumerated in the UN Charter. In the midst of these
turbulent uncertainties, an increasing amount of scholarship has been devoted to
the study of the possibility of the International Court of Justice reviewing the UN
political organs' decisions and actions. The justification for this search is to guard
the legitimacy of the United Nations system as a whole, and to inaugurate a New
World Order. Judicial review of the UN political organs' actions is an old but new
debate. The international legal community has been engaged in this issue since
the time of establishing the new international organisation at the San Francisco
Conference.
The United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO),
which opened in San Francisco in 1945, faced not only the problems of
12 See A. C. Arend, "The United Nations and the New World Order" 81 Georgetown L. J.
491(1993)
13 M. Weller, "The Lockerbie Case: A Premature End to the 'New World Order'?" 4 African
Journal ofInternational and Comparative Law 302 (1992)
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reconciling conflicting positions among States but also problems of effective
organisation, and national pride and prestige. Proposals by States were advanced
to maximise their benefit from the new organisation. Arguments were raised and
discussed to have a world organisation, not a "great powers" organisation. Many
participating States attempted to diminish the influence of big powers acting
through the Security Council by increasing the importance of the General
Assembly and the International Court of Justice. 14
One of the proposals, advanced to strengthen the role of the International
Court and to provide a safeguard against the "great powers" influence in the
Security Council, was the Belgian proposal. It read:
"before a project for settlement of difference, drawn
up by the Councilor by any other body became
final, each of the States concerned should be able to
ask for an advisory opinion from the International
Court of Justice as to whether the decision
respected its independence and vital rights."?'
In explaining the rationale behind his proposal, the Belgian delegate saw the
Security Council as a political organ and that the deliberations taking place in it
would be of a political character, so in that context, the essential rights of a State
might be disregarded by the discussions of the Security Council due to political
pressures or manipulation. 16
Although the aim of the Belgian proposal was to ensure that the sovereign
rights of States were protected, a surge of debate against the proposal was raised
in the seventh meeting of Committee Ill/2. To begin with, the United States
14 A. L. Bennett, International Organizations Principles and Issues (6th ed.) (1995) at 51-52
15 Doc.2 GI7 (k), 3 UNCIa Docs. 331 at 333
16 Ibid.
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delegate showed dissatisfaction with the Belgian proposal. He believed that
Security Council was bound to act in accordance with the principles ofjustice and
international law by the virtue of Article 1 of the Charter. For him, all UN organs
were also bound to act in conformity with the Principles and Purposes of the
United Nations. 17 Thus such an amendment, in his point of view, was not deemed
necessary.
The Soviet Union expressed the view that such a proposal would weaken
the Security Council's authority to maintain international peace and security. In
the Soviet Union delegate's opinion, the Security Council would not in any way
infringe the rights of sovereign States, since it was established to protect the
States' rights. 18
The United Kingdom delegate believed that the Belgian proposal would
seriously impair the success of the Court as ajudicial body. According to the
British delegate, the proposal "would result in the decision of the International
Court of Justice of political questions" 19. Besides, he believed that proposal would
provide "a powerful weapon" in the hands of any State contemplating aggression.
He shared with the Soviet delegate the point that such an amendment would
paralyse the Security Council in fulfilling the legitimate role of maintaining peace
that was intended for it.20
The only supporter for the Belgian proposal was Colombia. The
Colombian delegate, who did not expect his country to be a permanent member in
the Security Council, expressed the view that "the confidence generally felt in the
17 Doc.433 III/2/15, 12 UNCIO Docs. 47 at 49
18 Ibid.
19 Doc. 498 III/2/19, 12 UNCIO Docs 65 at 65
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Security Council should not exclude confidence in the International Court of
Justice ...noting that a justiciable dispute should be referred to Court'?'. He
continued to argue that there would be no question more eminently legal than one
concerning the essential rights of a State.
In response to this surge of criticism, the Belgian delegate clarified the
main objective of the proposal. He pointed out that: "it was not in any sense the
purpose of this amendment to limit the legitimate powers of the Security Council.
It would, however, be desirable to strengthen the juridical basis of a Security
Council decision.v" The Belgian delegate asked what the term "recommend" in
Chapter VIII Section A [now Chapter VI] would mean. He questioned whether it
would entail binding obligations for States or it would offer only advice, which
might or might not be accepted. He had been assured that "in Section A no
compulsion or enforcement was envisaged.'!" At the end, the Belgian delegate
withdrew its proposal after having been informed that the Security Council's
powers would be advisory and the recommendation under this Chapter did not
possess any obligatory effect."
Later, a new Belgian proposal was introduced. This proposal suggested
that since the Security Council was authorised to request an advisory opinion
from the International Court, in case of disagreement between the principal
organs as to the interpretation of a provision of the Charter, the matter should be
20 Ibid.
21 Doc.433 IlI!2/15, 12 UNCIa Docs. 47
22 Ibid.
23 Doc. 498 III/2/19, 12 UNCIa Docs 65 at 66
24 Ibid.
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submitted to the Court, as the guarantor of objectivity and uniformity of
jurisprudence."
The second Belgian proposal shared the same fate of the first proposal. It was
rejected by the Committee IV/2 on Legal Problems. Instead, the Committee
adopted a report on the interpretation of the Charter, which provided that:
"if two organs are at variance concerning the correct
interpretation of the Charter they may either ask the
Court for an advisory opinion, establish an ad hoc
committee ofjurists to examine the question and
report its views, or have recourse to ajoint
conference.'?"
The report suggested that the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the
International Court of Justice, as organs functioning within the framework of the
Charter, should each interpret the parts that are applicable to its own particular
functions." This is to leave the determination of the extent of competence to the
discretion of each organ.
The statement expressed the view that there is no need to include
provisions on the Charter's authoritative interpretation in the Charter since the
Charter defines the functions and the powers of each organ." In addition, the
statement concluded that if an interpretation by an organ "is not generally
acceptable it will be without binding force.':" The statement of the Committee
implied that the relationship among the principal UN organs is characterised by
the principles of specialisation, equality, and non-subordination. The Committee
25 Doc.843 IV/2/37, 13 UNCIa Docs. 645 at 645
26 Ibid. at 646
27 Doc.933 IV/2/42 (2), 13 UNCIa Docs. 703 at 709
28 Ibid.
I I
/affirmed that the UN Charter endowed each organ with a particular mission or a
range of special tasks with corresponding means and powers. That special mission
of each organ calls for autonomy of conduct and that autonomy establishes the
fact that each organ should be autonomous in interpreting the provisions of the
Charter related to its work. Although each principal UN organ enjoys a complete
independence in conducting its actions, co-ordination is needed in order to
achieve the overall purposes of the United Nations.
The travaux preparatoires did not then rule out the possibility ofjudicial
review from the outset. The discussion in the San Francisco showed that the
International Court of Justice might make determinations of the competence and
powers of the UN organs by the way of an advisory opinion sought specifically
for that purpose. According to the statement of the Committee IV/2, the Court
could review the legality and the validity of the Security Council's resolutions,
decisions, and interpretations, which are "generally unacceptable", through its
advisory competence." The negotiating history allowed the International Court of
Justice to review the "generally unacceptable" actions of the UN organs in a way
that would guarantee each organ its own jurisdiction and competence without any
infringement of the other organ's competence. In other words, the travaux
preparatoires did not indicate that a hierarchy exists among the UN organs but
established the fact that the UN organs actions could be reviewed if they were
generally unacceptable.
This would suggest that a power of review could be thought of, not in the
sense of a power to overrule decisions, as discussed earlier, but rather a power to
29 Ibid. at 710.
30 Doc 933, IV/2/42 (2), 13 UNCIO Docs. 703, at 709-710
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say that a given decision did not have the effect which its authors intended it to
have, and thought that it did have. This thesis proposes a middle-way judicial
review, a middle way between no judicial review and compulsory judicial review.
Middle-way judicial review means that the International Court could have the
capacity to determine whether or not a UN political organ has acted in contrary to
the UN Charter without overruling that action or decision.
In the light of this, this thesis seeks to accomplish four main goals. First, it
will attempt to demonstrate the existence of the doctrine of ultra vires in
international institutional law, and therefore, the existence of a basis for judicial
review. To do this, it will discuss the doctrine of implied powers and its
limitations, and it will show that the doctrine of ultra vires begins with the end of
the doctrine of implied powers. Second, this work will reject the idea of
modelling "international" judicial review with an analogy to that of decentralised
system ofjudicial review, in particular that of the United States. Third, it will seek
to demonstrate that there are limitations on the powers of the Security Council,
even when it is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Fourth, it will
examine the alternative procedure for the realisation ofjudicial review in the
international system.
In order to accomplish these tasks, this thesis is divided into four chapters.
Chapter I will examine judicial review in relation to the doctrine of ultra vires and
the doctrine of implied powers. Chapter II will discuss a comparison between the
International Court of Justice and the United States Supreme Court. Chapter III
will examine the institutional dilemma in the context of the relationship between
the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice. Chapter IV will
examine the possible procedure to realise judicial review. Finally, the work will
13
be concluded with the point that judicial review has a place in the UN system, and




Judicial Review and the International Court of
Justice
1 Introduction
One commentator has described the United Nations Security Council in a
metaphoric way,
"as a whale which, for reasons known and
unknown, lay quietly somewhere on the high seas
for most of its life. Some ten years ago, the whale
awoke and turned over once or twice, sending
waves to distant shores which, in turn, set in motion
the ships and boats and canoes of legal science." I
With the demise of the Cold War and with the end of reciprocal vetoes
between the permanent members, the Security Council assumed its intended
powers, especially its powers under Chapter VII, which were rarely used before
the nineties. The Security Council showed that it could be a guardian of
international peace and security when it ended the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and
took coercive measures under Chapter VII to reach this end.' But it also used these
powers when the threat to international peace was far less apparent. It intervened
in many conflicts for humanitarian purposes, such as in the case of Somalia.' The
Security Council applied Chapter VII without discussing how the situation
constituted a threat to international peace and security, the constitutional
limitation on the Security Council's authority under Chapter VII. The
I B. Fassbender, "Review Essay Quis judicabit? The Security Council, Its Powers and Its Legal
Control" 11:1 EJIL 219 (2000) at 219.
2 C. Greenwood, "New World Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law" 55:2
The Modern Law Review 153 (1992)
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determination of a threat of the peace was mentioned in the preambular part of
resolution 733. It appeared that the adoption of the resolution was motivated by
humanitarian concerns although there was a slight reference to the consequences
on the stability and peace in the region. SC Res. 733 (1992) stipulated that:
"The Security Council, ... [g]ravely alarmed at the
rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and
the heavy loss of human life and widespread
material damage resulting from the conflict in the
country and aware of its consequences on stability
and peace in the region, ... [d]ecides, under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all
States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace
and stability in Somalia, immediately implement a
general and complete embargo on all deliveries of
weapons and military equipment to Somalia until
the Council decides otherwise;"
In resolution 794, the Security Council authorised the use of force to
facilitate humanitarian assistance but it failed to mention how the situation had
changed from domestic to international and why it considered the situation in
Somalia a threat to international peace and security. The resolution simply stated
that:
"[t]he magnitude of the human tragedy caused by
the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated
obstacles being created to the distribution of
humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to
international peace and security.:"
3 SC Res. 733 UN SCOR (1992). Unanimously adopted. No objections were raised against it. See
UN Doc. S/1992/ PY.3039
4 SC Res. 733 UN SCOR (1992)
5 SC Res. 794 UN SCOR (1992)
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A number of Member States expressed the view that this was a collective
humanitarian intervention." As for other Member States, the concerns appeared to
be more related to the United Nations, versus U.S., control over the operation,
rather than whether this was an internal matter.' However, this resolution was
adopted unanimously.
Again, when the Security Council in July 1994 authorised Member States
to form a multinational force "to use all necessary means" to help Haiti to get rid
of its military dictatorship and to foster a return to democracy", only a few voices
in the Security Council debated and questioned whether the situation constituted a
threat to international peace." The general atmosphere was in support of the
adoption of resolution 940. 10 The representative of the legitimately elected Haitian
government stated that:
"[t]he ongoing situation is only exacerbating the
destruction of the country and increasing the
suffering of the people, who have no recourse but to
flee the country in any way they can, thus creating a
refugee problem for the entire region... the draft
resolution before the Security Council. .. contains
elements that will enable the international
community to respond appropriately to the
challenge issued by a handful of unscrupulous
soldiers who for more than three years have been
contributing to the destruction of their own
country." 11
6 UN Doc. S/1992/ PY. 3145 See for instance the statements of the Representatives, of Belgium at
23, of France at 28, of the United Kingdom at 34, and of the United States at 36
7 See for example UN Doc. S/1992/ PY. 3145 See the statements of the Representatives, of China
at 17 and of Zimbabwe at 7
8 SC Res. 940 UN SCOR (1994).
9 See UN Doc. S/1994/ PY.3413 See for instance the statements of the Representative of Brazil,
Mexico and China
10 Ibid. See for example the Statements of the Representatives of Canada at 7-8, ofYenezuela at 8,
and of Nigeria at 10-1 1
11 Ibid. at 3
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However, the representative ofMexico was explicit in finding the
situation did not amount to the application of Chapter VII measures. He stated:
"the crisis in Haiti ... is not a threat to the peace, a
breach of the peace or an act of aggression such as
would warrant the use of force in accordance with
Article 42 of the Charter.t'"
The representatives ofBrazil and China, who abstained from voting, shared the
same views. Both considered that the situation did not give rise to "threat to the
peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression". 13
The Security Council also applied Chapter VII in its approach to
international terrorism. In January 1992, the Security Council condemned the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, and asked the Libyan
Government to respond effectively to the United States and the United Kingdom
requests to surrender the two suspects. Resolution 731(1992) did not impose
Chapter VII sanctions, but it led two months later to one that did. The Libyan
Government began proceedings in the International Court of Justice, and shortly
after the close of the hearings, the Security Council adopted resolution 748( 1992)
under Chapter VII, imposing sanctions on Libya. Many argued that the situation
did not constitute a threat to international peace, especially as the incident
happened three years before resolution 748 was adopted. 14
12Ibid. at 4
13 Ibid. at 9, 10
14 See e.g. Judge Bedjaoui dissenting Opinion in Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and
Application of 197 I Montreal Convention Arising From Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 42- 43; K. Kaikobad, "The Court, the
Council and Interim Measures: a Commentary on the Lockerbie Order of 14 April 1992" 17
Australian Yearbook ofInternational Law 87 (1996) at 155; P. H. Kooijmans, "The Enlargement
ofthe Concept of 'A Threats to the Peace'" I I I at 117 in R. J. Dupuy (ed.) The Development ofthe
Role ofthe Security Council (1993)
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The actions of the Security Council in handling these international crises
gave rise to a surge of scholarly debate. IS The issues of the competence of the
Security Council, the limitations on its powers under Chapter VII, its capacity to
act ultra vires, and the powers of the International Court to review the Council's
actions were at the centre of the debate. It is worth mentioning that during the first
decade of the life of the United Nations, certain writers and learned societies of
international law paid attention to the doctrinal issues of the competence of the
United Nations. 16
However, the realities of international relations at that time left the topic
dormant. With changes in the international political equation, the question of
judicial review has been reinvigorated, and it acquires not only an academic
interest but also engages the attention of national and international political
concerns. 17 Now that judicial review has come to the fore, clarity is needed on the
IS See e.g., J. E. Alvarez, "The Once and Future Security Council" 10:2 Washington Quarterly 5
(1995); M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality ofits
Acts (1994); D.D. Caron, "The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council" 87
AJIL 552 (1993); T. M. Franck, "The "Powers of Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardian of
UN Legality?" 86 AJIL 519 (1992); T. M. Franck & F. Patel "UN Police Action in Lieu of War:
"The Old Order Changeth" 85 AJIL 63 (1991); H. Freudenschub, "Article 39 of the UN Charter
Revisited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent Practice of the UN Security Council" 46 Austrian
Journal ofPublic and International Law 1 (1993); M. 1. Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter" 85 AJIL 74 (1991); M. 1. Glennon, "Sovereignty and
Community After Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use of Force" 89 AJIL 70 (1995); R. Gorden,
"United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond" 15 Mich. J Int 'f.
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Michael Reisman, "Haiti and the Validity of International Action" 89 AJIL 82 (1995); A. P.
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Weston, "Security Council Resolution 678 And Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious
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16 See e.g., "Report of Special Committee on Reference to the International Court of Justice of
Questions of the United Nations Competence" Proc. Am. Int'!. I. 256 (1950); For a summary
account of the work of the learned societies of international law see M. Bedjaoui, The New World
Order and the Security Council Testing the Legality ofits Acts (1994) at 55-61
17 K. Kaikobad, The International Court ofJustice and Judicial Review (2000) at 4
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scope and the extent ofjudicial review, including the basis necessary for judicial
review to be exercised.
Generally speaking, the notion ofjudicial review, in terms of international
law, could be understood as the power of an international tribunal to pass upon
questions dealing with the validity of international action and decisions in the
light ofvarious principles of law, mainly those originating in the relevant
constitutive instruments of the international organisations; and as far as the latter
instruments are concerned, those provisions which deal with the competence,
powers and functions of international organisations and their respective organs
are ofparticular importance. Other sources of law against which the validity of
acts and decisions may be examined are treaties and conventions, while
customary international law and the general principles of law will also playa part
in all appropriate circumstances." Thus, like its municipal counterpart, an
international judicial body may be called upon to decide matters regarding the
validity of administrative, legislative and judicial action adopted by one or more
organs of an international institution. Where the impugned action is considered to
be inconsistent with the law, customary, conventional or general, it will stand
nullified, provided of course that the international tribunal is empowered to annul
the action or decision in question. This is, of course, a simplistic understanding of
judicial review in international law and the actual picture is more complex. For
present purposes, it will suffice to apply these concepts to the International Court
of Justice with a view to providing a look at the nature, extent and scope of the
rudimentary judicial review system operated by the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations. Clearly, any study of this system must take into account the
18 This will be discussed in detail in chapter III
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Court's powers exercised in its contentious and advisory proceedings. An account
of this kind, which serves to provide the essential contextual background against
which the judicial review system can be evaluated, is provided in the following
chapters.
In order to fully understand the notion ofjudicial review in the context of
international law and the powers the International Court enjoyed, it will be
necessary to identify the various elements which are usually found such a notion
in one form and degree or another. These are the grounds for nullity and other
legal difficulties with the act or decision, and the nature and effect of the Court's
decision. These elements are elaborated in detail below.
2 Grounds of Nullity
This is central to the notion ofjudicial review because it is this fact,
amongst other things, which sets it apart from the concept and process of appeal.
The latter will normally lie on the merits of a case in terms of being a challenge
against a judicial decision allegedly flawed in its application and interpretation of
the law and facts; while in judicial review the main thrust of the challenge is that
the acts or decision itself, whether executive, legislative or judicial, is invalid, and
hence a nullity in terms of law. It follows therefore that, in general terms, the
petitioner in judicial review is less concerned with the substance of the impugned
measures than the grounds of law allegedly nullifying the decision or act. The
general claim thus is that as a nullity in law, the measure is incapable of creating
or affecting the legal rights and obligations of the relevant parties. The grounds on
which a claim is based are many and varied. International law scholars have
21
identified three categories: ultra vires, procedural irregularities, and procedural
impropriety in terms of a breach of principles of natural justice. 19
There is no established procedure in either the UN Charter or the Statute
of the International Court of Justice to review the acts and the decisions ofthe
organs of the UN, and therefore, the doctrine of ultra vires has no place in the
international legal system." But, the question introduces itself: whether the UN
and its organs possess the capacity to commit ultra vires acts, i.e. decisions and
acts in excess of their competence and the authority conferred upon them by the
UN Charter?
It appears that the International Court adopted the view, when it faced the
question of the legal status of executive or legislative action, that a resolution of a
properly constituted organ of the United Nations which is passed in accordance
with the organ's rules of procedure, and which is declared by its President to have
so passed, must be presumed to have been validly adopted." In the Certain
Expenses Advisory Opinion 22, the International Court of Justice was asked to give
its opinion on whether certain expenditures, which were authorised by the
General Assembly to cover the costs of the United Nations operations in the
Congo and in the Middle East, constituted "expenses of the Organisation" within
the meaning of Article 17 para.2 of the UN Charter. It was argued before the
Court that the expenses, that resulted from operations for the maintenance of
19 K. Kaikobad, The International Court ofJustice and Judicial Review (2000) at 36; See
generally, E. Osieke, "Unconstitutional Acts in International Organisations: the Law and the
Practice of the ICAO" 28 ICLQ 1(1979); E. Osieke, "Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of
International Organisations" 77 AJIL 239 (1983); F. Morgenstern, "Legality in International
Organisations" 48 BYIL 241 (1976-7)
20 See Namibia Advisory Opinion 1971 ICJ Rep. 16 at 284 (Judge Fitzmaurice dissenting opinion)
21 Ibid. at 22
22 Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion 1962 ICJ Rep. 151
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international peace and security, were not "expenses of the organisation within
the meaning of Article 17 para.2 of the Charter, inasmuch as they fall to be dealt
with exclusively by the Security Council, and more especially through agreements
negotiated in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.'?" It was argued further
that since the General Assembly's power is limited to discussing, considering,
studying and recommending, it cannot impose an obligation on members to pay
the expenses which result from the implementation of its recommendations, and
therefore the General Assembly acted ultra vires,"
In considering these objections, the Court declared that:
"when the Organisation takes action which warrants
the assertion that it was appropriate for the
fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the
United Nations, the presumption is that such action
is not ultra vires the organisation.'?'
This approach of the Court to ultra vires decisions has led some scholars,
arguably, to believe that the doctrine of ultra vires is not applicable to
international organisations, and that they have the capacity to commit acts not
explicitly authorised by the United Nations Charter." But it must be stressed that
the Court only presumes that the action is intra vires and that it leaves itself the
room and the option of being able to declare future actions ultra vires, if it is
23 Ibid atl62
24 Ibid. at 162-63
25 Ibid at 162
26 E. Osieke, "Unconstitutional Acts in International Organisations: the Law and the Practice of
the ICAO" 28 ICLQ 1(1979) at 3; E. Osieke, "Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of
International Organisations" 77 AJIL 239 (1983); F. Morgenstern, "Legality in International
Organisations" 48 BYIL 241 (1976-7) at 241
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given the chance." As Shaw has noted: "the concept of a presumption ofvalidity
bears with it the seeds ofa finding of invalidity, at least potentially.'?"
Judge Spender, in his separate opinion in Certain Expenses, asserted that
the Court has the right to rule on the constitutionality of the action taken by UN
organs if the Court was asked to do so:
"The question of constitutionality of action taken by
the General Assembly or the Security Council will
rarely call for consideration except within the
United Nations itself, where a majority rule
prevails. In practice this may enable action to be
taken which is beyond power. When, however, the
Court is called upon to pronounce upon a question
whether certain authority exercised by an organ of
the Organisation is within the power of that organ,
only legal considerations may be invoked and de
facto extension of the Charter must be
disregarded."29
Judge Spender had affirmed that certain acts and decisions might be reviewed if
objections had been made." This opinion established a distinction between raising
the issue ofjudicial review within the context of the advisory jurisdiction and in
contentious proceedings. According to Judge Spender, the request of an advisory
opinion represents the rule of majority, which could allow the extension of
powers and competence of the Court to rule on the constitutionality of the UN
organs' actions, whereas in its contentious jurisdiction, the Court settles disputes
between two States or more, which limit the extension of its powers to the
questions presented. In its advisory competence, the Court has the role of "an
organ of the United Nations" as opposed to its role as "an organ of international
27 N.D. White, The Law ofInternational Organisations (1996) at 119
28 M.N. Shaw, "The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and
Judicial Function" 219 at 257in A.S. Muller et al (eds.) The International Court ofJustice (1997)
29 Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion 1962ICJ Rep. 151 at 197
30 Ibid. at 196
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law" obtaining in its contentious jurisdiction." Reisman has characterised the role
of the Court in its advisory mode as a "type of international constitutional tribunal
or as a cour de cassation for international organizations.'?" In that sense, the
International Court could review action taken and consider if a particular organ
has exceeded its delegated powers. In contentious proceedings, the Court could
review decisions and actions ofUN organs if doubts and questions raised during
the proceedings formed an essential part of the dispute."
On the basis of this case, that has been often cited to state the Court's
position on the doctrine of ultra vires, it has been argued that all acts undertaken
by the UN, no matter how irregular in procedure, are valid and binding." This
argument could partially be correct. Here, one should draw a distinction between
ultra vires and procedural irregularities. The United Nations Charter is notorious
for its vagueness in its separation of powers and functions. An organ could
overstep other organ's functions and still regarded intra vires." However, it would
amount for an act to be considered ultra vires in the case of the organ exceeding
the powers vested in it by the Charter, or acting to the contrary of the Charter's
objectives." UN organs' powers are not unbridled and uncontrolled." Their
31 L. Gross, "The International Court of Justice and the United Nations" 121 RDC 313 (1967-1) at
320
32 W. Michael Reisman, "The Other Shoe Falls: The Future of Article 36 (1) Jurisdiction in the
Light of Nicaragua" 81 AJIL 166 (1987) at 168
33 See for example, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction ofICAO Council(India v. Pakistan) 1972
ICJ Rep. 42; Arbitral Award of3 I July 1989 (Guinea Bissau v. Senegal) 1991 ICJ Rep. 53
34 E. Osieke, "Legal Validity of Ultra vires Decisions ofInternational Organisations" 77 AJIL 239
(1983)
35 See the Court's opinion in Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion 1962 ICJ Rep. 151 at 162
36 Constitution OfThe Maritime Safety Committee OfThe Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organisation Advisory Opinion 1960 ICJ Rep. 150
37 See below Chapter III
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functions and powers flow from the Charter. It is, however, possible that, in the
pursuit of their objects and purposes, UN organs may engage in activities which
are not authorised by the Charter, and may adopt decisions in a manner which
does not correspond entirely to the governing procedures, but they cannot
exercise powers against the spirit of the Charter."
In the IMCO Advisory Opinion, in that respect, the International Court
asserted the fact of the existence of the doctrine of ultra vires in the legal system
of international organisations. In this case, the International Court of Justice was
asked by the First IMCO Assembly to give an advisory opinion on the following
question:
"Is the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation,
which was elected on 15 January 1959, constituted
in accordance with the Convention for the
Establishment of the Organisation?":"
By nine votes to five, the Court gave a negative answer to the question. The Court
found that the decision of not including Liberia and Panama as members of the
Maritime Safety Committee was ultra vires Article 28(a) of the Convention,
which read as follows:
"The Maritime Safety Committee shall consist of
fourteen Members elected by the Assembly from
the Members governments of those nations having
an important interest in maritime safety, ofwhich
not less than eight shall be the largest ship-owning
nations, and the remainder shall be elected so as to
ensure adequate representation of Members,
governments of other nations with an important
interest in maritime safety, such as nations
interested in the supply of large numbers of crews
38 see below the discussion on the doctrine of implied powers
39 Constitution OfThe Maritime Safety Committee OfTheInter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative OrganisationAdvisory Opinion 1960 ICJ Rep. 150
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or in the carriage of large numbers of berthed and
unberthed passengers, and of major geographical
areas."40
The Court, in its opinion, stated that "the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO
which was elected .. .is not constituted in accordance with the Convention for the
establishment of the Organization."41 In other words, the Court found that the
decision could not be justified by reference to the basic instrument of that
organisation and it held that the election was unconstitutional and unlawful."
The acts were declared unconstitutional rather than ultra vires. Although
many consider that these two concepts are interchangeable, the answer to this
difficult and complex question cannot be found by reference to any general
principle or rule of international law, or to the constitutions of most of those
international organisations. There is also no consensus among international
lawyers on the subject." To declare an act unconstitutional rather than ultra vires
could be linked to the fact that most of the claims brought to the Court have often
contended that the particular international organisation and its organs had not
acted in conformity with the provisions of its constitution, so that the Court
answered the question affirmatively or negatively and would not go further to
determine the consequences of its findings.
40 Ibid. at 154
4l Ibid. at 171
42 Ibid. at 170-171
43 E. Osieke, "Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions ofInternational Organisations" 77 AlIL 239
(1983) at 262
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The International Court has, in almost all the relevant cases, found the
contested acts intra vires. Only in two cases", did it find the relevant acts to be
ultra vires. The invalidity of relevant organ's action was established on the ground
of clear non- observance of substantive provisions of the constitution of the
organisation concerned. It is however worth mentioning that the issues had been
brought before the International Court to provide interpretations of the law rather
than to review the legality of a certain act or decision."
On the other hand, the failure to observe that procedure could constitute a
ground for a review body to invalidate the resulting act or decision. Most of the
claims of irregular procedural acts have been made because a certain act was
adopted by the wrong organ within the organisation.
The attitude of review bodies to procedural irregularities appears to be
somewhat flexible. The International Court of Justice has been reluctant to admit
that such irregularities could amount to the invalidation of a decision of an
international organisation on the condition that these irregularities did not result in
the adoption ofwrong decision or in a miscarriage of'justice." It considered this
kind of irregularity as a matter of the internal law of the organisation, which
would not justify declaring the act invalid. In Certain Expenses, the International
Court decreased any potential in challenging procedurally wrong acts and
decisions. It stated:
44 One during the days of the PCU The Competence ofthe /LO to Regulate Agricultural
Production Case, PCU Series B. No.3; and one by the ICJ Constitution OfThe Maritime Safety
Committee OfThe Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation Advisory Opinion
1960 ICJ Rep. 150
45 C.F. Amersinghe, Principles ofthe Institutional Law ofInternational Organisations (1996) at
181
46 See the Opinion of Judge Dillard in Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction ofICAO Council 1972
ICJ Rep. 4 at 100
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"If it is agreed that the action [of the General
Assembly] in question is within the scope of the
functions of the Organisation but it is alleged that it
has been initiated or carried out in a manner not in
conformity with the division of functions among the
several organs which the Charter prescribes, one
moves to the internal plane, to the internal structure
of the Organisation. If the action was taken by the
wrong organ, it was irregular as a matter of that
internal structure, but this would not necessarily
mean that the expense incurred was not an expense
of the Organisation. Both national and international
law contemplate cases in which the body corporate
or politic may be bound, as to third parties, by an
ultra vires act of an agent.':"
In the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction ofthe lCAD Council case, the
Government ofIndia contended before the Court that the decisions of the ICAO
Council were vitiated by procedural irregularities and errors." The Court used the
same reasoning as it had employed in Certain Expenses and declared that:
"The Court however does not deem it necessary or
even appropriate to go into this matter, particularly
as the alleged irregularities do not prejudice in any
fundamental way the requirements of a just
procedure. The Court's task in the present
proceedings is to give a ruling as to whether the
Council has jurisdiction in the case. This is an
objective question of law, the answer to which
cannot depend on what occurred before the Council.
Since the Court held that the Council did and does
have jurisdiction, then, if there were in fact
procedural irregularities, the position would be that
the Council would have reached the right
conclusion in the wrong way. Nevertheless, it
would have reached the right conclusion. If, on the
other hand, the Court had held that there was and is
no jurisdiction, then, even in the absence of any
irregularities, the Council's decision to assume it
would have stood revised."49
47 Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion 1962/CJ Rep. 151 at 168
48 ICAO Council case 1972/CJ Rep. 4 at 69
49 Ibid
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It would appear, therefore, that procedural irregularities do not normally
constitute a ground for declaring certain acts and decisions ofan international
organisation invalid, unless these irregularities lead to a miscarriage ofjustice.
Judge Dillard pointed out in leAD case that: n[i]t is, of course, not impossible to
contemplate a situation of gross abuse of procedural requirements leading to a
miscarriage ofjustice. In such a situation the validity of the decision adopted by a
subordinate adjudicating body may be legitimately challenged on appeal.'!"
Similarly, Article 11 ofthe Statute of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
contemplates an error of procedure which results in a failure ofjustice. In Review
ofJudgment No.273 51, the Court found that the Committee on Applications for
Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments had committed an error of
procedure in the composition ofthe Administrative Tribunal. The Court posed the
question why, when the three regular members of the Tribunal had been available
to sit and had sat, it had not been thought appropriate to allow an alternate
member to sit, who in fact appended a dissenting opinion to the judgment." But,
the Court noted that it had not been asked to consider whether the Tribunal might
have committed a fundamental error in procedure having occasioned a failure of
justice. Accordingly, it did not consider the matter further."
50 Ibid. at 100 Judge Dillard (Separate Opinion)
51 Applicationfor Review ofJudgement No.273 ofthe United Nations Administrative Tribunal
1982 ICJ Rep. 325 (Mortished case)
52 Ibid. at 340
53 Ibid.
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Osieke questioned what amounts to a miscarriage ofjustice. His answer
was that it depends on the special circumstances of each case." A straightforward
example of an irregularity that would lead to a miscarriage ofa justice is where
the rules stipulate that a certain decision should be adopted by two-third majority
and the organ adopts the decision by a simple majority, which violates the
constitutional rights of some member States. The procedural irregularities could
be identified as a "serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure. "55
It is correct in general principle that in cases ofjudicial review it is not the
substance of the acts or decision which is of primary concern, but the validity in
law of that measure. However, where the measure is challenged on the ground of
ultra vires, the substance of the said measure will normally playa crucial role.
For here the very essence of the challenge is based on questioning whether the
public body, or international organisation, or organ thereof, was empowered to
adopt that measures. And to translate this into the language of the United Nations,
the challenge is based on whether the General Assembly or the Security Council
was empowered by the Charter to adopt such measures. The vagueness and
indefinite nature of the UN Charter has established a leeway to escape this
dilemma. The scope of the UN organs' competence has been often widened by
implying powers from expressed powers or from the purposes and principles of
the Charter.
54 E. Osieke, "Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International Organisations" 77 AJIL 239
(1983) at 247
55 Article 35(C) of the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure see 1958 Yearbook ofthe Il.C. Vol II at
12
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3 The Doctrine of Implied Powers
The doctrine of implied powers found its place slowly but progressively in
the law ofintemational organisations.56 It is generally known that the notion of
implied powers originated in legal municipal system. The United States Supreme
Court spoke of the doctrine of implied powers during its early days. McCulloch v.
Maryland case" arose when the Congress of the United States passed in April
1816, 'an act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank ofthe United States'. The
General Assembly of Maryland, in response, passed 'an act to impose a tax on all
banks, or branches thereof, in the state ofMaryland, not chartered by the
legislature' in February 1818. After the First Bank of the United States (1791) had
folded in 1811 due to a lack of congressional support, inflation in the years
following the War of 1812 compelled Congress to establish a new national bank.
The Second Bank of the United States was authorised by Congress to help control
the unregulated issuance of currency by state banks. Many continued to oppose
the bank's constitutionality, and Maryland set an example by imposing a tax on all
banks not chartered by the state. When the U.S. branch bank in Baltimore refused
to pay taxes, Maryland brought suit for collection from the bank, and challenging
the constitutionality of the US National Bank.
Chief Justice John Marshall, in deciding the case, dealt with the issue of
the constitutionality of a congressional act. He held that:
"the powers of the governrnent are limited, and that
its limits are not to be transcended... the sound
56 See A. I. L.Campbell, "The Limits of Powers of International Organisations" 32 ICLQ 523
(1983)
57 The United States Supreme Court, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); See D. Alfange
Jr., "Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In defense of
Traditional Wisdom," 7 The Supreme Court Review 329 (1993); C. Eisgruber, "John Marshall's
Judicial Rhetoric" 10 The Supreme Court Review 439 (1996); B. Schwartz, A History ofthe
Supreme Court (1993)
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construction of the constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion, with respect to
the means by which the powers it confers are to be
carried into execution, which will enable that body
to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional. .."58
The chartering of a bank, according to the Court, was a power implied from the
constitutional power over Federal fiscal operations. Because the State cannot
impede constitutional Federal laws, the Maryland tax was voted
unconstitutional.59
Chief Justice Marshall continued to state that when there is no prohibition
in the Constitution, the implied powers would be constitutional, but "[s]hould
Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by
the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers,
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a
decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land. "60
This opinion gave trenchant expression to the doctrine of implied powers.
It showed that these powers could be implied to fulfil a legitimate end, if the
constitution does not prohibit the new measures."
58 McCulloch v. Mary/and, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)
59 Ibid
60 Ibid
61 C. Eisgruber, "John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric" 10 The Supreme Court Review 439 (1996) at
449; B. Schwartz, A History ofthe Supreme Court (1993) at 45-46
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The same notion of implied powers was incorporated in and introduced
into international institutional law. The Permanent Court of International Justice,
for example, in the European Commission ofthe Danube opinion", laid down the
proposition that an international organisation has in principle only the powers
conferred on it by its constituent instrument. But it went further to note that "[a]s
the European Commission is not a State, but an international institution with a
special purpose, it only has the functions bestowed upon it by the Definitive
Statute with a view to the fulfilment of that purpose, but it has power to exercise
those functions to their full extent, in so far as the Statute does not impose
restrictions upon it.?"
It was argued that even the most prescient founders of an organisation
could not have foreseen the developments that have occurred since the
establishment of the organisation, and restricting the organisation to the express
provisions of its constituent instrument would paralyse it from playing an
effective role in the world affairs, and from performing its functions and powers."
The doctrine establishes that international organisations are deemed to
have certain powers, which are additional to those expressly stipulated in their
constituent instruments. These additional powers are necessary or essential for the
fulfilment of the tasks or purposes of the organisation, or for the performance of
its functions, or for the exercise of the powers explicitly granted.
The relationship between ultra vires and the doctrine of implied powers should be
seen from the perspective that the doctrine of implied powers could be used to
determine the extent of ultra vires. An international organisation always needs to
62 1927 PCIJ, Series B, No. 14
63 Ibid. at 64
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justify its action and to demonstrate that it is using its powers judiciously, as a
part of its contractual relation with Member States." As it is never possible to lay
down an exhaustive list of powers ofan organisation in its constituent instrument
and it is impossible to foresee subsequent developments at the time of the
organisation's establishment, the doctrine of implied powers helps to establish a
legal foundation for an act when there is no express provision to support it.
The International Court of Justice stated, in the Reparationsfor Injuries
suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations opinion, that:
"Under international law, the Organization must
deemed to have those powers, which though not
expressly provided for in the Charter, are conferred
upon it by necessary implication as being essential
to the performance of its duties."66
Implied powers are, therefore, those powers which are not expressly granted, but
are implied either from express provisions or from the purposes and the functions
of the organisation, for a necessary fulfilment of the objectives of the
organisation. The foundation of implied powers is the constituent instrument of
the organisation. Both express powers and implied powers are related to the
constituent instrument. Express powers remain the source of: and framework for,
the implication of powers.
Occasionally, a distinction is made between powers implied from explicit
powers as opposed to powers implied from the purposes and functions of the
organisation. Many argue that powers can only be implicated from existing
powers, i.e. those expressly conferred by the constituent instrument of the
64 N. D. White, The Law a/International Organisations (1996) at 129
65 E. Lauterpacht, "The Development of the Law ofIntemational Organisations by the Decisions
ofIntemational Tribunals" 152 RDC 387 (1976-IV) at 416
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organisation," Schenners and Blokker express the view that: "many powers can
only be exercised on the basis that other powers exist..."68 However, they
continue further to state that implied powers can be also derived from the general
principles and purposes of the organisation such as those found in the preamble of
the UN Charter." It is difficult to separate the purposes and functions of an
organisation from its existing powers, and to treat them as distinct bases of
implication." In a number ofjudicial decisions, purposes, functions, and explicit
powers have been used in combination to justify the implication of powers. The
use of differentiation between implication from existing powers and implication
from purposes and functions of the organisation has proved to be unclear in
practice. As Skubiszewski has explained:
"[f]unctions relate to the subject matter of the
activity and stand, therefore, close to the tasks of
the organization. Powers are more concentrated on
measures that the organisation can or must take and
which produce legal effects for the organisation
and! or its Members. Where a function of the
organization becomes the basis for implying a
power, i.e. where a power is said to be necessary to
carry out a particular function, the link between
function and power is inevitable.'?'
66 Reparations/or Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations, Advisory Opinion: 1949
ICJ Rep. 174 at 182.
67 G. Tunkin, "Legal Bases ofIntemational Organization Action" 261 at 265-267in R. 1. Dupuy
(ed.), A Handbook ofInternational Organizations (1988) Tunkin argued that powers cannot be
implied from the "institutional effectiveness" or the objects and purposes of an organisation but
only from concrete provisions of its constituent instrument.
68 Schermers & Blokker International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity (1995) at 233
69 Ibid.
70 K. Skubiszewski, "Implied Powers ofInternational Organisations" 857 in Y. Dinstein (ed.),
International Law at a Time 0/Perplexity (1989)
71 Ibid. at 858.
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Bowett also related implied powers to functions, purposes, and explicit powers.
He stated that:
"great care is taken to restrict implied powers to
those which may reasonably be deduced from the
purposes and functions of the organisation in
question. Therefore, the test is a functional one;
reference [should be made] to the functions and
powers of the organisation exercised on the
international plane ... "72
Such wide implication of powers could leave the international organisation with a
considerable scope for extension of its powers in practice. The International Court
of Justice, however, often related implied powers more broadly to the carrying out
ofthe functions, and to the fulfilment of objects and purposes of the organisation.
It has stressed that the implication of powers should be limited to deductions from
the purposes and functions of the organisations.
Almost at very commencement of its activity the Permanent Court of
International Justice was called upon to decide the question whether the
International Labour Organisation possessed the competence for an inter- state
regulation of conditions of labour of persons employed in agriculture." The
Court, in giving an affirmative answer to the question put to it by the Council of
the League ofNations, rejected the view that the term "industry" constantly
mentioned in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles" referred to industry in the
limited meaning of the word to the exclusion of agriculture and navigation. This
72 D. W. Bowett, The Law ofInternational Institutions (1982) at 337
73 The Competence ofthe International Labour Organisation with Respect to Agricultural Labour,
1922 PCU, Series B., No.2
74 On June 28, 1919, Germany and the Allied Nations (including Britain, France, Italy and Russia)
signed the Treaty of Versailles, formally ending the war. The Treaty of Versailles included the
Covenant of the League of Nations and Constitution ofILO (Part XIII) among other agreements to
establish peace in the world.
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answer was determined by the consideration that the failure to regulate conditions
ofwork in agriculture by way of international agreement might frustrate the
purpose of the Treaty by acting as a check upon the adoption ofmore humane
conditions of labour and by constituting a "handicap against the nations which
had adopted them, and in favour of those which had not, in the competition of the
markets of the world."75
However, the Court was criticised for basing its answer on "grammatico-
logic" grounds rather than on the genesis of the Treaty of Versailles," Another
criticism was that the Court should have based its argument on the Treaty
provisions, as they were contractual." In other words, Member States signed the
Treaty because they agreed upon its provisions, so that the provisions cannot be
interpreted without any regard to the intentions of the parties."
Nevertheless, the Court adopted a broad understanding of the word
"industry". By that, it determined the scope and extent of the work ofIL079, and it
extended the organisation's competence for necessary execution of its purposes.
The PCIJ was subsequently involved in determining the ILO's competence
to draw up and propose labour legislation which, in order to protect certain
classes of workers, regulated the same work when performed by employer
himself. The problem began with a proposal to prohibit night work in bakeries.
Objections were raised in connection with whether the ILO had competence to
75 The Competence ofthe International Labour Organisation with Respect to Agricultural Labour,
1922 PCU, Ser. B., No.2 at 25
76 J. H. W. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence ofthe World Court (Vol. 1)(1965) at 33
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 H. Lauterpacht, The Development ofInternational Law by the International Court (1958) at 267
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regulate the work of those who were not employees. The question before the
Court was whether, in the absence of express provisions to regulate the work of
employers, the ILO possessed in these circumstances an implied power to do so.
The PCU gave an affirmative answer. It stated that:
"the High Contracting Parties clearly intended to
give ILO a very broad power ofco-operating with
them in respect of measures to be taken in order to
ensure humane conditions of labour and the
protection of workers. It is not conceivable that they
intended to prevent the Organisation from drawing
up and proposing measures essential to the
accomplishment of that end. The Organisation,
however, would be so prevented if it were
incompetent to propose for the protection of wage-
earners a regulative measure to the efficacious
working of which it was found to be essential to
include to some extent work done by employers."80
The PCU emphasised that the ILO needed to expand its powers by implication in
order to fulfil the purposes of the organisation effectively. Here, the PCU
examined the intention of the parties to the Treaty of Versailles to show what the
purposes of the organisation were, and found that the ILO acted within its
competence that stemmed from the essential purpose for the establishment of the
ILO, that is the protection of the workers. The Court went further to state that:
"it should be left to the Labour Conference itself to
decide if and in what degree it is necessary and
opportune to 'embody in a proposed Convention
provisions destined to secure its full execution. "81
The International Court of Justice has, similarly, adopted the doctrine of
the implied powers to broaden the scope of the competence of UN organs. By
that, it aimed at facilitating the work of the United Nations. In the Reparation
80 Competence ofthe fLO to Regulate, incidentally, the Personal Work ofthe Employer, 1926
PCIJ, Series B. No,13 at 18
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Advisory Opinion, the General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice
to give an advisory opinion on the question whether the United Nations could
raise a claim against dejure or de facto governments in the event of the damage
caused to a UN agent." The Court explained that such a question meant that the
United Nations was a subject of international law and capable of possessing
international rights and duties, and that it had the capacity to maintain its rights by
bringing international claims." The Court concluded that the UN possessed, as
well as rights and obligations, a large measure of international personality and the
capacity to operate upon an international plane, but it was not a super-State. The
International Court found that the notion of "international personality" to the
international organisation was necessary and "indispensable" to achieve the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter."
After asserting the international personality of the United Nations, the
International Court had to consider whether the provisions of the Charter relating
to the functions of the UN implied that the latter was empowered to assure its
agents limited protection. The Court confirmed that these powers, which were
essential to the performance of the functions of the organisation, should be
regarded as a necessary implication arising from the Charter. The Court went
further to note that, in discharging its functions, the UN could find it necessary to
entrust its agents with important missions to be performed in disturbed parts of
the world. These agents should be ensured of effective protection. It was only in
81 Ibid at 23
82 Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations Advisory Opinion 1949
ICJ Rep. 174
83 Ibid. at 179.
84 Ibid
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this way that the agent would be able to carry out his duties satisfactorily. The
Court reached the conclusion that the organisation has the capacity to exercise
functional protection in respect of its agents." However, Judge Hackworth, in his
dissenting opinion, criticised the Court's approach. He stated that:
"[t]here can be no gainsaying the fact that the
Organisation is one of delegated and enumerated
powers. It is to be presumed that such powers as the
Member States desired to confer upon it are stated
either in the Charter or in complementary
agreements concluded by them. Powers not
expressed cannot freely be implied. Implied powers
flow from a grant of expressed powers, and are
limited to those that are "necessary" to the exercise
of powers expressly granted. No necessity for the
exercise of power here in question has been shown
to exist. There is no impelling reason, if any at all,
why the Organisation should become the sponsor of
claims on behalf of its employees.':"
The difference between the approach adopted by the International Court and that
of Judge Hackworth shows "the doctrinal confusion of what exactly is meant by
implied powers.':"
The opinion ofjudge Hackworth showed the fear that the international
organisation might abuse the doctrine of implied powers and exceed its
constituent powers, and violate Member States' rights. The International Court of
Justice, on the other hand, stressed that flexibility is required for the fulfilment of
the purposes and objectives of the United Nations, and the limitation could be
derived from the condition of necessary implication." That might provide a
functional test for the extent of the implied powers. In other words, this shows a
85 Ibid. at 182-183.
86 Ibid. at 198.
87 N. D. White, The Law ofInternational Organisations (1996) at 129.
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conflict between narrow and broad interpretations of UN powers. However, the
broad approach looks at the "necessary implication" as the test or the limitation on
the scope of implied powers."
In the Effect ofAwards Advisory Opinion, the International Court had to
deal with a case where the competence of a UN organ was an issue. It was asked
to give its opinion on whether:
"the General Assembly has the right on any grounds
to refuse to give effect to an award of
compensation made by that Tribunal in favour of a
staff member of the United Nations whose contract
of service has been terminated without his
assentr?"
The Court did not involve a consideration of implied powers in its line of
reasoning at first. The Court found that the General Assembly had intended to
create a tribunal possessed of truly judicial characters and that these included the
characteristic of giving awards which were binding on the parties, and which were
final without appeal. But in dealing with a number of arguments put forward in
support of the view that the General Assembly might be justified in refusing to
give effect to awards of the Tribunal, the International Court had to examine
whether the General Assembly had the power to establish the Tribunal in the first
place.
The Court, after identifying the necessity to recruit a Secretariat and to
establish a judicial or arbitral remedy to settle disputes between the UN and the
Secretariat, concluded that:
88 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations, Advisory Opinion: 1949
IC] Rep. 174 at182.
89 See below the assessment of the functional test at 47-53
90 Effect ofAwards ofCompensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
Advisory Opinion 1954 IC] Rep. 47 at 51
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"in these circumstances...the powers to establish a
tribunal, to do justice as between the Organization
and the staff members, was essential to ensure the
efficient working of the Secretariat...Capacity to do
this arises by necessary intendment out of the
Charter.'?'
The Court had to deal further with the question of whether the General
Assembly could establish a tribunal with the authority to make decisions binding
on the General Assembly itself. The International Court of Justice argued that the
General Assembly was bound by the decisions of an Administrative Tribunal
created by it, since it had intended to create a judicial organ with the power to
take binding decisions. One of the reasons for this exception was that the General
Assembly had not delegated powers which it could have exercised itself but had
created the Administrative Tribunal under its general power to regulate staff
relations."
It argued that there is a difference between establishing an organ in order
to delegate to it the performance ofthe principal organ's functions, and
establishing an organ the existence and activity of which is necessary for the
performance of the functions of the principal organ. In the latter case, delegation
does not have to take place. In other words, if for the General Assembly and
other organs to function effectively the creation of a new body is necessary, then
this body's existence will be "necessary for the proper performance of functions"
of those organs, although it will exercise functions not vested in the main organ."
91 Ibid. at 57
92 Ibid. at 55
93 Ibid. at 57
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However, in the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion", the Court
implicated power from the function and purposes of the organisation, and from
the intentions of the framers. In that case, the International Court of Justice argued
that the development of a power to create and mandate peacekeeping forces by
the General Assembly was necessary for the fulfilment of the express provisions
of the Charter." It insisted on the fact that the necessity for the fulfilment of UN
purposes justified the act of the General Assembly.96
Although the central issue in that opinion was the meaning of a Charter
provision, the Court opted to use the doctrine of implied powers, though in a
minimal way, to clarify the issue of "Organisation expenditure"." Thus, the Court
argued that the text of Article 17, paragraph 2, referred to "the expenses of the
Organisation" without any further explicit definition. The interpretation of the
word "expenses" had been linked with the word "budget" in paragraph 1 ofthat
Article and it had been contended that in both cases the qualifying adjective
"regular" or "administrative" should be understood by implication. According to
the Court this would be possible only if such qualification must necessarily be
implied from the provisions of the Charter.
The Court, also, implied from what the drafters intended to mean by the
word "budget". Concerning the word "budget" in paragraph 1 of Article 17, the
Court found that the distinction between "administrative budgets" and
"operational budgets" had not been absent from the minds of the drafters of the
Charter since it was provided in paragraph 3 of the same Article that the General
94 1962ICJ Rep. 151
9S Ibid. at 167-168
96 Ibid. at 163
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Assembly "shall examine the administrative budgets" of the specialised agencies.
Thus, if the drafters had intended that paragraph 1 should be limited to the
administrative budget of the United Nations itself, the word "administrative"
would have been inserted in paragraph 1 as it had been in paragraph 3.98
It is apparent that the wider the wording ofthe UN Charter is, or that of
any institution's constituent treaty, the greater the international organisation will
rely on implied powers." Clearly, the Court accepted this fact and used the
doctrine of implied powers to interpret the vague express powers in order for the
UN to efficiently fulfil its goals.
In the Namibia Advisory Opinion 100, the International Court of Justice, for
instance, did not solely trace the competence of the international organisation to
its purposes and functions, but also to its express powers. 101
The International Court, in the course of its examination of the case,
studied the arguments raised against the competence of the UN organs (the
General Assembly and the Security Council), and against the validity of their
resolutions.!" The Court observed that, according to a general principle of
international law (incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties),
the right to terminate a treaty on account of breach must be presumed to exist in
respect of all treaties, even if unexpressed. 103 In addition, it pointed out that the
97 Ibid. at 159-162
98/bid. at 160
99 N. D. White, The Law ofInternational Organisations (1996) at 130
100 Namibia Advisory Opinion 1971 IC) Rep. 9
101 K. Skubiszewski, "Implied Powers of International Organisations" 857 at 859 in Y. Dinstein
(ed.), International Law at a Time ofPerplexity (1989)
102Namibia advisory opinion 1971 IC) Rep. 16 at 22-23
103 Ibid. at 47
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United Nations, as a successor to the League, acting through its competent organ,
must be seen above all as the supervisory institution competent to pronounce on
the conduct of the Mandatory; and that the General Assembly was not making a
finding on facts, but formulating a legal situation; it would not be correct to
assume that, because it is in principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is
debarred from adopting, in special cases within the framework of its competence,
resolutions which make determinations or have operative design. 104 Although the
competence to revoke a mandate had not been expressly provided for in any of
the applicable instruments, the Court insisted that the necessity for the fulfilment
of UN purposes and principles justified the power of the General Assembly to
terminate the mandate to be implied. 105
From that perspective, the Court implied the supervisory power of the
United Nations with regard to Namibia. The Court granted the supervision by
necessary implication. Nevertheless, it was not the sole ground on which the
Court based its argument. It found confirmation of its views in Article 80 (1) of
the Charter, which maintained the obligations of the mandatory. 106
The International Court of Justice has also had to imply powers to solve
problems between the General Assembly and the United Nations Staff, and
between the United Nations staff and Member States.
In 1973, the ICJ fully confirmed the propriety of the establishment and
functioning of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal system. The Court
followed a similar line as it did in 1954. It pointed out that Article 22 of the
Charter "specifically leaves it to the General Assembly to appreciate the need for
1M Ibid. at 47-48
105 Ibid. at 49-50
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any particular organ," the sole restriction being the necessity for performance of
its functions."? The Court admitted that here there had been no instance of
delegation of functions, relying once again (as it had done with regard to UNAT)
on Article 101(1) of the Charter to conclude that:
"it necessarily follows that the General Assembly's
power to regulate staff relations also comprises the
power to create an organ designed to provide
machinery for initiating the review ofjudgments of
such a tribunal." 108
In this case, the International Court applied the doctrine of implied powers
to expand its own powers. The Court had to examine a number of criticisms
addressed to Article 11109 of the UNAT Statute procedure, and in particular of the
fact that the Committee on Application for Review "being composed of member
States, the Committee is a political organ", yet discharged "functions which, in
the Court's view, are normally discharged by a legal body." 110 Ultimately, the
106 Ibid at 37
107 Application for Review ofJudgement No. 158 ofthe United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
1973 ICJ Rep. 166 (July 12) (Falsa Case) at 172-173
108 Ibid. at 173
109 Article 11 provides: "1. If a Member State, the Secretary-General or the person in respect of
whom a judgement has been rendered by the Tribunal (including anyone who has succeeded to
that person's rights on his death) objects to the judgement on the ground that the Tribunal has
exceeded its jurisdiction or competence or that the Tribunal has failed to exercise jurisdiction
vested in it, or has erred on a question oflaw relating to the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, or has committed a fundamental error in procedure which has occasioned a failure of
justice, such Member State, the Secretary-General or the person concerned may, within thirty days
from the date of the judgement, make a written application to the Committee established by
paragraph 4 of this article asking the Committee to request an advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the matter.
2. Within thirty days from the receipt of an application under paragraph 1 of this article, the
Committee shall decide whether or not there is a substantial basis for the application. If the
Committee decides that such a basis exists, it shall request an advisory opinion of the Court, and
the Secretary-General shall arrange to transmit to the Court the views of the person referred to in
paragraph 1."
110 Applicationfor Review ofJudgement No. 158 ofthe United Nations Administrative Tribunal,
1973 ICJ Rep. 166 (July 12) (Falsa Case) at 176
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Court, however, considered that it should give an advisory opinion at the request
of the Committee established under Article 11. It noted that:
"A refusal by the Court to play its role in the system
ofjudicial review set up by the General Assembly
would only have the consequence that this system
would not operate precisely in those cases in which
the Committee has found that there is a substantial
basis for the objections which have been raised
against a judgement."!"
The Court affirmed this conclusion in subsequent applications for review.
In the Yakimetz Case'", the Court pointed out that its competence to deliver an
advisory opinion at the request of the Committee on Applications for Review of
Administrative Tribunal Judgements was derived from several provisions: Article
11, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Statute of the Tribunal, Article 96 of the Charter
and Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. Citing the Falsa case and
the Mortished case 113, it concluded that it possessed competence, and its view was
that the questions, in this case, addressed to it were clearly legal questions arising
within the context of the Committee's activities.!"
The International Court of Justice has also implied powers to deal with a
dispute between a United Nations member of staff and a Member State. In the
Mazilu case'", the question that was before the Court was whether, in principle,
Article VI, section 22 of the so-called General Convention-sa provision
III Ibid at 177
112 Applicationfor Review ofJudgement No. 333 ofthe United Nations Administrative Tribunal
1987 ICJ Rep. 18 (Yakimetz case)
113 Applicationfor Review ofJudgment No. 273 ofthe United Nations Administrative Tribunal
1982 ICJ Rep. 325 iMortished case)
114 Applicationfor Review ofJudgement No. 333 ofthe United Nations Administrative Tribunal
1987 ICJ Rep. 18 (Yakimetz case) at 29-33
115Applicability ofArticle VI, Section 22, ofthe Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations 1989 ICJ Rep. 177 (Mazilu case)
48
concerning the privileges and immunities of "Experts on mission" for the United
Nations-was applicable to a person (Mr. Mazilu) who had the status of a special
rapporteur of the Sub-Commission (of the Commission on Human Rights) on
Prevention ofDiscrimination and Protection of Minorities. The Court
unanimously answered in the affirmative. Applying the same principle as the
Reparations advisory opinion, the Court found that the term "experts" could be
included in the category of special rapporteurs. It stated:
"The purpose of Section 22 is nevertheless evident,
namely, to enable the United Nations to entrust
missions to persons who do not have the status of
an official of the Organization, and to guarantee
them 'such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions'." 116
The Court was subsequently asked to give its advisory opinion on
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process ofa Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights?" The question was whether the Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers enjoyed immunity from legal process. In his capacity as Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Data Param Cumaraswamy commented on certain litigation that
had been carried out in Malaysian Courts in an interview with a commercial
magazine. Many companies in Malaysia filed legal suits against him. Arguing for
the immunity from legal process ofthe Special Rapporteur, the United Nations
Economic and Social Council asked for the Court advisory opinion on the
applicability of Article VI (22) of the Convention on the Privileges and
116 Ibid. at 194 (para.47)
117 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process ofa Special Rapporteur ojthe
Commission on Human Rights 1999 ICJ Rep. 62
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Immunities of the United Nations. Citing the Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in
the Service ofthe United Nations:", the Court affirmed that immunity could be
implied as it was necessary for the independent and satisfactory performance of
the Special Rapporteur's duties.!"
However, the International Court, in the Legality ofthe Use by a State of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (WHO request)?", rejected the WHO request
for an advisory opinion on the basis that the request did not fall within its scope of
activities. The International Court of Justice asserted that" [i]nternational
organisations are governed by the 'principle of speciality', that is to say, they are
invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a
function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust them."'"
According to the Court, the WHO was a specialised agency whose functions are
restricted to the sphere of public health and the Court could not see any relation
between WHO's function and the legality of the use of the nuclear weapons. 122
The International Court stated that:
"to ascribe to the WHO the competence to address
the legality of the use of nuclear weapons- even in
view of their health and environmental effects-
would be tantamount to disregarding the principle
of speciality; for such competence could not be
deemed a necessary implication of the Constitution
118 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations 1949 ICJ Rep. 174
119 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process ofa Special Rapporteur ofthe
Commission on Human Rights 1999 ICJ Rep. 62 at 84-86 <http://www.icj-cij.org>
120 Legality OfThe Use By A State OfNuclear Weapons In Armed Conflict Advisory Opinion 1996
ICJ Rep. 66 (World Health Organisation Request)
121 Ibid. at 78-89
122 Ibid. at 80
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of the Organisation in the light of the purposes
assigned to it by its member States."123
The International Court rejected the WHO's request, as it could not find the
request necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
It is noteworthy that the International Court of Justice has invoked the
principles of "necessity" and "essentiality" as safeguards or limitations of the
doctrine of implied powers. In other words, if a power is to be implied it has to be
essential and necessary for the fulfilment of the functions and purposes of the
organisation. Many have argued that these two principles are wide and broad
enough to be subjectively determined. What is the meaning of necessary and
essential? Do these factors form safeguards to define the limit of implied powers?
And who will determine measures are "necessary" and "essential"?
4 What is Essential or Necessary?
What the Court has usually looked for, according to Lauterpacht, is
evidence that the power to be implied would enable the UN to function to its full
capacity as expressed in its objects and purposes. 124 The principle of functional
necessity could be understood in its most general pronouncement, "an entity shall
be entitled to (no more than) what is strictly necessaryfor the exercise ofits
functions in the fulfilment ofits purposes. "125
The principle of functional necessity differs from the theory of
functionalism, which presents an external and ideological point of view of
123 Legality a/The Use By A State a/Nuclear Weapons In Armed Conflict Advisory Opinion 1996
ICJRep.66 (World Health Organisation Request) at 79
124 E. Lauterpacht, "The Development of the Law of International Organisations by the Decisions
ofIntemational Tribunals" 152 RDC 387 (1976, IV) at 432
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international co-operation and organisation. 126 Advocates of the theory of
functionalism propose that an increasing range of functions should be carried out
at the interstate level to promote the goals of world peace and enhanced social
welfare. 127 Archer explained that:
"[t]he Lilliputian ties of international functional co-
operation would pin down the giant of conflict,
weakening the urge to destruction and warfare by
the promise ofconstruction and co-existence." 128
However, the theory of functionalism studies the external facade of an
international organisation while the principle of functional necessity tackles the
internal mechanism of an international organisation. Indeed, Bekker rightly
explains the difference between the two principles. He states:
"[w]hile the theory of functionalism is at the macro
level and addresses the concept of the international
organisation, i.e., what instrumental value
international organisations in general should have in
society, functional necessity is a mirco concept
related to the identifiable purposes and functions of
any given organisation, ... "129
For that reason, it is not the place here to discuss the theory of functionalism in
depth.
A study of the international organisations' competence coincides with the
study of function. "Competence designates the object itself of function, namely
125 P.H.F. Bekker, The Legal Position ofIntergovernmental Organisations: A Functional
Necessity Analysis oftheir Legal Status and Immunities (1994) at 39 (emphasis in original)
126 Ibid at 43
127 For account summary on the belief and assumptions behind the theory see C. Archer,
International Organisations (2nd ed.) (1992) at 88-94
128 C. Archer, International Organisations (2nd ed.) (1992) at 91
129 P.H.F. Bekker, The Legal Position ofIntergovernmental Organisations: A Functional
Necessity Analysis oftheir Legal Status and Immunities (1994) at 44. For more discussion on the
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the range of activities which the international organisation is entitled to undertake,
and the conditions attached thereto, in the pursuit of its purposes." 130 In that sense,
international organisations may perform any act that is necessary in the exercise
oftheir functions to achieve the goals for which they were created. It could also
have negative implication that international organisations must not perform any
act that goes beyond the fulfilment of their purposes. 131
The principle of functional necessity can be best illustrated in the context
of the privileges and immunities of international organisations. International
organisations have been accorded privileges and immunities to enable them to
function properly, and to fulfil their purposes. However, these privileges and
immunities are limited to those are necessary for the organisation to fulfil its
functions-in that respect they are functional. I32 Functional in the sense that
international organisations exercise powers within the framework of their
functions, which depends on the purposes assigned to them by Member States. 133
The International Court of Justice has left the terms "necessary" and
"essential" undefined. The Court invoked the "principle of functional necessity"
that may require construing the UN Charter in order to enhance the effectiveness
of the UN as a whole, and to reach to the right conclusion. It left the concept to
be subjectively determined, "varying estimates may be given of what is necessary
or essential for the accomplishment of a task or function, or for the exercise of an
theory of functionalism see I. L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares- the problems and Progress
ofInternational Organisation (3'd ed.) (1964) at 344-351
130 P.H.F. Bekker, The Legal Position ofIntergovernmental Organisations: A Functional
Necessity Analysis oftheir Legal Status and Immunities (1994) at 75
131 Ibid at 76
132 I. Scobbie, "International Organisations and International Relations" 831 in Rene'<Jean Dupuy
(ed.), A Handbook on International Organisations (1998) at 840,842.
133 UN Doc. A/CN. 4/Ser. AI 19851 Add. 1 (Part 1) para. 62
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explicit power."!" It has been suggested that the boundaries ofwhat is essential or
necessary depend closely on the law ofthe specific organisation.!" In his
dissenting opinion in the Reparation advisory opinion, Judge Hackworth who
called for implication only from expressly granted powers, stated:
"[pJowers not expressed cannot freely be implied.
Implied powers flow from a grant of expressed
powers, and are limited to those that are 'necessary'
to the exercise ofpowers expressly granted."!"
In Certain Expenses advisory opinion, Judge Koretsky warned that:
"the necessity of the strict observation and proper
interpretation of the provisions of the Charter, its
rules, without limiting itself by reference to the
purposes of the Organization; otherwise one would
have to come to the long ago condemned formula:
'The end justifies the means' ."137
Nearly three decades ago, Lauterpacht tried to find a concrete definition
for the word 'essential'. In his discussion of the Reparations and the Effect of
Awards advisory opinions, he suggested that the meaning of the word 'essential'
is "something more than 'important', but less than 'indispensably requisite' ."138
He also observed that the Court, in determining what was essential to the
performance of the functions of the United Nations as a basis for implying a
134 K. Skubiszewski, "Implied Powers of International Organisations" 857 at 861 in Y. Dinstein
(ed.), International Law at a Time ofPerplexity (1989)
135Ibid.
136Reparationsfor Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations, Advisory Opinion: 1949
ICJ Rep. 174 at 198 (Judge Hackworth dissenting opinion)
137Certain Expanses ofthe United Nations, 1962 ICJ Rep. 151 at 268 (Judge Koretsky dissenting
opinion)
138 E. Lauterpacht, "The Development of the Law of International Organisations by the Decisions
ofInternational Tribunals" 152 RDC 387 (1976, IV) at 431
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power, had not considered the criterion of essentiality as meaning 'absolutely
essential' or 'indispensable' .139
Therefore, the term "necessary" for independent function cannot be pre-
determined precisely in advance, as it depends on the circumstances of each
case.!" Lauterpacht noted that the International Court avoided the problem of the
exact definition ofwhat is 'essential' by holding "the precise nature and scope of
the measures was a matter for determination" by the organ concerned. 141
Evidently, the determination that it is essential to imply a power rests with
the organ which adopts a resolution reflecting the assumption that the claimed
power exists. So, 'necessity' or 'essentiality' is still subjectively determined, and
the problem of abuse of powers looms in the horizon. As Judge Gros, in his
dissenting opinion in the Namibia advisory opinion, stated:
"to say that a power is necessary, that it logically
results from a certain situation, is to admit the non-
existence of any legal justification. Necessity knows
no law, it is said; and indeed to invoke necessity is
to step outside the law."!"
Skubiszewski has insisted on the fact that: "the organ assumes a new, i.e. implied,
power always enjoys a measure of freedom: it belongs to the intrinsic nature of
the doctrine. But the organ's activity remains to be governed by the law of the
organisation and the lawfulness of the implication can be checked. The organ
cannot abuse its competences, and if implication of powers amounts to a
139 Ibid. at432
140 Schermers & Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity (1995) at 236.
141 E. Lauterpacht, "The Development of the Law ofIntemational Organisations by the Decisions
ofIntemational Tribunals" 152 RDC 387 (1976, IV) at 432
142 Namibia advisory opinion 1971lCJ Rep. 9 at 339 (Judge Gros dissenting opinion)
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detournement de pouvoir the organ's activity is unlawful."!" Therefore, the abuse
of the term 'necessity' could be leading to an unlawful implication, and it could
be considered ultra vires.
The Court has limited its scrutiny to the character of the measure rather
than to its scope and its extent. The Court left the scope of the meaning of
'necessity' and 'essentiality' to be subjectively determined by the organs
concerned. In the Effect ofAwards advisory opinion, the International Court
stated:
"There can be no doubt that the General Assembly
in the exercise of its power could have set up a
tribunal without giving finality to its judgements. In
fact, however, it decided, after along deliberation, to
invest the Tribunal with power to render
judgements which would be 'final and without
appeal' and which would be binding on the United
Nations. The precise nature and scope ofthe
measures by which the power ofcreating a tribunal
was to be exercised, was a matterfor determination
by the General Assembly atone?":
Lauterpacht has observed that: "the restraint demonstrated by the Court appears to
accord with the idea that the Organisation is the best judge of what circumstances
require and to this extent, therefore, the Court's restraint is directed towards the
more effective fulfilment of the objectives of the Organisation."!" In other words,
the limit to the scope and the extent of the 'necessity' and 'essentiality' is part of
the fulfilment of the purposes and the functions of the organisation in an effective
143 K. Skubiszewski, "Implied Powers ofIntemational Organisations" 857 at 862 in Y. Dinstein
(ed.), International Law at a Time ofPerplexity (1989)
144 Effect ofAwards ofCompensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribuna11954
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way. Indeed, in the course of the ILC's study of the limitations on international
organisations' competence, it has been pointed out that:
"Legal doctrine and jurisprudence show a marked
tendency to recognise that, although international
organisations enjoy international legal competence,
that enjoyment is neither general nor complete. It
has certain limitations, since, unlike States,
international organisation are not sovereign entities.
These limitations are defined by the purposes for
which the organisation was established. The legal
regime of the limitations is determined by the
special function of the organisation. The
organisation is a medium for carrying out the
purposes of general interest of its creators... "146
Back to the initial aim of this chapter, which was to understand ultra vires,
as a ground of nullity, an element ofjudicial review, it was essential to determine
the scope of the competence of the UN or of any other international organisation.
The International Court's formulation has both positive and negative implications.
Positive in the sense that it states the powers of the UN and other international
organisations, and transcends its constituent instrument; and negative in as much
as these powers are limited by considerations of functional necessity. 147 From that
point, one can conclude that any consideration of ultra vires can be established
when the UN or any other international organisation exceeds the functional
necessity limitations. The limitations could be seen in the context of the
organisation's purposes and in the strict understanding ofthe words "necessary"
and "essential". As Bekker points out: "acts may be challenged which have been
performed in order to attain aims covered in the constituent instrument on the
basis that such acts were not strictly necessary or essential to achieve these
aims... [these conditions] should be applied literally, i.e., in accordance with the
146 UN Doc. A/CN. 4/391 and Add. 1 (1985)
147 UN Doc. NCN. 4/ Ser. N 1987 para. 33
57
normal meaning of the term "necessary" or "essential" used by the COurt"148. That
would provide the trigger to challenge the constitutionality of a certain act or
decision on the ground of ultra vires.
5 The Doctrine of Inherent Powers
Some have argued that the consequence of the International Court's
approach, in implying from expressly granted powers and from the general
purposes of the organisation, is to suggest that international organisations have
inherent powers to perform any acts which are directed at attaining the aims of the
organisation.!" This view was pioneered by Seyersted. He argued that:
"Indeed, it appears that while intergovernmental
organisations, unlike States, are restricted by
specific provisions in their constitutions as to the
aims for which they shall work, such Organisations
are, like States, in principle free to perform any
sovereign act, or any act under international law,
which they are in a factual position to perform to
attain these aims, provided that their constitutions
do not preclude such acts. While a minority of the
members will always have the right to challenge the
legality, from an internal point of view, of acts
performed to attain aims other than those defined in
the constitution, the minority cannot challenge acts
performed in order to attain aims covered in the
constitution merely on the basis that such acts were
not 'essential' or 'necessary' to attain these aims.
Thus, it is not necessary to look for specific
provisions in the constitution, or to resort to strained
interpretations of texts and intentions, or to look for
precedents or constructions to justify legally the
performance by an intergovernmental organisation
of a sovereign or international act not specifically
authorised in its constitution: As an
148 P.H.F. Bekker, The Legal Position ofIntergovernmental Organisations: A Functional
Necessity Analysis oftheir Legal Status and Immunities (1994) at 83
149 F. Seyersted, "United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems" 37 BYIL 351 (1963) at 453-460;
F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law a/Peace and War (1966) at 155
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intergovernmental organisation it has an inherent
power to perform such acts."!"
According to this school of thought, the criteria to control the international
organisations' powers are, firstly, to act within their aims and purposes; secondly,
to not perform acts which are expressly prohibited; thirdly, to act through the
proper organs; and fourthly, the principle that these organisations do not have
general inherent jurisdiction over the Member States. 151
The supporters of inherent powers have argued that the International Court
of Justice has utilised the same line of reasoning. According to the International
Court, the purposes of the organisation and the effectiveness of its operations in
carrying out its functions are the main restrictions, as explained in Certain
Expenses advisory opinion. Action which can be shown to contribute to the
fulfilment of the purposes and the functions of the organisation is within the
competence of the organisation as long as it is not expressly precluded from
performing this action. 152
However, this school of thought has been subject to criticism. In his article
"International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International
Organisations"!", Rama- Montaldo's criticism was made mainly on the basis that
this school of thought fails to distinguish between the powers that are necessary
consequences of international legal personality which are possessed by all
international organisations, and the powers that must be implied because they are
150 F. Seyersted, United Nations Forces in the Law ofPeace and War (1966) at 155
lSI Ibid. at 156-160
152 D. Akande, "The Competence of International Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice" 9:3 EJIL437 (1998) at 446; N. D. White, The Law. of
International Organisations (1996) at 132
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necessary to implement functions provided for in a particular organisation's
constitution. In his reply to Seyersted's argument that the International Court
adopted the doctrine of inherent powers rather than of implied powers, Rama-
Montaldo pointed out:
"the Court did not have recourse to the concept of
personality of the organisation as the foundation of
the legality of the operation of the United Nations
Forces and of the right ofthe organisation to create
them ...On the contrary, the Court expressly took
note of the purposes and functions of the
organisation to uphold the legality of the action as
well as the right to establish the forces and gave the
concept of function a decisive importance, ... "154
In other words, the International Court based the foundation of legality in the
fulfilment of the functions of the organisation. The establishment of armed forces
is not an inherent power arising from international personality, but instead it is a
function which "must be expressly or impliedly recognised in the constitutive
document"!". Bowett shares the same opinion. He notes that" ...the test is a
functional one, reference to the functions and powers of the organization
exercised on the international plane, not to the abstract and variable notion of
personality, will alone give guidance on what powers may properly be implied."!"
However, this observation establishes the fact that the doctrine of implied
powers and the doctrine of inherent powers are close but not similar. Both
approaches restrict the organisation's rights to fulfilment of its purposes and
functions. The difference might, nevertheless, draw on the scope of personality of
153 M. Rama Montaldo, "International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International
Organisations" 44 BY/L 111(1970) at 118-124.
154 Ibid. at 122
155 Ibid.
156 D. W. Bowett, The Law ofInternational Institutions (1982) at 337
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the organisation. As White has argued: "Rama- Montaldo starts from the
proposition that the personality of organisations is much less than that of States
but their rights can be added to by a wide approach to implied powers, whilst
Seyersted starts from the position that the personality of organisations is the same
as that of States, but that its inherent rights are limited by the provisions of the
constitutions."!"
The doctrine of inherent powers obviously begs the question. It considers
that international organisations are sovereign entities. However, by contrast to
States, international organisations lack sovereignty and depend, as concerns their
legal status, on the purposes for which they were created. They do not have
inherent powers to perform any act whatsoever.158 That stems from the nature of
the international organisations' personality. An international organisation's
personality is not primary but rather it is of a secondary nature, in the sense that,
its personality has been conferred on it for the fulfilment of the purposes of the
organisation as a whole.!" In the light of this, international organisations cannot
have inherent powers to act the way they want, without having their actions
subject to any check or limitations.
6 Legal Remedies and Legal Effects of the Decisions of the Court on
Ultra Vires Acts
The central issue, here, is what are the procedures available for Member
States to challenge an international organisation's decisions? In the absence of
157 N. D. White, The Law ofInternational Organisations (1996) at 133
158 P.H.F. Bekker, The Legal Position a/Intergovernmental Organisations: A Functional
Necessity Analysis oftheir Legal Status and Immunities (1994) at 83
159 J. Sztucki, "International Organizations as Parties to Contentious Proceedings before the
International Court of Justice" 141 at 144 in A. S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court of
Justice (1997); see below at 64- 65
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compulsory judicial review, the mechanism to raise an objection against a
decision already taken by an organ of the United Nations is limited to either the
advisory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; a unilateral challenge of
the decision; or through the Court's contentious proceedings. However, the latter
could be only done by an indirect challenge, as international organisations have
not been granted locus standi before the Court in contentious proceedings. 160 It
follows from defining the legal remedies the nature and effect of the reviewing
body's decisions on the illegal acts.
The United Nations Charter does not contain express provisions
authorising Member States to challenge its acts and decisions on the grounds of
excess of authority or procedural irregularity. In practice, however, Member
States have frequently challenged the validity and the legality of the decisions and
acts of the UN unilaterally, and this approach has mostly, although
controversially, been accepted. Member States often unilaterally resort to
disregard decisions of international organisation, which they considered to be
ultra vires. For example, the Soviet Union in Certain Expenses showed its
rejection of General Assembly resolutions obliging Member States to pay for the
expenses of the United Nations operations in Congo and the Middle East, by
withholding the payment of its share, although it ran the risk of losing its vote in
the General Assembly."!
160 See below Chapter II for the discussion on Article 34 of the ICJ Statute at 130-132
161 See generally the discussion in J. E. Alvarez, "Legal Remedies and the United Nations aLa
Carte Problems" 12 Mich. J. Int'/' L. 229 (1991); G. Arangio-Ruiz, "The 'Federal Analogy' and
UN Charter Interpretation: A Crucial Issue" 8 EJIL 1 (1997); E. Zoller, "The "Corporate Will" of
The United Nations and the Rights of the Minority" 81 AJIL 610 (1987)
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States' right to unilaterally challenge "unlawful" decisions or acts is
derived from the premise that the constitutions of international organisations are
nothing but international treaties. Oseike has stated that:
"The right of member states ... appears to derive
from the consensual nature of the constitutions
concerned. Because they are international treaties,
each party possesses an inherent right to supervise
their implementation to ensure that the
organisations do not adopt decisions that would be
incompatible with their objects and purposes, or
that would be detrimental to the interests of the
member states in excess of what they had accepted
as the basis for membership.t''"
Upon a close look, one can find the issue at hand is the interpretation of the
Charter. In the absence of an impartial third party to interpret the Charter, it is
difficult to determine the right interpretation. Dan Ciobanu is right in pointing out
that:
"dissenting Member States may claim that their
interpretation of the Charter (and generally of the
law of the United Nations) is the correct one, and
decline to comply with decisions made by the
political organs on the basis of their own
interpretation of the Charter .... States possess,
under the law of the United Nations as it stands at
present, the so-called 'right of last resort'."163
The "right of last resort" has found some kind of encouragement in the
individual opinions of the International Court judges. Judge Winiarski, then
president of the International Court, in his dissenting opinion in the Certain
Expenses advisory opinion stated that:
"[i]n the international legal system, ... there is, in the
absence of the agreement to the contrary, no
162 E. Osieke, "Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions ofIntemational Organisations" 77 AJIL
239 (1983) at 240.
163 D. Ciobanu, Preliminary Objections Related to the Jurisdiction ofthe United Nations Political
Organs (1975) at 74
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tribunal competent to make a finding of nullity. It is
the State which regards itself injured party which
itself rejects a legal instrument vitiated, in its
opinion, by such defects as to render it a nullity.
Such decision is obviously a grave one and one to
which resort can be had only in exceptional cases,
but one which is nevertheless sometimes inevitable
and which is recognized as such by general
international law.
A refusal to pay, as in the case before the Court,
may be regarded by a Member State, loyal and
indeed devoted to the Organization, as the only
means ofprotesting against a resolution of the
majority which, in its opinion, disregards the true
meaning of the Charter and adopts in connection
with it a decision which is legally invalid; ... "164
Judge Gros, in his separate opinion, took a similar view in the WHO/
Egypt case. He stated:
"[a] decision of the WHO which is contrary to
international law does not become lawful because a
majority of States has voted in favour of it. The
WHO and, in particular, its Assembly were created
by the member States in order to carry out that
which they had decided to do together, and that
alone; member States are not bound to implement
an unlawful act if that is what they hold it to be, and
the practice of international organizations has
shown that recourse is had in such circumstances to
a refusal to carry out such act. Consequently
nothing is settled by a decision taken by a majority
of member States in matters in which a specialized
agency oversteps its competence. Numbers cannot
cure a lack of constitutional competence." 165
Unilateral challenge is linked to the absence of an already established
mechanism that would help Member States to refer challenges to an ultra vires
164 Certain Expenses advisory opinion 1962 ICJ Rep. 151 at 232
165 Interpretation ofthe Agreement ofMarch 25.1951 Between the Who and Egypt advisory
opinion 1980 ICJ Rep. 73 at 104
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decision to the International Court of Justice, in contrast to the situation in the
European Union. 166
The EC Treaty established "a complete system of legal remedies and
procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of
measures adopted by the institutions."!" The European Court of Justice can
entertain cases brought by the organisation, Member States, and even by
individuals. Article 230 (Art. 173 formerly) of the EC Treaty, as amended by the
Treaty of Amsterdam168, stipulates that:
"The Court of Justice shall review the legality of
acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament and
the Council, of acts of the Council, of the
Commission and of the European Central Bank,
other than recommendations and opinions, and of
acts of the European Parliament intended to produce
legal effects vis- a-vis third parties."
Accordingly, the European Court may thus review the legality of the acts of the
Community institutions. The phrase "other than recommendations and opinions"
implies that only acts and decisions that impose binding obligations are subject to
judicial review. 169 However, the European Court of Justice, in ERTA Case 170 ,
stated that: "[a]n action for annulment must ...be available in the case of all
166 E. Zoller, "The "Corporate Will" ofThe United Nations and the Rights of the Minority" 81
AJIL 610 (1987) at 625-626
167 Les Verts v. European Parliament, Case 294/83 (1986) ECR 1339 para. 23
168 The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999. The Treaty of
Amsterdam has a significant impact on the European Court of Justice as it conferred new powers
on the Court, and changed the scope of the Court's jurisdiction, see for example, A. Albors-
Llorens, "Changes in the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice after the Treaty of
Amsterdam" 35:6 CMLRev 1273 (1998); A. Arnull, The European Union and Its Court ofJustice
(1999)
169 L.N. Brown & T. Kennedy The European Court ofthe European Communities (4th ed.) (1994)
at 125
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measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are
intended to have legal effects"!". In that sense, the European Court asserted that
the general scheme of the Treaty is to make a direct action available against any
measure adopted by the institutions of the European Union which was intended to
have legal effect. 172
Article 230 did not grant the ECJ the power to bring an action to annul ex
proprio motu. It enumerates a Member State, the Councilor the Commission as
competent to bring an action to annul.!" They are accepted as having a sufficient
legal interest to give them locus standi for such an action. For an individual to
bring an action, Article 230(4) states that:
"Any natural or legal person may, under the same
conditions, institute proceedings against a decision
addressed to that person or against a decision
which, although in the form of a regulation or a
decision addressed to another person, is of direct
and individual concern to the former."
The Court of Justice can review all or part of an item of Community legislation,
and individuals may seek the annulment of a legal measure which is of direct and
individual concern to them. The requirement for "direct and individual concern"
is to limit the flow of the suits brought by individuals for annulment. 174
170 ERTA Case, Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (1971) ECR 263. The Commission sought the
annulment of the conclusions reached by the Council concerning the negotiating position to be
adopted by the Member States in discussion on a European road transport agreement.
171 Ibid. at 42
172·A. Arnull, The European Union and Its Court ofJustice (1999) at 35
173 Article 230 of EC Treaty
174 L.N. Brown & T. Kennedy The European Court ofthe European Communities (4th ed.) (1994)
at134
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Where an application under Article 230 is successful, the European Court
declares the contested act void.!" A declaration that an act or measure is void has
the immediate effect of restoring the status quo, in legal terms, "by destroying the
existence in law of the annulled act ab initio"'". However, the European Court
cannot order the defendant institution to take any particular steps, but the
institution is required by the Treaty to do what is necessary to comply with the
judgment. 177
Contrariwise, in the United Nations system, there is no clear provision
empowering the International Court of Justice to exercise judicial review.
However, it is apparent, from what it has been discussed above, that most of the
review cases have been brought before the International Court under its advisory
jurisdiction. Although it was generally implicit, the Court examined the legality of
the acts under question as a part of the discharge of its judicial function. 178
Besides, it is sometimes the case that a challenge could be raised indirectly
against a UN organ's action or that of any other international organisation in the
course of the contentious proceedings. 179
International organisations today participate in international relations
almost as much as States. It is inherent in the notion of an international
175 Article 231 EC
176 K. P. E. Lasok, The European Court ofJustice: Practice & Procedure (2nd ed.) (1994) at 541
177 Article 233 EC; A. Amull, The European Union and Its Court ojJustice (1999) at 33; K. P. E.
Lasok, The European Court ofJustice: Practice & Procedure (2nd ed.) (1994) at 542
178 See for example, Certain Expenses and Namibia advisory opinions The advisory jurisdiction of
the IC] will be discussed extensively below in Chapter IV
179 Arbitral Award ofthe King ofSpain 1960 ICJ Rep. 192; Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction oj
ICA0 Council 1972 ICJ Rep. 42; Arbitral Award oj31 July 1989 (Guinea Bissau v. Senegal) 1991
ICJ Rep. 53; and Aerial Incident of3 July 1988 1996 ICJ Rep. 6 (In this case, Iran filed an
application against the United States in the form of appeal under Article 86 of the Chicago
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organisation that it will be able to summon Member States to comply with the
commitments they accepted when adhering to the organisation. International
organisations, as they have international personality, can also conclude treaties in
their own name. Some organisations also have officials and representatives in
their Member States. Thus, disputes may well arise between an organisation and a
State. 180 As the UN Secretary General has stated:
"disputes relating to the law governing co-operation
will tend to become more numerous. As a
consequence of that development, such disputes
will ever more frequently involve groups of States
and international organizations as well as States
individually ... "181
So far as international organisations are concerned, by reason of Article 34
of the ICJ Statute, they have no standing as parties in contentious cases before the
International Court. Article 34 establishes the fact that only States might be
parties in cases before the Court. There have been pleas for the amendment of
Article 34 to grant locus standi to international organisations before the
International Court of Justice. 182 These calls stem from the International Court of
Justice's recognition of international organisations' international personality in
the Reparations advisory opinion. However, it has been argued that while
international organisations may have international personality and the capacity to
Convention on International Civil Aviation Organisation against the decision of the ICAO Council
of7 March 1989.The case discontinued in Feb. 1996)
180 I. Seidl-Hoenvedlern, "Access of International Organisations to the International Court of
Justice" 189 at 189 in A.S. Muller et at. (eds.), The International Court ofJustice (1997)
181 UN Doc. A/45/430 (1990) at 66.
182 For Instance, 1. Sztucki, "International Organizations as Parties to Contentious Proceedings
before the International Court of Justice"141 at 142-43 in A. S. Muller et al. (eds.), The
International Court ofJustice (1997); See below Chapter II at 118-120 for extensive presentation
and discussion on the amendment of Article 34 of the IeJ Statute
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have rights and obligations in international law, they are not states.!" Sztucki has
pointed out a difference between primary and secondary international personality.
In his opinion, primary international personality is only given to States by the
very fact of the acquisition of statehood. 184 However, international organisations
have secondary international personality, since it conferred upon them by primary
subjects of international law, i.e. Member States. 185
From that difference, one might say that since they have different
categories of international personality, international organisations and Members
States are different, and have different rights and tasks. 186 International
organisations cannot have an equal footing with Member States in the context of
access to the International Court of Justice in contentious proceedings. However,
that will not determine the issue of granting international organisations access to
contentious proceedings. In the words of Sztucki: "[G]ranting the ius standi [to
the international organisations] seems to depend upon practical considerations
rather than on doctrinal solution to the problem of the specific characteristics of
the international personality of international organizations and their impact on the
question of modes of access to the Court."!"
Practice shows that it is possible to have international organisations, albeit
indirectly, as parties to contentious cases when constitutional issues and questions
of legality of decisions arise in the proceedings between states, as in Jurisdiction
183 C. F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (1990) at 375
184 1. Sztucki, "International Organizations as Parties to Contentious Proceedings before the




187 Ibid. at 147
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oflCAD Council (India v. Pakistan)!" recently in the Lockerbie cases!", and
Application ofthe Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime of
International organisations have been asked to the bar as defendants, and
the Court could review the constitutionality or the legality of international
organisations' decisions in due process 191, as it is apparent in Application ofthe
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia).
Such an indirect challenge to international organisations' ultra vires
decisions can perform a remedial function. Although the indirect claims against
international organisation are sometimes unsuccessful, they offer Member States
a widespread exposure of their claims. In Bringing the case and provoking a
debate on the constitutional limitations of the international organisation and its
organs is a gain for the aggrieved state. However, the main setback in asking the
International Court of Justice for a remedy, through its contentious proceedings, is
the long time that the Court needs to deal with a particular dispute. 193
188 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction ofthe ICAD Council (India v. Pakistan), 1972 ICJ Rep. 4 at
61-70
189 Questions ofInterpretation and Application ofthe 1971 Montreal Convention arisingfrom the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) and (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 1992 ICJ Rep. 3
190 Application ofthe Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) 1993 ICJ Rep. 325
191 1. Sztucki, "International Organizations as Parties to Contentious Proceedings before the
International Court of Justice" 141 at 158 in A. S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court of
Justice (1997)
In J. G. Merrills, "Reflections On The Incidental Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice"
53 at 54-56 in M. Evans (ed.), Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma, (1998)
193 R. Higgins, "Remedies and the International Court of Justice: an Introduction" I at 9 in M.
Evans (ed.), Remedies In International Law: the Institutional Dilemma, (1998)
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Nevertheless, the indirect challenge of ultra vires acts of international
organisations, it has been argued, is the only way available to Member States,
until the amendment of Article 34 to grant locus standi to international
organisations is achieved. 194
The issue of the legal consequences of ultra vires decisions and acts is the
other side of the coin, and it proved to be controversial. It is generally accepted
that ultra vires decisions or actions cannot be declared null and void, as this
greatly depends first on the general structure of the United Nations system.!"
Specifically speaking, there is, in strict terms, no hierarchy among the principal
organs of the UN, each of which is supreme in its own sphere of competence. It
may be that some of these individual spheres of competence are more or less
important in terms how fundamental the functions are with respect to the
principles and purposes of the United Nations. None ofthe principal organs of the
United Nations is able to override or supersede the acts adopted by the other. It
follows that while the Court cannot declare null and void an act of the Security
Councilor the General Assembly, the latter two organs cannot, by the same
token, purport to annul a judgment or an opinion of the Court.
Secondly, the nature of the decisions adopted by the Court is of itself
indicative of why the Court lacks the power to annul the acts of the organs of the
UN. Judgments are binding only on States which agree to request the Court to
adjudicate, and these decisions cannot produce direct legal effects in terms of
194 See below chapter III at 119-120 for the debate on the amendment of Article 34. See also E.
Lauterpacht, Aspects ofthe Administration ofInternational Justice (1991) at 66; 1. Sztucki,
"International Organizations as Parties to Contentious Proceedings before the International Court
of Justice" 141 at 167 in A. S. Muller et al. (eds.) The International Court ofJustice (1997); P. C.
Szasz; "Granting International Organizations Ius Standi in the International Court of Justice" 169
at 188 in A. S. Muller et al. (eds.) The International Court ofJustice (1997);
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nullification of any act of an international organisation, including the United
Nations. Similarly, advisory opinions, which are not binding, cannot, in principle,
affect or create legal rights or obligations either for the organisation whose act has
been "declared" null and void by the Court in its opinion; or for Member States
who dispute the validity of the act.
The question of whether these acts are void ab initio or they are only
voidable depends on the existence of reviewing machinery. As mentioned above,
the machinery of review could be either compulsory, as in the case of the
European Union, or advisory, as in the case of the United Nations system. Ifit is
compulsory, the ultra vires act will be annulled. Until the decision is taken by the
reviewing organ, the parties affected by the allegedly illegal act should continue
to comply with it on the assumption that it is valid. On the other hand, if the
machinery ofjudicial review is advisory, the situation is totally different. In a
well-known article, Lauterpacht has noted that "a conflict between the principle
that an illegal act is null ab initio and the principle that the mere assertion by an
interested party that the act is unlawful should not conclusively determinative of
that question"!" is to be faced. There is as yet no adequate answer to the question
of the legal consequences of illegal acts of international organisations when there
is no machinery for compulsory judicial review. 197
195 E. Osieke, "Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions ofInternational Organisations" 77 AlIL
239 (1983) at 243
196 E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations"88 at lIS in
Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour ofLord McNair (1965)
197 E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations"88 at lIS in
Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour ofLord McNair (1965); See also
D. Akande, "The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there room for judicial
control of decision of the political organs of the United Nations?" 46 ICLQ 309 (1997) at 335; V.
Gowlland-Debbas, "The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice And the Security
Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case" 88 AlIL 643 (1994) at 672
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The International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses opinion, as
noted earlier, drew a distinction between two categories of illegal acts that may
occur within an organisation. First, there are those acts that are unlawful because
they exceed the powers and the boundaries of the organisation as a whole. These
acts are with no legal effect. The second category is the acts that, though within
the competence of the organisation, are unlawful because they are carried out by
the wrong organ. These may be irregular as a matter of internal structure, but have
legal effect.
However, Lauterpacht has given another interpretation to the Court's
conclusion. He pointed out that the Court distinguished between these two
categories of illegal acts by reference not to their consequences, but rather to the
force of presumption operating in favour of the legality of each class of act. 198
Lauterpacht took the view that the Court has "been prepared to acknowledge that
if an action (whether "external" or "internal") could be truly established as ultra
vires, it would be without legal force as a basis for further action by the
organisation, its organs or its staff."!" The Court has been reluctant to admit that
such irregularities might constitute the basis of invalidating a decision of an
international organisation, when it examined the nature of the operations of the
United Nations Emergency Forces.
Lauterpacht went further to declare that, as a matter of principle, "illegal
acts ought not to give rise to valid and permanently effective consequences in
law.'?" There may be degrees of invalidity, or a finding by the Court of invalidity
198 E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations" 88 at 111 in
Cambridge Essays in International Law: Essays in Honour ofLord McNair (1965)
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid. at 115
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could render the decision voidable at the discretion of the organ concerned?" The
International Court has never been called upon to determine this point. However,
Judge Morelli, in his separate opinion in Certain Expenses advisory opinion,
stated:
II [i]n the case of acts of international organizations,
and in particular the acts of the United Nations,
there is nothing comparable to the remedies existing
in domestic law in connection with administrative
acts. The consequence of this is that there is no
possibility of applying the concept of voidability to
the acts of the United Nations. If an act of an organ
of the United Nations had to be considered as an
invalid act, such invalidity could constitute only the
absolute nullity of the act."?"
But he stated that II [i]t is only in exceptionally serious cases that an act of
the Organization could be regarded as invalid, and hence an absolute nullity.'?"
This suggests that certain unauthorised acts might go totally unsanctioned.'?'
7 Conclusion
The question of whether the International Court of Justice is entitled to
review the United Nations organs' decisions presupposes the legal possibility that
these organs may act unlawfully.?" It is possible that the United Nations, as a
subject of international law, and bound by international law, might overstep or
disregard substantive rules of the United Nations Charter while discharging its
201 J. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council" 90 AlIL I (1996) at 6-7
202 1962 Iel Rep. 151 at 222 (emphasis original)
203 Ibid. at 223
204 H. Thirlway, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960- 1989" 67
BYIL I (I 996) at 55
20S K. Doehring, "Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and Their Legal Consequences"
9\ at 108 in J A. Frowein & R Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law,
(vol.I) (\998).
74
duties and functions.?" Seidl-Hohenveldern rightly argued that: "the field of
action of the international organisation in international law is limited by the
powers which the Member States bestow on it. An organisation may thus act ultra
vires."207
It is believed that the UN organs are free to determine the scope of their
functions?". This argument is based on the belief that the international legal
system is a system of pure co-ordination and opposed to any subordination.i"
That means that UN organs alone can determine their rights and powers.
However, this suggests a contradiction with the constitutional foundations of the
United Nations. The United Nations was established on a consensual basis.
Member States delegated powers to the United Nations in order that it should
function with the purpose of realising the international community's common
goods. The organisation's powers are enumerated in its constituent instrument. It
has, however, been argued that to ensure the effectiveness of the organisation in
dealing with the developments of the international community, a mechanism of
new powers' implication should be utilised under the condition of the necessity
and essentiality to fulfil the organisation's objectives and purposes. However, the
broad meaning of the words "necessary" or "essential" raised, as been shown
above, certain concern, specifically, to what extent the international organisations
can abuse this powers. The limitations, it was argued, could be derived from the
206 Ibid.
207 1. Seidl-Hoenvedlem, "Access of Intemational Organizations to the International Court of
Justice" 189 at 194 in A.S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court ofJustice, (1997)
208 Doc. 933 IV/2/42 (2), 13 UNCIO Docs. 703 at 709
209 K. Doehring, "Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and Their Legal Consequences"
91 at 93 in J A. Frowein & R Wolfrum (eds.), Max: Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law,
(vol.I) (1998)
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criteria of the functional necessity, as the words should be understood in their
strict and literal meaning. In the light of this, an action is ultra vires when the
newly implied powers exceed the boundaries of the functional necessity.
What follows after the determination of the grounds of nullity such as
ultra vires is how Member States can challenge illegal acts of the international
organisations. It was argued that the issue could be raised through the
International Court's advisory jurisdiction; unilateral challenge; or through
contentious proceedings. However, determining the legal consequences of illegal
acts is the other side ofjudicial review. There is no coherent theory on that but it
was argued that invalid action could lead to absolute nullity."?
As it was discussed in the introduction, there are different models of
judicial review that are available in the different municipal legal systems. As for
the international legal system, the question of the model ofjudicial review has
recently been extensively debated. Many call to have the United States Supreme
Court as a model to establish judicial review in the international legal system.":
To what extent will such model be functional and successful? The following
chapter explores the model ofjudicial review that the International Court of
Justice should adopt. The argument will focus on a comparison between the
United States Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice to establish
the fact that the international legal system, in the form of the United Nations
system, already has the mechanism, which differs from the municipal mechanism,
but it is ignored by the international community.
210 See above at 58- 70
211 See for example T. M. Franck, "The "Powers of Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardian
of UN Legality?" 86 AJIL 519 (1992)
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Chapter II:
The United States Supreme Court
& The International Court of Justice
1 Introduction
It has been claimed that the idea of the International Court of Justice was
"fathered" in the United States and "born of the success of the United States
Supreme Court".' As early as 1899, the United States proposed for the world the
idea of a World Court in the First Hague Conference. This was inspired by the
political success of the US union. The US argument was if the United States
people were able to overcome their differences, combine in a federal union, and
settle their disputes by referring them to a national Supreme Court, why could not
the sovereign nations around the world do likewise?'
The outcome of the Hague Conference was, however, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration instead. This body was criticised for being a court in name only.' The
Permanent Court of Arbitration allows each state to have four eminent persons
who should hold themselves ready to serve as arbitrators in disputes upon the
invitation of the disputing states. The disputant states have the right to select their
own arbiters from a panel of names, who could be, in a way or another, motivated
by the disputant states' interests.
I D. F. Fleming, The United States and The World Court (1945) at 23
2 Ibid. at 15
3 D. S. Patterson, "The United States and the Origins of the World Court", 91:2 Political Science
Quarterly 279 (1976) at 281
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This panel did not fulfil the American dream, which was looking for a
permanent court, in the real sense, with obligatory jurisdiction, composed of
judges who were judicial officers, who had no other occupation, and who would
solve international disputes in accordance with the rules and disciplines of
international law.
The Americans pushed hard in the Second Hague Conference of 1907 to
achieve this dream, and the Conference "recommend[ed] the establishment of a
court of arbitral justice, which would be permanent to the extent that it was to
meet once every year. .. "4 But nothing was put into action. States were still in
favour of arbitration; treaties still contained clauses agreeing on ad hoc arbitration
to settle their future disputes.
During and after the First World War, American statesmen began thinking
of a way to change the old European diplomacy of force to a new diplomacy of
co-operation and understanding.' In every sense, they wanted a larger model of
their society, where justice, neighbourly and friendly relations would prevail.'
However, the Americans in their search for world peace had two schools of
thought. Whereas one school argued for the establishment of a political body to
settle disputes arising in international society through negotiations and mediation,
the other was in favour of a judicial body or a World Court to deal with disputes.
4 D. F. Fleming, The United States and The World Court (1945) at 19
5 A. Zimmem, The American Road to World Peace (1953) at 61
6 Ibid. at 30
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It is well known that the idea of a political organisation was championed
by President Wilson. President Wilson emphasised the fact that there would be no
place for peace in the world unless a stable balance of power could be guaranteed.
He stressed further the need not just for a stable balance of power, but rather for
"a community of power, not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."
To President Wilson, the outbreak of the War in Europe was for a political reason
in the narrow sense. The problem could be solved by the exercise of a political
technique that was used in formulating the American Constitution.' In his view,
the concept of sovereignty dominated the atmosphere in Europe at that time, and it
blocked any opportunity for the Europeans to regard each other as friends and
neighbours. For him, it prevented the Europeans of thinking of establishing
democratic institutions in terms of political and social co-operation rather than of
competition for power. President Wilson worked hard for the Europeans to accept
his idea of a "democratic and co-operative" league to enforce world peace, and
they did, but he failed to convince his country to be part of the "American
approach" to world peace problems.'
On the other end of the spectrum, there was the "legalist" school, to a
certain extent led by a well-known American jurist, Republican Senator Elihu
Root. Senator Root urged the Wilson administration to include a clause for the
establishment of an international court in any future League of Nations," He
shared with most of the American legalists the desire for the creation of an
7 Ibid. at 62
8 D. F. Fleming, The United States and The World Court (1945) at 27
9 M. Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1935 (1988) at 21
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international court. However, Senator Root was the only legalist to reflect fully
during the war on the post-war arrangements for preserving world peace. 10 The
outbreak of World War I convinced him that the breach of world peace was a
matter of concern to all nations. He believed that nation states should develop
rules, rights, and responsibilities for international conduct. 11 Fully aware of the
interdependence of states' obligations and rights, he called for the establishment
of a world court and a political council, which would convene automatically
during international crises." He believed that such bodies would provide a forum
for the discussion of controversies. While the political council would deal with
political disputes, the World Court would tackle justiciable questions. In other
words, he maintained that having a World Court was a sufficient remedy, but
moved by the war, he saw that political organisation would also be essential."
Senator Root was appointed as the representative of the United States in
the Commission of Jurists, which was established upon the recommendation of
the League of Nations Council to elaborate a plan for the creation of the World
Court. According to Root's biographer, Phillip C. Jessup, Root took the lead in
the discussions." The Commission faced many difficulties, in particular in
deciding how to select judges and the jurisdiction of the Court. He approached
these problems in a way showing how much he was influenced by the American
10 D. F. Fleming, The United States and The World Court (1945) at 36; A. Zimmem, The
American Road to World Peace (1953) at 92
11 P. Jessup, Elihu Root, Vol II (2nd ed.)(l964) at 373
12 Ibid. at 374
13 D. F. Fleming, The United States and The World Court (1945) at 25, see also P. Jessup, Elihu
Root, Vol. II (2nd ed.)(l964) at 375
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government's experience and that of the Supreme Court." Although he succeeded
in the first, he failed to achieve a general consensus on the issue of the jurisdiction
of the Court. 16 The method of selecting the judges was solved by an analogy with
the American system where the smaller states are given equal representation in the
Senate while the larger states have a representation in the House proportionate to
their size." The establishment of the League ofNations Council and Assembly
cleared the way for such an analogy." Root proposed that in the League the two
bodies should vote concurrently but separately on the list of candidates and
majority of votes should be achieved in each body to elect the judges." In the case
of deadlock, a committee of representatives of both bodies should be composed,
similar to that of both Houses of the Congress. The plan was adopted, remained
intact, and is still in use.20
The setback for Root was the determination of the nature and scope of the
jurisdiction of the World Court. A proposal was put forward of giving this new
permanent judicial body, a power to render advisory opinions. Root opposed this
proposal." His argument was clearly influenced by the American Supreme Court.
The grounds for his objections were that Root aimed at having a Court which
14 See generally P. Jessup, Elihu Root, Vol. II (2nd ed.)(l964) at 418-422
15 Ibid. at 420
16 Ibid. at 421- 22
17 Ibid. at 420
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. at 421
20 Ibid.
21 M. Pomerance, The United States and The World Court As A 'Supreme Court ofthe Nations ':
Dreams, Illusions and Disillusion (1996) at 74
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would be able to determine its own jurisdiction for a given dispute, and he
maintained that this determination should be made on the basis of international
law and accepted precedent, the method that the United States Supreme Court
used." For the Court to render an advisory opinion upon the request of a political
body, the League Councilor Assembly, to a dispute to which it was not a party,
would destroy the Court's position and make it subordinate to a political
authority, in contrast with the United States Supreme Court, which was co-
ordinated with the legislative and executive branches ofthe government." Root
anticipated that giving the World Court the power to render advisory opinions
would endanger the development of the law through precedents, since the
judgment would be of an uncertain nature." Finally, for many Americans, the
advisory function would give the Court a political character rather than a judicial
one, a "League Court" rather than a "World Court"; and a non-American rather
than an American inspired product. 25
Any discussion of the advisory function of the World Court would not be
complete without looking at the debate on the Court's competence to render
advisory opinions presented by John Bassett Moore. Moore was appointed as a
22 Minutes of 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists at 584
23 M. Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1935 (1988) at 38; See also M. O.
Hudson, "Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts" 37 Harvard Law Review 970
(1924)
24 M. Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920- I935 (198.8) at 38; See also M.
Pomerance, "The United States and the Advisory Function of the Permanent Court of International
Justice" 567 in Y. Dinstein (ed.), International Law at A Time ofPerplexity: Essays in Honour of
Shabtai Rosenne (1989)
25 M. Pomerance, "The United States and the Advisory Function of the Permanent Court of
International Justice" 567 at 574 in Y. Dinstein (ed.), International Law at A Time ofPerplexity:
Essays in Honour ofShabtai Rosenne (1989)
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full judge in the first bench in September 1921.26 Moore supported the idea of the
new Permanent Court of International Justice, but he was against American
membership of the League." He was working on getting the United States to
adhere to the new World Court in order to give the Court an independent and
global character. However, Moore thought that the advisory function of the Court
would jeopardise the Court's status. He presented his arguments to the 1922
Committee of Jurists in a long memorandum. Opposing the Court's advisory
function, Moore argued that this function would hamper the character and
reputation of the Court, as its opinions would have an advisory character, they
would lose their effective force." Moreover, he argued that this function raised the
dangerous possibility of states' intervening in the Court's conduct of an advisory
opinion for fear a judgment on either a pending dispute or hypothetical question
might prejudice established rights or traditional claims. The other worry that
Moore expressed was that the advisory function would demean the Court as it
would be seen as touting for quasi-judicial business from a litigious League."
Moore's colleagues were not persuaded by his arguments. They saw that there was
no way to avoid the provisions of Article XIV of the Covenant which created the
advisory jurisdiction. Moore's colleagues showed that they were not concerned
26 M. Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1935 (1988) at 61, 102
27 Ibid. at 61
28 Moore's Memorandum, "The Question of Advisory Opinions", 18 February 1922, PCIJ Series
D:2 383 (Annex 58a) at 383
29 Ibid. at 393
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with whether or not the advisory function would affect the judicial character of the
Later, by the spring of 1925 when the Senate agreed to debate the protocol
to adhere to the Court, the Permanent Court of International Justice had delivered
only five contentious cases in contrast to ten advisory opinions. That led the
opponents to the idea of adherence to re-affirm their original charges that the
Court would be subordinate to the League."
The debate continued and the United States advanced reservation after
reservation. Finally, the US Congress refused to let the United States to be part of
the Court on the ground that the advisory function would give a free hand for the
Court to call the United States to appear in any dispute even if that dispute would
jeopardise its national interests. Throughout the battle from 1923-1935, the
advisory function of the Permanent Court was the centre of controversy. As noted
earlier, the advisory jurisdiction stamped the Court as "apolitical 'League Court,'
rather than ajudicial 'World Court' ... a supergovernmental agency which might
violate U.S. Sovereignty ... ; and a threat to the traditional American policies of
non-entanglement in Europe's ills ... "32 In the opinion of the Senators opposing
the US membership in the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice, the US
membership of the Court would be the thin edge of full adhesion to the League's
30 M. Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1935 (1988) at 103
31 Ibid. at 104
32 M. Pomerance, The United States and The World Court As A 'Supreme Court ofthe Nations ':
Dreams, I//usions and Disillusion (1996) at 91 (emphasis in original)
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collective security arrangements and involvement in the problems of Europe." In
their perspective, the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice was associated with
the League of Nations. The League organs participated in the establishment of the
Court, its financing, the elections of its judges, and the most crucial association is
that the League political organs could request advisory opinions from the Court-
"membership in such a Court meant membership in the League via the 'back
door' ."34
After the Second World War, although the International Court of Justice
was empowered with the competence of rendering advisory opinions, the United
States decided to participate in the new Court. As Pomerance noted that it was
"only after World War II that the United States 'swallowed the whole whale of
membership' in a collective security organisation... "35 The threat of the advisory
function to its national interests appeared less menacing." The difference,
between before World WarII and after, was the establishment of a political
organisation with a detailed "Constitution?". For many Americans, the League of
Nations was merely a form of alliance between the Great Powers, and its
Covenant was just a treaty." With the creation of the United Nations, the
33 M. Pomerance, "The United States and the Advisory Function of the Permanent Court of
International Justice" 567 at 592 in Y. Dinstein (ed.), International Law at A Time ofPerplexity:
Essays in Honour ofShabtai Rosenne (1989)
34 M. Pomerance, The United States and The World Court As A 'Supreme Court ofthe Nations ':
Dreams, Illusions and Disillusion (1996) at 66
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 See below the discussion on the nature of the UN Charter, Chapter III at 142-158
38 A. Zimmern, The American Road to World Peace (1953) at 208-209
85
American idea (President Wilson's idea) of an institution governed by a detailed
constitution was somehow crystallised."
This review of the history of the Court and the influence of the United
States' thinking shows that although the Americans tried to model the Court on
the United States Supreme Court, the international system determined that the
Court have different characteristics. International society, during the days of the
establishment of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International
Justice, was not able to separate itself from the old diplomacy totally. The Great
Powers, then, were still swinging between the old diplomacy, that of force, and
the new diplomacy, that of co-operation. It seems that it was still "unnatural" for
sovereign States to "go before a court and submit the question whether their
actions and their views accord with the principles ofjustice.'?" Still, there was a
long way ahead for the Great Powers to accept any threat to their sovereignty and
to be under the scrutiny of an autonomous judicial power, as is the case with the
United States Supreme Court, which has the power to review the legality of a
decision or an order taken by the legislative and executive branches. It will be
argued here that although the International Court and the US Supreme Court have
some points in common, for the Court to follow the same path as the US Supreme
Court in asserting powers ofjudicial review will be full of difficulties and
setbacks. The issue of resemblance between the two courts resurfaced when the
International Court of Justice dealt with the Lockerbie Cases. It was argued that
39Ibid.
40 E. Root, "The Importance of Judicial Settlement" Proceedings ofthe American Society of
Judicial Settlement ofInternational Disputes 9 (1910) at 13-14, cited in M. Pomerance, The
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two centuries ago, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity in
Marbury v. Madison to assert its power ofjudicial review, and the same
opportunity was given to the International Court of Justice in the Lockerbie Cases
(Interim measures)." However, such a comparison disregards the fact that the
International Court of Justice has its own peculiarities and characteristics that
make it difficult for the Court to follow the exact way of the US Supreme Court."
The International Court still has not established itself as an independent organ of
the United Nations. It still works closely with the other organs of the UN. In
contrast, at the domestic level, the judiciary has achieved its independence from
the other branches of the government. Besides, the problems facing the Court on
the international level are totally different from those facing the national judiciary
on the national level. Municipal courts and the International Court have different
natures and different factors are relevant.
Nonetheless, that does not mean that the International Court of Justice's powers of
judicial review could not be established. The argument of this chapter will be,
however, that the International Court of Justice should, in order to establish the
competence ofjudicial review, choose alternative attitudes and paths.
This chapter will start by showing the similarities between the two Courts.
It will make clear how both are subject to a combination of law and politics when
the two Courts consider their cases. In the light of this, Marbury v. Madison will
United States and The World Court As A 'Supreme Court ofthe Nations ': Dreams. Illusions and
Disillusion (1996) at 12
41 T. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" 86
AJIL 519 (1992); W. M. Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations" 87 AJIL 83
(1993)
421. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council" 90 AJIL I (1996) at 4-6
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be discussed in detail with the aim of highlighting the political issue involved. On
the other hand, the practice ofthe International Court of Justice in dealing with
provisional measures applications shall be discussed exhaustively, aiming to make
it clear that the International Court has other considerations, specifically political,
in indicating provisional measures other than the "official" criteria of urgency,
irreparable damage, and the establishment of the Court's jurisdiction. The reason
behind discussing the Court's jurisprudence in dealing with provisional measures
is to set the scene for the discussion ofthe Lockerbie Cases. To determine its
analogy with Marbury v. Madison, i.e the relation between law and politics in
tackling the case, it is necessary to discuss the case law of the Court's interim
measures to compare and to establish influence of the political factors in the
Lockerbie Cases.The conclusion to be drawn is that though the International
Court and the Supreme Court share certain characteristics and to a certain extent
behave in a similar way, the International Court cannot follow the same path of
the United States Supreme Court in asserting a competence ofjudicial review.
2 Marbury v. Madison
Marbury v. Madison marks the beginning ofjudicial review as a power in
the hands of the United States Supreme Court. This case shows how the Supreme
Court established a place for itself away from the political tension that was taking
place at that time. However, that does not mean that the Supreme Court
established that place without entering the circle of political crisis. The
Jeffersonians, the Republicans, were then controlling the government, while the
Federalists were in control of the Supreme Court since the judges of the Supreme
Court were all Federalists. Nevertheless, other scholars have claimed that the
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Supreme Court in this case attempted to rise above the bickering of party politics,
which had engulfed the other branches of government, and to show that the Court
would rule in accordance with the Constitution."
As a beginning, it is useful to look at Marbury v. Madison and how the US
Supreme Court was able to handle the issues involved in a very diplomatic way
without undermining either its power or that of the government. Why should
Marbury v. Madison, in particular, be discussed? Because, for many US legal
historians, Marbury v. Madison's ruling made judicial review positive
constitutional doctrine."
Marbury v. Madison arose out of the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1801
which provided for the appointment of a large number of Federal judges during
the final days of President Adams. The passage of this law angered President
Jefferson who was about to assume office. President Jefferson ordered his
Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the commissions of office to
Adams' appointees. Among the appointees was William Marbury, selected by
President Adams as a Justice of the Peace in Washington. Marbury unsuccessfully
tried to retrieve his commission from the Secretary of State. About a year after
Jefferson assumed his office, Marbury filed an action in the Supreme Court,
asking the Supreme Court to order Madison to deliver his commission, since the
Judiciary Act of 1789 authorised the Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus
43 See P. W. Kahn, The Reign ofLaw: Marbury v. Madison and the Constitution ofAmerica
(1997); B. Schwartz, A History ofThe Supreme Court (1993)
44 B. Schwartz, A History ofThe Supreme Court (1993) at 40; RH. Burton "Marbury v. Madison:
The Cornerstone of Constitutional law" 14 in J.H. Choper (ed.) The Supreme Court And Its
Justices (1987)
89
in cases warranted by the principles and usages oflaw, to any courts appointed, or
persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.':"
Justice Marshall was then the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He
clearly saw the problem as far more complicated than merely whether the Court
could issue a mandamus against the Secretary of State. Justice Marshall
considered that ifhe dismissed Marbury's action, he would have abdicated the
judicial powers of the Court. On the other hand, ifhe ordered the Secretary of
State to deliver a writ to Marbury, and declared the Court's authority to hold the
government to the law, the court itself would be unable to enforce this, and by that
the Court would have lost its credibility." However, Justice Marshall chose
neither of these considerations. He chose to escape from this dilemma by ruling
that the Court lacked jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorised the
Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in cases where the Court had
jurisdiction. However, the Court argued that, in this case, it had no jurisdiction
since Article III of the American Constitution allows the Court only to take
original jurisdiction in cases involving states or emissaries of foreign
governments. Furthermore, the Court chose to escape jurisdiction on the ground
of the unconstitutionality of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. After close
textual reading of Section 13 of the 1789 Act and also Article III of the
Constitution, it ruled that Section 13 of the 1789 act was unconstitutional. The
Congress could not add to the Court's juridiction as Section 13 did, because
45 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137; 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)
46 B. Schwartz, A History ofThe Supreme Court (1993) at 41
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Article III had already established the Court's jurisdiction." The Court considered
that the Constitution has its own supremacy and could not be altered by ordinary
law formed by the Congress. The Court then ruled that Section 13 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 exceeded the authority allotted the Court originally under Article III
of the Constitution and was therefore null and void."
Alfange has pointed out that: "[b]y choosing this way (ruling on the
unconstitutionality of Section 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789) of avoiding the
assumption ofjurisdiction, the Court could assert the power ofjudicial review.':"
Thus, the Court refused Marbury's application not because the Executive Branch
was above the law, but because the Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ that
Marbury had requested." By this opinion, the Supreme Court established its
power to rule on the validity of an Act of the Congress, although the US
constitution is silent on the Court's power ofjudicial review." John Marshall's
opinion, representing the whole bench, was divided in two parts. The first part
discussed whether Marbury's claim could be sustained on the basis of the vested
rights doctrine, that is the claim that certain rights are so fundamental that they are
beyond the government's control. The Court pointed out that the Court was under
an obligation to protect such fundamental rights. The second part took back what
the Court gave to Marbury in the first half of the opinion. It said that the Court
47 D. Alfange, Jr., "Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom" The Supreme Court Review 329 (1993) at 366
48 B. Schwartz, A History ofThe Supreme Court (1993) at 41
49 D. Alfange, Jr., "Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom" The Supreme Court Review 329 (1993) at 366
50 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)
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could not issue the writ, since section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
unconstitutional. It went on to say that Congress could not add to the Court's
jurisdiction, because Article III of the Constitution had already established the
Court's jurisdiction fully."
However, it is necessary to examine why Chief Justice Marshall proceeded
to invalidate the Judiciary Act 1789. When the Chief Justice showed some
readiness to inquire into the conduct of affairs by the executive, as manifested by
the order of the Supreme Court to Madison to show why a writ of mandamus
should not be delivered, the consequences were more than dire. Jefferson and his
Republican allies in the Congress were able to enact legislation repealing the
Federalists' Judiciary Act of 1801, thus keeping the Supreme Court out of session
for over a year." He therefore needed to find a reason for invalidation that would
not anger the Republicans.
Justice Marshall was more than sure that he and his Supreme Court could
no more issue a writ of mandamus than they could declare the Repeal Act
unconstitutional and order the circuit court judges and the Supreme Court judges
restored to their office."
The Supreme Court found a way to announce and establish the principle of
judicial review over the legislative and the executive branches of the government
without making an immediate application of it hostile to the then
51 B. Schwartz, A History of The Supreme Court (1993) at 41(quoting Charles Warren)
52 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)
53 See 1. M. O'Fallon, "Marbury" 44 Stan. L. Rev. 219 (1992) at 222-224
54 D. Alfange, Jr., "Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom" The Supreme Court Review 329 (1993) at 366
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Administration." In other words, the decision of that case suppressed any
potential institutional conflict among the branches of the government as it
outlined the boundaries of the competence of each branch. The boundaries were
drawn with respect to the Constitution, as Justice Marshall stated in his opinion
"[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men.':" However, Justice Marshall kept on
asserting that the Court had the responsibility to determine what the Constitution
meant. "It is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department,"
he wrote, "to say what the law is .. .If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each.''"
It was shown earlier that the US Supreme Court was the model for the
International Court." The success of the US Supreme Court furnished and
encouraged the debate to establish the "World Court" using the Supreme Court's
model." Ironically, as the US Supreme Court had to face in its early stages a
dispute involving government political branches, the International Court was put
in, relatively, the same position while it was dealing with the Lockerbie cases.
55 H.H. Burton, "Marbury v. Madison: The Cornerstone of Constitutional law" 14 at 18 in J.H.
Choper (ed.), The Supreme Court And Its Justices (1987)
56 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)
57 Ibid. at 177
58 See above at 69-70
59 M. Pomerance, The United States and The World Court As A 'Supreme Court ofthe Nations ':
Dreams, Illusions and Disillusion (1996) at 12
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3 Lockerbie Cases
It is a tragic story, and one with which most are familiar. In 1988, the
American flight Pan Am 103 exploded over the Scottish sky, taking 270 lives.
The American and the British investigations" led to the belief that two Libyans
were guilty in connection with the bombing of the Pan Am flight. A United States
Federal grand jury indicted the two Libyan nationals on charges of having caused
the bomb to be placed on Pan Am 103. The 193-count indictment identified the
two accused as officials of Libyan Arab Airlines and members of Libya's
intelligence organisation. Simultaneously, charges were laid by the Lord Advocate
of Scotland against the two men for conspiracy, murder, and contravention of the
Aviation Security Act of 1982.61
Later, the American and the British governments issued ajoint declaration
demanding the Libyan government to surrender the two suspects to stand trial in
either the United States or Scotland, and to pay appropriate compensation." Libya
refused to surrender the suspects, claiming that it had no extradition treaties with
the UK or US and that, in any case, Libyan law prohibited the extradition of its
60 Speculation about who would want to plant a bomb abroad has included pro-Iranian groups as a
revenge for the US downing of an Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf in July 1988. The
speculation has also included Syrian involvement. See M. David, "Passport to Justice:
Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World Court" 40: 1 Harv.
1. Int 'I L. 81 (1999) at 83; S. Evans, "The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan- Sponsored
Terrorism, Judicial Review And The Political Question Doctrine" 18:1 MD Journal of
International Law And Trade 21 (1994) at 27
61 Announcement by the Lord Advocate of Scotland on 14 November 1991 reprinted in 31
I.L.M.718 (1992).
62 Joint Declaration of the United States and the United Kingdom reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 723
(1992)
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own nationals. Libya doubted the fairness of any trial held in the United States
and the United Kingdom."
Unsatisfied with these responses, the United States and the United
Kingdom, with the support of France, went to the United Nations Security
Council. Under its powers under Chapter VI, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 731.64 Although the resolution does not explicitly indicate that it was
adopted under the Council's Chapter VI powers, the absence of the language of
Chapter VII, that is the determination of the existence of "threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression", suggests that Resolution 731 was
adopted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Both Judge Bedjaoui and Judge
Weeramantry argued that the Security Council adopted resolution 731 under its
powers of Chapter VI.65 However, Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri argued, in his
dissenting opinion, that resolution 731 was adopted under Chapter VII66, he noted
that the wording used in drafting resolution 731 could be regarded as referring to
Chapter VII. The resolution started with the condemnation of international
terrorism and the determination to eliminate it. Resolution 731 urged the Libyan
government to surrender the two suspects. This resolution is noteworthy in one
63 Annex to Letter, 8 January 1992 From the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, Sf 23436 reprinted in 31
J.L. M. 724 (1992)
64 Sec. Res. 731 UN SCOR (1992) 21 January 1992
65 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 1992 IC] Rep.3;
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) 1992 IC] Rep.
3 (Judge Bedjaoui dissenting Opinion) at 41 and (Judge Weeramantry dissenting Opinion) at 53-
55
66 Lockerbie Cases 1992 IC] Rep.3 at 97 (Judge ad hoc El- Kosheri dissenting opinion). The
argument of Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri discussed below at 109-110
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aspect. It was the first time that the Security Council had been asked to call for the
extradition of the citizens of one country to stand trial in another. 67
In the meantime, Libya instituted proceedings in the International Court of
Justice against the United States and the United Kingdom. Libya claimed that the
matter was governed by an international agreement, the Montreal Convention of
23 September 1971. The Court was asked to adjudge and declare that:
1. Libya had fully complied with all of its
obligations under the Montreal Convention;
2. The United States and the United Kingdom had
breached, and were continuing to breach, their legal
obligations to Libya under Article 5(2), 5(3),7, 8(2)
and 11 of the Montreal Convention; and
3. The United States and the United Kingdom were
under a legal obligation immediately to cease and
desist from such breaches and from the use of any
and all force or threats against Libya, including the
threat of force against Libya, and from all violations
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the
political independence of Libya."
In addition, Libya asked the Court to indicate provisional measures. Libya asked
the Court to enjoin the United States and the United Kingdom from taking any
action against Libya calculated to coerce or to compel Libya to surrender the two
suspects to any jurisdiction outside Libya, and to ensure that no steps would be
taken to prejudice in any way the rights of Libya with respect to the legal
proceedings. Libya, along with this application, offered to hand the two accused to
67 See V. Gowlland-Debbas," The Relationship Between The International Court of Justice and the
Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case" 88 AJIL 643 (1994) at 663 (discussing the
Security Council overstepped its limits in that request)
68 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 1992/CJ Rep.3;
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) 1992 ICJ Rep.
114
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a neutral country for trial. However, the offer was dismissed by the American and
the British governments.
Three days after the close of the hearings, the Security Council adopted
resolution 748. The Security Council, acting explicitly under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Libya." The
International Court of Justice asked the parties involved to return and make their
submissions on the resolution. Both respondents submitted that, because the
resolution bound Libya, it precluded any conflicting order by the Court." On the
other hand, Libya submitted that because no hierarchy existed between the
Security Council and the International Court of Justice within the United Nations,
and because each exercised its own competence, the risk of conflicting decisions
by the two bodies did not render the Libyan claim inadmissible." Libya went
further to claim that the two Security Council resolutions were contrary to
international law, and criticised the Security Council's invocation of Chapter VII
as a pretext to elude application of the Montreal Convention." The turning point
in the dispute was when the International Court of Justice ruled on Libya's
application for interim measures.
69 Security Council Resolution 748, 31 March 1992 "The Security Council determines that: in this
context... the failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation
of terrorism and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests in
resolution 731 (1992) constitutes a threat to international peace and security." (Emphasis added)
70 Lockerbie Cases 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 14 para. 37
71 Ibid. para. 36
71 Ibid.
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By 11 votes to 5,73 the Court held that the circumstances of the cases did
not require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice to indicate provisional measures. The Court found it
could not make, in accordance with Article 41, definitive findings either of fact or
of law on the issues relating to the merits; the Court's decision therefore did not
affect the parties' rights to contest such issues at the stage of the merits. The most
controversial paragraph in the International Court of Justice's Order was
paragraph 39. The Court ruled that:
" whereas both Libya and the United Kingdom [the
United States], as Members of the United Nations,
are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council in accordance with Article 25
of the Charter; whereas the Court, ... ,considers that
prima facie this obligation extends to the decision
contained in resolution 748(1992); and whereas, in
accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the
obligations of the Parties in that respect prevail over
their obligations under any other international
agreement, including the Montreal Convention; ... "74
The Court feared that such protection would likely to impair the rights that prima
facie were enjoyed by the respondents by virtue of resolution 748 (1992).
However, the Court's Order established the fact that the rights of the parties to
submit arguments at the merits stage would remain unaffected when it stated that
the Court had not been called on to determine the question of its jurisdiction to
entertain the merits of the case.
73 Lockerbie Cases 1992 IC} Rep.3.( In favour: Vice-President Oda, Acting President; President
Sir Robert Jennings; Judges Lachs, Ago, Schwebel, Ni, Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume,
Shahabuddeen, Aguilar Mawdsley; Against: Judges Bedjaoui, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Ajibola;
Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri)
74 Lockerbie Cases 1992/C} Rep.3 at 15
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Although the request for provisional measures was rejected, Libya did not
comply with the Security Council resolutions 731 and 748. The United Nations
renewed its demands for Libya to hand over the two suspects," which Libya
rejected. It was thought that a breakthrough had been made in early 1994, when
Libya agreed on the proposal of a trial in a neutral venue before a panel of
international judges. Britain and America refused to accept this compromise,
demanding a trial in either Scotland or the United States. This deadlock remained
till 1998.
It became crystal-clear at the beginning of 1998 that, despite sanctions, the
two Libyans would not be surrendered for trial. On 24 August, the British and the
American governments, went back to the Security Council, proposing that the trial
should be held in the Netherlands before a panel of three Scottish judges and with
no jury." This offer was broadly accepted by Libya, which said that it was for the
two suspects and their legal advisers to decide whether they would appear in the
Netherlands for trial." The two accused surrendered themselves on 5 April 1999
and the trial began on May 3rd, 2000. The Scottish Court residing in Camp Zeist in
the Netherlands gave its verdict of finding one of the suspects to be guilty and the
other not guilty." Sanctions were suspended in April 1999 following the surrender
75 SC Res. (883) UN SCOR (1993)
76 Security Council Resolution 1192 (1998) 27 August 1998; see also the Joint letter of the United
Kingdom and the United States S/1998/795 24 August 1998
77 The Letter of the Libyan Government S/1998/808 26 August 1998
78 For the Verdict check <http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/download/lockerbiejudgement.pfd>31
January 200 I
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of the two accused Libyans." On 7 July 1999, the British Foreign Secretary,
addressing the House of Commons, announced that the UN sanctions on Libya
were suspended." However, three days later, the US vetoed the permanent lifting
of sanctions by the Security Council against Libya." The then US President, Bill
Clinton, in his report to the Congress on Lockerbie asserted that while the
development over the last few months indicated Libyan co-operation, the extent of
it could not be fully judged until the trial was at least under way. In the light of
this, the US unilateral sanctions would remain in force as long as appropriate."
The UN Security Council, in its Press Release, showed that it was the UN wish
that sanctions should be lifted permanently as soon as possible." However, the
United States, after the verdict, stated that the sanctions would not be lifted until
Libya accepted responsibilities for the bombing and paid compensation."
The Court is currently considering the arguments on the merits of the
Lockerbie Cases. It is still unclear whether the Court, in its judgment, will discuss
the constitutionality of the Security Council resolutions or not. For instance, one
commentator has advanced the argument that with the Security Council resolution
1192 (to entice Libya to give up suspects and end sanctions) and with Libyan
consent to give the two suspects to the Scottish Court for trial, the International
79 Press Release SC/6664 8April 1999
80 Statement By The Foreign Secretary On Relations With Libya, House Of Commons, London,
Wed. 7 July, 1999 <http://www.fco.goy.uk/news/newstext.asp?2622>
81 Press Release SC/6700 9 July 1999
82 Clinton Report to Congress on Libya National Emergency 20 July 1999
<http://www.un.int/usa/99Iib719.htm>
83 Press Release SC/6700 9 July 1999
8~ zo" April 200 I Washington Post at A20
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Court of Justice cannot review resolutions 731, 748, 883, as the parties have
resolved the dispute by themselves." However, the International Court, in its
course of dealing with a case, often looks and considers all the relevant facts and
data as part of discharging its judicial function." Therefore, the possibility is there
for the Court to deal with the Libyan argument on the constitutionality and
validity of the Security Council resolutions, because they are affecting the legal
rights and obligations of the concerned parties.
4 Law and Politics In the Two Courts
4.1 In The United States Supreme Court
According to one commentator, the importance of Marbury v. Madison lies
in its judicial politics. Professor Franck has stated:
"The judicial 'politics' of Marbury were simple but
brilliant: let President Jefferson win by agreeing that
his executive discretion to issue or withhold
commissions was constitutionally unlimited, but
also stake out the general power of the Court to
determine, by its ultimate role as constitutional
umpire, the boundaries within which that unfettered
political discretion could be exercised.':"
85 D. D'Angelo, "The 'Check' on International Peace and Security Maintenance: the International
Court of Justice and Judicial Review of Security Council Resolutions" 23:2 Suff. Transnat'l. L.
Rev. 561 (2000) at 592
86 See Conditions ofAdmission ofa State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 ofthe
Charter) (1947-1948) 1947 IC] Rep. 57, The Reparations for injuries 1949 IC] Rep. 174; Certain
Expenses Advisory Opinion 1962 IC] Rep.151; Namibia Advisory Opinion 1971 IC] Rep.9
87 T. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" 86
A]IL 519 (1992) at 519
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It is impossible to understand this decision without an understanding of
the politics surrounding it at that time. American politics were tense with partisan
struggles, the Republicans took control over the Presidency and the Congress,
while the Federalists put their hands on the Supreme Court and the Circuit
Courts." In other words, Marbury v. Madison was a creature of the politics of
that period, and political considerations were part of the deliberations in the
Supreme Court."
Marbury v. Madison arose at the time when Jefferson's Republicans had
defeated Adams and the Federalists. The change was not just a change of
administration or change in officeholders, it was the first time that one party, the
Republicans, took control over the two political branches of the government, the
Presidency and the Congress", while the other party, the Federalists, controlled
the judiciary. President Adams was convinced that Judiciary Act of 1801 was his
last chance, before leaving the office, to have a Federalists' presence in the
Republicans' administration. Thus, when Marbury filed the action in the Supreme
Court, the matter appeared to the Republicans as a purely partisan measure."
88 D. Alfange, Jr., "Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom" The Supreme Court Review 329 (1993) at 349.
89 See generally R. G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (2nd ed.) (1994) at 4-5; R. 1.
Mckeever, The United States Supreme Court: A Political and Legal Analysis (1997) at 47-66
90 P. W. Kahn, The Reign ofLaw: Marbury v. Madison and the Constitution ofAmerica (1997) at
10
9\ 1. M. 0' Fallon, "Marbury" 44 Stan. L. Rev. 2 19 (1992) at 2 I9-220
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It has been argued that it is misleading to locate Marbury v. Madison's
brilliance in the assertion of a political strategy that accomplished its end of
empowering the Court while avoiding any command to the executive." To
consider judicial review as a political power and Marbury v. Madison as a
successful seizure of this power by the Court, and to see Justice Marshall as a
political actor competing with other political actors, is also misleading." Instead,
the significance of the case, it has been argued, lies in the distinction of law from
political action." In Kahn's words, Marbury v. Madison is not a step "toward the
political empowerment of the Court but the displacement of political action by the
rule of law.'!" Nevertheless, considering the case out of its political context is also
misleading. The political tension was the catalyst of Marbury v. Madison.
Jefferson's refusal to deliver the commission to Justices of the Peace cannot be
understood as anything but a political action. The Supreme Court's acceptance of
the case and order to Secretary of State Madison to show the reasons had been
seen from a political point of view. Well before Marbury v. Madison, federal law
and federal courts were viewed by Jefferson and the Republicans generally as the
expression of a partisan lawlessness." Thus, Marbury v. Madison gave both
parties the chance to hit each other politically.
92 Ibid.; R. G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (1960) at 40
93 C. L. Eisgruber, "John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric" The Supreme Court Review 439 (1996) at
440
94 P. W. Kahn, The Reign ofLaw: Marbury v. Madison and the Constitution ofAmerica (1997) at
10-11
95 Ibid. at 16
96 Ibid. at 13
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The Supreme Court in this case used a brilliant strategy using law and
politics equally in reaching its decision. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court did
not grant Marbury the writ of mandamus on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction.
That does not seem as a political choice; however, the choice of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 was. Why did the Supreme Court choose that law? First, the Supreme
Court chose this law, as it was not of essential interest to the Republicans. The
Republicans were, on the contrary, more than pleased to see more limits on the
"federal" court. 97 Second, it might be thought that its invalidation as a denial by
the Court of its own authority. It was argued that Chief Justice Marshall took
advantage of political circumstances to deflect attacks upon the Supreme Court
and to secure useful precedents. In Marbury v. Madison, it was argued that John
Marshall worked his argument for judicial review with an effective manoeuvre.
He exercised judicial review to strike down a law that would have increased the
judicial power and thus enabled the Federalist judiciary to protect a Federalist
appointee." In other words, the Chief Justice John Marshall tamed the
Republicans' reaction by invalidating a law that would help advancing the
Federalists' powers.
Although it might be thought that that law's invalidation was a denial of
the Supreme Court's own power, and thus it could not be considered as a
politically intelligent choice, it was not, because Section 13 was only held
97 D. Alfange, Jr. "Marbury v. Madison And Original Understanding of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom" The Supreme Court Review 329 (1993) at 368
98 C. L. Eisgruber, "John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric" The Supreme Court Review 439 (1996) at
446
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unconstitutional as applied in this case." Therefore, the Court retained full power
under the law to issue writs of mandamus whenever it found it proper to do so in a
case within the scope of its constitutional jurisdiction. 100 But the greater
achievement of the Supreme Court, in this case, was that it seized the opportunity
to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. Therefore, it is no wonder that
many consider the Marbury v. Madison opinion as "a masterpiece of political
strategy". 10\
4.2 In The International Court Of Justice
Controversies and question marks have always surrounded the indication
of provisional measures of protection in cases before the International Court of
Justice. Both the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International
Court of Justice have had to face the problem of provisional measures of
protection in their case law. The power to indicate provisional measures of
protection is contained in Article 41 102 of the Court's Statute, which provides:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it
considers that circumstances so require, any
provisional measures, which ought to be taken to
preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures
suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and
to the Security Council. (Emphasis added)
99 D. Alfange, Jr. "Marbury v. Madison And Original Understanding of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom" The Supreme Court Review 329 (1993) at 368
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Article 41 is substantially the same as Article 41 of the Permanent Court of International Justice
Statute with minor differences. The reference to the Council of the League of Nations changed to
the United Nations Security Council. The word "reserve" in the English text changed to
"preserve". See B. H. Oxman, "Jurisdiction and The Power to Indicate Provisional Measures" 323
at 324 in L.F. Damrosch (ed.), The International Court ofJustice At A Crossroad (1987)
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Article 41 is notoriously ambiguous.!" It leaves questions concerning the
scope and the basis for the indication of provisional measures unanswered; it
opens the door for wide interpretations of these concerns. 104 Although the Rules of
the Court have answered certain problems concerning provisional measures 105, the
case- law of the Court is still the only way to understand the basis and scope of
Article 41. 106
Provisional measures of protection are designed to deal with those
situations where waiting for the International Court to render its final judgment
may cost either party to the dispute irreparable damage. The criteria most often
used to indicate provisional measures are the existence of the factors of urgency
and irreparable damages. The jurisprudence of the Court has supported these
factors to indicate provisional measures of protection. In the lnterhandel case'",
the International Court denied a Swiss application for provisional measures
against the United States on the grounds that the situation was not urgent and the
US Federal Court proceedings would reach a "speedy conclusion't.!" However, if
103 However, the International Court of Justice, recently, established that orders on provisional
measures have binding character. See LaGrand Case (Germany v. the United States)
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketligus/igusframe.htm> at paras. 102, 103
104 J.G. Merrills, "Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice" 44 ICLQ 90 (1995) at 90
105 Articles 73-78 of the 1978 Rules deal with provisional measures procedure: the timing of the
filing of a request for provisional measures, priority of consideration of provisional measures
requests, the authority of the President of the Court pending the convening of the Court, the
authority of the Court to act proprio motu, and modification or revocation of provisional measures.
106 Ibid., see also J. Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court (1983) at 231; B. H. Oxman,
"Jurisdiction and The Power to Indicate Provisional Measures" 323 at 323 in L.F. Damrosch (ed.),
The International Court ofJustice At A Crossroad (1987)
107 Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States) 1957 IC] Rep. 105 (Interim Measures Order
of Oct. 24 th )
108 Ibid. at 112
106
the damage is not irreparable, the dispute can be settled by a final award of
compensation or money damages, as an adequate protection of any rights
prejudiced. 109 In the Sino-Belgian Treaty case, the President of the Court noted
that the possible damage by China's unilateral denunciation of the treaty in issue
"could not be made good simply by the payment of indemnity or by compensation
or restitution in some other material form."'"
The criteria of granting provisional measures of protection further include
rather an important factor, that of the Court's jurisdiction. The Permanent Court
ofInternational Justice did not face objections against its jurisdiction; the
International Court of Justice, on the contrary, often has to deal with the
respondents' objections against the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim.
The question that manifests itself here is: what is the relationship between Article
41 and the substantive jurisdiction? Sztucki sees the answer to this question as
primarily one of jurisprudential policy. He argues that: "[ijts solution much
depends on the underlying legal philosophy and tradition as confronted with extra-
legal realities."!" The International Court of Justice, since the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Case 112, has adopted criteria on the relationship between Article 41 and the
substantive jurisdiction. I 13
109 Aegean Sea Continental ShelfCase (Greece v. Turkey) 1976 IC} Rep. 3 (Interim Measures
order of Sept. II th) at 16
110 Sino-Belgian Treaty (Belgium v. China), 1927 PCIJ Ser. A, No.8, at 6,7 (Provisional Measures
Order of Jan.8 th)
III J. Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court (1983) at 231
112 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), 1951 IC} Rep. 89
113 1. Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court (1983) at 251
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In this case, Britain challenged Iran's plan to nationalise the British-owned
Anglo- Iranian Oil Company Ltd. Invoking both States' declarations under Article
36 (2) as a basis for the Court's jurisdiction, Britain requested the Court to
indicate provisional measures to forestall the nationalisation pending the final
judgment. The Iranian government contested the jurisdiction of the Court. In its
reply to the notification of the British request, the Iranian Foreign Minister stated
that: "the Iranian Government hopes that the Court will declare that the case is not
within its jurisdiction because of the legal incompetence of the complainant and
because of the fact that exercise of the right of sovereignty is not subject to
complaint. Under these circumstances, the request for interim measures of
protection would be naturally be rejected."!" The Court indicated extensive
provisional measures to the extent that "no measure of any kind should be taken
designed to hinder the carrying on of the industrial and commercial operations of'
the company and that "the Company's operations in Iran should continue under
the direction of its management as it was constituted prior to May 1st, 1951".115
Iran subsequently filed a formal preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of
the Court. In a judgment of22 June 1952 the Court, by nine votes to five, found
itself without jurisdiction in the case. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was the only
instance that the Court formally declared that it lacked jurisdiction after indicating
extensive provisional measures of protection. The Court stated that the order on
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. at 93
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provisional measures "ceases to be operative upon the delivery of this
judgment".116
The International Court of Justice has subsequently followed certain rules
of conduct. The Court may only indicate provisional measures if it is able to hold,
even provisionally, that it will be competent to entertain the case on the merits.'!'
The Court set itself a standard that has been repeated in many cases'", which it
generally restates with a slight difference in wording with respect to the nature of
the case: "on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before
indicating them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the
case, yet it ought not to act under Article 41 of the Statute if the absence of
jurisdiction on the merits is manifest".1l9 In the Passage Through The Great Belt
case'" (Finland v. Denmark), Denmark raised an argument that, before
provisional measures were indicated, Finland should substantiate the right it
claimed to the point where a reasonable prospect of success on the merits existed.
Finland maintained that Denmark's demand required the Court to go into the
116 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (Preliminary Objections) 19S2 ICJ Rep. 93
117 S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice ofthe International Court 1920-I996 (1997) at 1444
118 See Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland) 1972 ICJ Rep. 12 (Provisional Measures order of Aug.17) at 15-16; Nuclear Tests Cases
(Australia v. France, New Zealand v. France) 1973ICJ Rep. 99,106 (provisional measures) Order
of Jun. 22) at 101; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran)
1979 ICJ Rep. 7 (Provisional Measures Order of Dec.IS), at 13; Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 1984 ICJ Rep. 169
(Provisional Measures Order of May 10), at 179-80; Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
NATO Members), <http://www.icj.law.gla.ac.ukJicjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm>
(Provisional Measures Order of June 2), Para. 21
119 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (United Kingdom v. Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland) 1972ICJ Rep. 12 (Provisional Measures order of Aug.17) at 15-16
120 Case Concerning Passage Through The Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark) 1991 ICJ Rep. 12
(Provisional Measures Order of July 29th)
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merits, and Finland's legal right of free passage could not be considered prima
facie unfounded. However, as the International Court dealt with Denmark's
objection very briefly, perhaps the Court recognised that Finland's request would
be denied on other grounds. The Court noted that the existence of a right of
Finland of passage through the Great Belt was not challenged, the dispute between
the Parties being over its nature and extent, and concluded that such a disputed
right may be protected by provisional measures if the circumstances so required.!"
Judge Shahabuddeen thoroughly discussed Denmark's submission in his
separate opinion. He pointed out that Denmark's argument could be summarised
as, to justify a grant of interim measures, Finland was required, inter alia, to show
a prima facie case as to the existence of the right sought to be preserved. In his
view, Finland had indeed been obliged to demonstrate the existence of the specific
right of passage claimed in respect of drill ships and oil rigs of over 65 metres'
clearance height.!" Finland had established the existence of the rights sought to be
protected.!" In addition, Judge Shahabuddeen asserted that since the effect of
provisional measures was to impose a temporary restraint, which will often affect
the disputing parties unequally, it is reasonable to make an order only if the
applicant can show some possibility of success on the merits. 124
As mentioned above, the Court did not discuss the Danish argument
thoroughly, because there was another reason, a lack of urgency, for not granting
121 Ibid. at 17
122 Ibid. at 28 (Judge Shahabuddeen separate opinion)
123 Ibid. at 36( Judge Shahabuddeen separate opinion)
124 Ibid. at 30-35 (Judge Shahabuddeen separate opinion)
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the provisional measures to Finland. 125 However, Judge Shahabuddeen's separate
opinion, with reference to the Court's conduct and the arguments of counsel in
previous cases, reinforced the relevance between this factor and the proceedings
under Article 41. The International Court of Justice's standard of setting the prima
facie test for jurisdiction is thus well established.
In the Application ofthe Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime ofGenocide Case126[Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro)], the Court further clarified its standard ofprima facie jurisdiction
over the merits:
"Whereas on a request for provisional measures the
Court need not, before deciding whether or not to
indicate them, finally satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought
not to indicate such measures unless the provisions
invoked by the Applicant or found in the Statute
appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the
jurisdiction of the Court might be established;
whereas this consideration embraces jurisdiction
both ratione personae and ratione materiae, even
though, inasmuch as almost all States are today
parties to the Statute of the Court, it is in general
only the latter which needs to be considered."!"
With regard to this tendency in the International Court of Justice's practice to
emphasise establishing a prima facie jurisdiction, as Szutcki anticipated and
observed almost two decades ago:
125 Case Concerning Passage Through The Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark) 1991 IC} Rep. 12 at
17 (Provisional Measures Order of July 29 th )
126 Application ofthe Convention on the prevention and punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1993 IC} Rep. 3 at 12
(Provisional Measures Order of 8 April)
127 Ibid. at 11
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" ... both by the [Court's] practice and by slight but
steady modifications in the same direction of the
language used in the motives of its orders, it slowly
but consistently glides towards the recognition of
rather safe prospects of substantive jurisdiction as a
necessary basis for its action under Article 41." 128
A recent case showed that the Court is more and more dependent on the
jurisdictional factor to grant or deny the provisional measures. The Legality of
Use ofForce Cases'" (Yugoslavia v. certain NATO Members) were the first cases
in the Court's history in which the requests for provisional measures were denied
on the ground of lack ofprima facie jurisdiction. 130 Although the situation was an
urgent case and the damage involved irreparable, the International Court of Justice
denied the Yugoslav request on the basis of a lack ofjurisdiction. 131
Therefore, from the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, and
its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice, one can say that the
three factors that determine the granting of provisional measures of protection are
urgency, irreparable damage, and the existence of the Court's jurisdiction.
Looking back at Lockerbie Cases, perhaps the most interesting point that
can be raised is whether any other factor can playa role in the Court's decision
whether or not to grant the request for provisional measures? To begin with, it is
128 1. Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court (1983) at 251
129 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. NATO Members)
<http://www.icj.law.gla.ac.uklicjwww/idocketliybe/iybeframe.htm> (Provisional Measures Order
of June 2nd) (1999)
130 P.H.F. Bekker & C.J.Borgen, "World Court Rejects Yugoslav Requests to Enjoin Ten NATO
Members From Bombing Yugoslavia" ASIL Insights (June 1999)
131 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. NATO Members)
<http://www.icj.law.gla.ac.uklicjwww/idocketliybe/iybeframe.htm> (Provisional Measures Order
of June 2nd) para. 37
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necessary to determine whether the Lockerbie Cases fulfilled the three essential
requirements.
Libya requested the International Court to indicate provisional measures of
protection to enjoin the United States of America and the United Kingdom from
imposing any sanctions or considering any use of force against Libya. The threat
ofjeopardising the sovereignty of Libya, through the resolutions of the Security
Council in which the two respondents are permanent members, was seen by
Libya'Fas an element of urgency. The respondents rejected the Libyan claims of
urgency. For the respondents, the Libyan government failed to prove that there
were measures, including possible recourse to the use of armed force,
contemplated by the respondents against it.133 The respondents argued that
Security Council Resolution 731(1992) 134 did not amount to coercive measures. 135
To establish the element of urgency, it is necessary to understand the
nature of the Resolution 731. By this resolution, the Security Council urged Libya
to respond to the requests made to establish responsibility for the terrorist acts in
question. The terms of this resolution are important: terrorism was condemned
and Libya was requested to co-operate. The Security Council urged all States to
provide assistance in order to induce the Libyan authorities to respond to the
132 Lockerbie Cases 1992 IC} Rep. 3 at 10; See also J.G. Merrills "Interim Measures of Protection
in the Recent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice" 44 ICLQ 90 (1995) at III; M.
David, "Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for Application in
the World Court" 40:1 Harv.1. Int'! L. 81 (1999) at 136
133 Lockerbie Cases 1992 Ie} Rep. 3 at 11
134 The disputants discussed the Security Council Resolution 731 at length before the International
Court of Justice. Libya asked the Court for provisional measures after the adoption of that
resolution.
135 Lockerbie Cases 1992 IC} Rep. 3 at 12
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request for co-operation made by the United States and the United Kingdom.!"
The Security Council requested but did not require, so the terminology used did
not make the resolution mandatory. Furthermore, the resolution cannot amount to
Chapter VII wording. It lacked an Article 39 determination; that of the existence
of a threat to peace or a breach of the peace and international security. 137
Accordingly, the situation did not fulfil the factor of urgency, which is essential
for the Court to establish in order to indicate provisional measures of protection.
However, Judge Bedjaoui, in his dissenting opinion, saw the resolution
differently, that although the Security Council resolution 731 was adopted under
Chapter VI 138, the element of urgency was still there. He stated that:
"As regards the question of urgency, which is
another element the case-law of the Court
traditionally takes into account in deciding whether
or not to indicate provisional measures, it is
abundantly clear that this urgency does exist in the
case in point. Libya is asked to reply "immediately",
or "without any further delay" to the requests of the
two Respondent States, particularly as regards the
extradition of its nationals."!"
Judge Ajibola argued that the urgency in this case was without doubt. He
indicated that new developments during the proceedings [the adoption of Security
136 SC Res. 731 UN SCOR (1992)
137 Ibid. The Security Council did not make any reference to Chapter VII in this resolution.
l3S 1992 ICJ Rep.3 (Judge Bedjaoui dissenting opinion) at 41-42; (Judge Weeramantry dissenting
opinion) at 53-55
139 Ibid. at 39 (Judge Bedjaoui dissenting opinion)
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Council Resolution 748 (1992)] made it more obvious that the Court had to take
an immediate action and "to give Libya's request the priority that it deserves ... "140
On the other hand, Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri showed that the language of
the resolution 731(1992) gave the impression that the resolution was adopted
under Chapter VII rather than under Chapter VI. He considered that:
"The text of the resolution itself, as well as the
interventions of those who participated in the
debates, clearly indicates unanimous, general and
deep concern at the "worldwide persistence of acts
of international terrorism in all its forms",
particularly "illegal activities directed against
international civil aviation", and the Security
Council's determination "to eliminate international
terrorism". Specifically, with regard to the attacks
carried out against Pan Am flight 103 and UTA
flight 772, the Council expresses a deep concern
"over results of investigations, which implicate
officials of the Libyan Government", and after
strongly deploring "the fact that the Libyan
Government has not yet responded effectively to the
above requests [of France, the United Kingdom and
the United States of America] to co-operate fully in
establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts" in
question, the Council, in a key paragraph:
'3. Urges the Libyan Government immediately to
provide a full and effective response to those
requests so as to contribute to the elimination of
international terrorism.' "141
Judge El-Kosheri indicated that beside the fact that the resolution 731 was
adopted under Chapter VII, the adoption of resolution 748 made the situation
extremely urgent. He maintained that the circumstances of this case required the
indication of provisional measures, and the Court had "to act to avoid the coming
140 Ibid. at 82 (Judge Ajibola dissenting opinion)
141 Ibid. at 97 (Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri dissenting opinion)
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into force of the sanctions adopted by the Security Council under certain
paragraphs of resolution 748 (1992), a decision taken by the Security Council in
the exercise of its powers under Chapter VII, hence outside the scope of the legal
issue pending before the Court."!" One commentator noted that:
"[I]n the Lockerbie cases it might have been
possible to demonstrate the necessary element of
urgency was present ... , but when the Court rejected
the request on the basis of Article 103 of the
Charter, this point became irrelevant.'?"
Therefore, we can safely say that there was an element of urgency, but the
International Court of Justice did not recognise this, perhaps because it knew that
it would refuse the Libyan request on the basis of Article 103 of the United
Nations Charter.
The International Court of Justice has often used, as mentioned above, the
irreparable damage factor to determine the indication of provisional measures of
protection. Did the Lockerbie Cases fulfil that factor?
The risk of irreparable damage constitutes an important part of the criteria
to determine the indication of provisional measures of protection. The respondents
argued against the existence of any risk or possibility of irreparable prejudice to
Libya's rights. 144 The United Kingdom argued further that since the parties were
142 Ibid. at 110
143 J.G. Merrills "Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice" 44 ICLQ 90 (1995) at III
144 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 1I
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already under an obligation to avoid any irreparable prejudice to the potential
judgment of the Court and to irreparable harm to the rights claimed, the indication
of provisional measures of protection was unnecessary. 145
The dissenting judges, on the other hand, gave clearer arguments. They
made a differentiation between irreparable harm or irreparable prejudice and the
possibility or the risk of irreparable harm or prejudice, which they claimed it was
the case in the Lockerbie Cases. Judges Bedjaoui'", Ranjeva'", Ajibola'" and El-
Kosheri'" pointed out to the fact that the Libya's request could have been
successful had not the Security Council acted.
Their argument was that if Libya was forced to surrender the two suspects,
it would lose its rights under the Montreal Convention to try them, and there was
a risk that Libya would be subject to force or coercion by the respondents. All the
dissenting judges agreed that the Security Council's action changed the situation
completely. Resolution 748 had its binding effects that prevailed over any other
conventional obligations by virtue of Article 103 of the United Nations Charter. In
other words, it was argued that if the Court had not had to reject the request for
provisional measures on the basis of Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, it
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid. at 39
147 Ibid. at 73
14& Ibid. at 84-85
149 Ibid. at 109
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could have decided that the respondents were likely to take action against Libya to
coerce it to surrender the suspects, and granted Libya the requested provisional
measures. ISO
So far, it can be said that the Lockerbie Cases fulfilled two criteria that
were set out under Article 41 of the Statute. However, it is already known that the
establishment of a prima facie jurisdiction over the merits is another factor in
determining the indication of provisional measures of protection.
The International Court had to face the question ofjurisdiction in the
Lockerbie Cases. Libya argued that the International Court of Justice had
jurisdiction on the basis of Article 14 (1) of the Montreal Convention. Article 14
(I) provides that in case of disputes between the contracting parties, concerning
the application and the interpretation of the convention, which could not be settled
by negotiations, the matter should be referred to the Court. Libya claimed that this
provision prima facie established a basis for the Court's jurisdiction. However,
the respondents contested the Court's jurisdiction. The United States and the
United Kingdom maintained that the six-month period for negotiation and
arbitration prescribed in this provision had not then elapsed for the dispute be
referred to the International Court of Justice, and that Libya had failed to
demonstrate that the two respondents had refused to arbitrate."! The Court did not
make any finding concerning its jurisdiction on the ground that the request could
be refused on the basis of Article 103 of the United Nations Charter. However, the
matter ofjurisdiction was fully discussed by judges in their individual opinions.
150 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 31 (Judge Bedjaoui dissenting opinion)
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All five dissenting judges shared the opinion that the Article 14 (1) provided a
possible basis for jurisdiction. 152 Similarly, Judge Oda, in his declaration,
indicated that there was no convincing ground for asserting that the Court's
jurisdiction was lacking.!" On the other hand, Judge Ni held that the Court's
jurisdiction was lacking. 154 It is quite significant that six judges out of seven who
examined the issue saw no jurisdictional objection to indicate the requested
provisional measures. More interestingly, the objections of the respondents
appeared to be of a type that the Court has not usually treated as defeating a
finding ofprima facie jurisdiction. Judge Oda pointed out that:
"[t]he Respondent asked that the Court should
decline to indicate provisional measures on the
ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction... since the
requirements of Article 14 paragraph 1, of the
Montreal Convention had not been fulfilled ...
through the Court's jurisprudence it is established
that, if the Court appears prima facie to possess
jurisdiction, it may ... indicate provisional measures,
and this rule has always been interpreted most
generously in favor of the applicant. ..The
possibility of indicating provisional measures may
be denied in limine only in a case where the lack of
jurisdiction is so obvious as to require no further
examination of the existence ofjurisdiction in a
later phase."'"
151 1992ICJ Rep. 3 at 10
152 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 (Judge Bedjaoui dissenting Opinion) at 35-37; Ibid. (Judge Ranjeva dissenting
Opinion) at 74-76; Ibid. (Judge Ajibola dissenting Opinion) at 80,82-84; Ibid. (Judge EI-Kosheri
dissenting Opinion) at 107-108
153 Ibid. at 18-19 (Judge Oda Declaration.)
154 Ibid. at 22-23 (Judge Ni Declaration)
155 See Ibid. at 19 ( Judge Oda Declaration)
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It should be remembered that the Court's power to indicate provisional
measures is always discretionary .156 However, it was suggested that had not there
been the Security Council resolution 748(1992), the Court might have found
prima facie jurisdiction sufficient to indicate the provisional measures
requested. 157
Libya's request for provisional measures of protection did, to a certain
extent, fulfil the three elements of the criteria to indicate provisional measures.
Urgency was seen in the risk that the United States and the United Kingdom
might use force against Libya. The element of irreparable damage lay the risk that
Libya would lose its rights under Montreal Convention. In addition, the ground
for prima facie jurisdiction was founded on the basis of Article 14(1) of the
Montreal Convention. However, these elements were outweighed by the fact that
the Security Council had acted and eliminated the rights that Libya could enjoy
under the Montreal Convention. Are there any other factors or elements that the
International Court should consider before indicating provisional measures of
protection?
It is not unusual to have the International Court of Justice and the Security
Council simultaneously dealing with the same dispute. The Court can sometimes
1561. Sztucki, Interim Measures in the Hague Court (1983) at III
157 See for example, S. Bortz, "A voiding a Collision of Competence: the Relationship between the
Security Council and the International Court of Justice in Light of Libya v. United States" 21.
Transnat'/. L. & Pol. 353 (1993) at 375; M. David, "Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the
Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World Court" 40:1 Harv.1. Int 'l L. 81 (1999) at
103-104; K. H. Kaikobad, "The Court, the Council and Interim Protection: A Commentary on the
Lockerbie Order of 14 April 1992" 17 Aust. r Int'/. L. 87 (1996) at 154-155; 1.G. Merrills
"Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice"
44 ICLQ 90 (1995) at 95
120
be faced with a situation in which one party is seeking a judicial solution but the
other is referring the matter to the other UN organ. 158 Whenever different
procedures are being pursued simultaneously, the Court has obviously to deal with
the questions ofjurisdiction and admissibility.
The Court has to answer these questions before it can proceed to the
merits. If the Court has to deal with a request for provisional measures of
protection, the relationship between legal and political means of settlement may
also present issues under Article 41 of the Statute. 159
The case law of the International Court of Justice shows that there is no
objection to refer a case to the Court while another UN organ, in particular the
Security Council, is already seized the issue. But the question here is whether the
simultaneous seizure of the case would affect the Court's decision to indicate
provisional measures?
In the Aegean Sea Continental ShelfCase'", the International Court of
Justice cited Security Council resolution 395 (1976) of25 August 1976 as a part
of its justification for denying the Greek government's request for provisional
measures.": On the other hand, the Court did unanimously grant the United
States' request for provisional measures in the United States Diplomatic and
158 See the discussion below Chapter III on the doctrine of litispendency at 180-185
159 Ibid. at 125
160 Aegean Sea Continental ShelfCase (Greece v, Turkey) 1976 IC] Rep. 3 (Provisional Measures
Order of Sept. 11th)
161 Ibid. at 11
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Consular Staff in Tehran Case'", although the Security Council had already
entertained the case, and passed a resolution on the matter. In its judgment on the
merits, the Court, after noting that: "there can be no doubt at all that the Security
Council was 'actively seized of the matter' ...when...the Court decided
unanimously that it was competent to entertain the United States' request for
provisional measures, and proceeded to indicate such measures," stated that:
"whereas Article 12 ofthe Charter expressly forbids the General Assembly to
make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security
Council is exercising its function in respect of that dispute or situation, no such
restriction is placed on the functioning of the Court by any provision of either the
Charter or the Statute of the Court."!" That implies that the Court does not count
the role of the political organs as a part of the criteria for indicating provisional
measures, or not.
The Court has again had to face the same questions in its recent
jurisprudence. The relationship between the procedures that were instituted in the
Security Council and before the Court was raised in the Lockerbie Cases. The
respondents argued that the Court should not entertain and indicate the provisional
measures because the Security Council was already seized of the dispute.!"
Furthermore, the United Kingdom contended that the requested provisional
measures were designed to fetter the Security Council from exercising its proper
162 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran (United States v. Iran) 1979ICJ Rep. 7
(Provisional Measures Order of Dec.IS)
163 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran) 1980 ICJ Rep.3
(Merits-Judgment of May 24 th) at 21-22
164 Lockerbie Cases 1992ICJ Rep. 3 (Provisional Measures Order of May 14th) at 14
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powers in combating international terrorisrn.!" When the Security Council
adopted resolution 748 under Chapter VII ofthe UN Charter, the situation totally
changed. Article 25 of the UN Charter holds all the UN Member States
responsible and bound to carry out Security Council decisions. On the other hand,
Article 103 of the UN Charter stipulates that:
"In the event of a conflict between the obligations
of the Members of the United Nations under the
present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail."
Therefore, the Court had to reject the Libyan request for provisional measures not
on the ground that the Security Council had already dealt with the issue, but rather
because of a conflict between the treaty obligations and Charter obligations. Had
Libya placed its argument on its sovereign rights generally under international law
or on jus cogens rules rather than upon treaty rights in the Montreal Convention,
the International Court might have given a different order. 166 It has been argued
that the UN Charter takes priority over any other treaty but not over jus cogens
rules. 167 Judge Lauterpacht in the Genocide case made it clear that Article 103
does not extend to a conflict between the Security Council resolution and jus
cogensl"
165 Ibid. at 11
166 Ibid. at 20 (Declaration of Judge ada)
167 See the argument in Chapter III below
168 Application ofthe Convention on the prevention and punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1993 IC) Rep. 325 at 439
(Provisional Measures Order of 8 April)
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The Court's decision not to grant Libya the provisional measures was
based mainly on Article 103 of the Charter, on the conflict between the rights
under the UN Charter and the rights under the Montreal Convention.
The Court has maintained on several occasions'" that the involvement of
the Security Council is not to be treated as a decisive consideration for refusing
provisional measures.!" However, the political organs' intervention could have
some significant effects, especially when it could render provisional measures
ineffective. What the Security Council did in the Lockerbie Cases, as several
judges pointed out, was that it created a situation where Libya's rights under the
Montreal Convention were no longer significant and capable of being protected by
provisional measures. 171
The practice of the International Court in dealing with requests for
provisional measures suggests that the Court has a great deal of discretionary
powers in indicating them and that it, sometimes, considers other factors, which
are highly dependent on political appropriateness. Macdonald observed the reason
behind the Court's rejection of Libya's request for provisional measures was that:
"[tjhe rationale of the decision could have been
either that an indication of the provisional measures
requested would have had no effect or that the Court
169 Aegean Sea Continental ShelfCase (Greece v. Turkey) 1976 IC} Rep. 3 (Provisional Measures
Order of Sept. 11th); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran)
1979 IC} Rep. 7 (Provisional Measures Order of Dec.15); Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 1992 Ie} Rep.3; Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America) 1992 IC} Rep. 113
170 J.G. Merrills, "Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice" 44 ICLQ 90 (1995) at 132
171 Lockerbie Cases 1992 IC} Rep. 3 (Judge Shahabuddeen separate opinion) at 28; (Judge
Bedjaoui dissenting opinion) at 41; (Judge Ajibola dissenting Opinion) at 88
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felt that it should avoid making a determination that
would conflict with a binding resolution ofthe
Security Council."!"
The Lockerbie Cases fulfilled the essential conditions!", but still
provisional measures were not granted. The involvement of the Security Council
in the case, especially resolution 748, played a significant role. It ruined Libya's
claim of rights under the Montreal Convention. Thus, the Court could have gone
to the extreme and examined the Security Council's resolution. As one
commentator pointed out: "[0]nce the Security Council had taken action under
Chapter VII, compliance with Libya's requests could have been based only on a
finding that Resolution 748 was unconstitutional."!" The International Court of
Justice avoided getting itself into the position that it needed to review explicitly
the Security Council's actions by finding that it lacked jurisdiction, similar to the
position the Supreme Court chose in Marbury v. Madison.
Moreover, the International Court of Justice, in the Genocide Convention
Case, avoided Bosnia's request to indicate, as part of provisional measures, that
Security Council resolution 713 175 was ultra vires, by ruling that this aspect of the
request lay outside its jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention. 176
172 R.StJ. Macdonald, "Changing Relations between the International Court of Justice and the
Security Council of the United Nations"31 Can. YB. Int 'l. L. 3 (1993) at 21
173 As it was established by some of the Court's judges and some commentators, see above 109-
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174 1.G. Merrills, "Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice" 44 ICLQ 90 (1995) at 131
175 SC Res. 713 (1991) 25 Sept.l991 Para.6 reads as follows:
"the Security Council...decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that al1
States shal1, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately
implement a general and complete embargo on al1 deliveries of weapons and military equipment to
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Therefore, the International Court of Justice uses its discretionary powers to
indicate provisional measures as a way of self- restraint or as a way to avoid
possible confrontations with UN political organs.
5 Marbury v. Madison, Lockerbie Compared
The International Court of Justice in the Lockerbie cases faces the same
dilemma that the US Supreme Court faced in Marbury v. Madison around two
hundred years ago. The problem could be understood from the perspective of the
two courses Justice Marshall had to deal with. Should the Court dismiss Libya's
application, the Court would abrogate its powers to address a legal question
concerning an interpretation of a treaty. Should the Court rule in Libya's favour,
that would directly undermine the Security Council's authority, but at the same
time it would undermine the Court's accountability and credibility if the decision
was left without enforcement. The International Court of Justice, while discussing
granting Libya's provisional measures request, chose neither course and instead
decided that since there was no sufficient case of ultra vires and urgency, the
Court could not establish the necessary grounds for granting Libya interim relief.
In other words, the International Court of Justice examined and reviewed the
Security Council resolutions, and after that it reached its decision. This, for many,
appeared as an implicit assertion of the right of judicial review. 177 Thus, some
Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation between the
Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia; .."
176 Application ofthe Convention on the prevention and punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1993 ICJ Rep. 3 (Provisional
Measures Order of 8 April)
177 M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality ofits Acts
(1994); T. Franck, "The 'Power of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of the United
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scholars have referred to the Lockerbie cases as the Marbury v. Madison of the
UN legal system. 178 Like the US Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, the
International Court of Justice in the Lockerbie Cases could seize the power to
determine whether any United Nations political organ acted ultra vires. 179 It is
primarily for this reason that these two cases are often compared.!" However,
Thomas Franck saw another reason for the resemblance. In the words of Franck:
"[m]ost significant, however, as also in Marbury v.
Madison, is what the Court left unsaid. As in
Marbury, the Court superficially appears to accede
to the broad discretionary power of the system's
political "branch." But, as in Marbury, it accedes
not by refusing to decide, but by exercising its
power of decision.'?"
Even though the International Court did not grant Libya the provisional
measures requested, that did not mean that the Court abolished its right to decide.
Nations Legality?" 86 AJIL 519 (1992), T. Franck, "The Security Council and "Threats to the
Peace" Some Remarks on Remarkable Developments" 83 at 107-110 in Rene-Jean Dupuy,
Development ofthe Role ofthe Security Council Colloque July 21-23, 1992 (1993); B. Graefrath,
"Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court- Libyan Case" 4 EJIL 184 (1993); E. McWhinney,
'The International Court of Justice as Emerging Constitutional Court and the Co-ordinate UN
Institutions (Especially the Security Council): Implications of the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie" 30
Can. YE. Int'l. L. 261 (1992); K. Roberts, "Second-Guessing the Security Council: the
International Court of Justice and its powers of Judicial Review" 7 Pace Int'l. L. Rev. 281 (1995);
B. Simma, "From Bilateralism to Community Interest" 250 RDC 229 (1994)
178 M. David, "Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for
Application in the World Court" 40: 1 Harv.1. Int'l L. 81 (1999) at 91
179 T. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" 86
AJIL 519 (1992) at 520
180 M. David, "Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for
Application in the World Court" 40: 1 Harv.J. Int'l L. 81 (1999) at 91; S. Evans, "the Lockerbie
Incident cases: Libya-Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine"
18 MD. 1. Int'!. L.& T 21 (1994) at 65-67; T. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the
Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" 86 AllL 519 (1992); M. 1. Herdegen, "The
'Constitutiona1ization' of the UN Security System" 27 Vand. 1. Transnat'l. L. 135 (1994) at 149; R.
Kennedy, "Libya vs. United States: The International Court of Justice and the Powers of Judicial
Review" 33 Va. 1. Int'!. L. 899 (1993) at 915; G.R. Waston, "Constitutionalism, Judicial Review,
and the World Court" 34 Harv. Int'l. L. 1. 1 (1993)
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The Court's decision not to grant Libya the provisional measures was based on the
reasoning that Article 103 of the Charter overrides all rights Libya could have
under Montreal Convention. According to Acting President Judge Oda, had Libya
argued on more general principles, for example, had it argued on the ground that
the Security Council resolution was not in conformity with its sovereign rights
which it enjoys under general international law, the International Court of Justice
would have granted Libya the provisional measures it requested.!" Judge Oda
was of the opinion that the rejection of Libya's application had nothing to do with
the adoption of the Security Council resolution 748 (1992). On the contrary, he
stated:
" ... [the] mismatch between the object of the
Application and the rights sought to be protected
ought. .. to have been the main reason for the Court
to decline to indicate provisional measures. On that
basis, the Court would have come to the same
negative conclusion, even before 31 March 1992,
the date on which the Security Council resolution
748 (1992) was adopted."!"
More interesting are the legal issues suggested by some judges in their
individual opinions. Judge Lachs, for example, insisted on the fact that since "the
Court has the vocation of applying international law as a universal law, operating
both within and outside the United Nations, it is bound to respect, as part of that
law, the binding decisions of the Security Council'?". Judge Lachs saw this
181 T. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" 86
A}IL 519 (1992) at 521
182 1992 IC} Rep. 3 at 20 (Declaration of Acting President Judge Oda)
183 Ibid.
184 1992 IC} Rep. 3 at 27 (Judge Lachs separate opinion)
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"respect", however, "should not be seen as an abdication of the Court's
powers."!"
On the other hand, Judge Shahabuddeen's separate opinion, concurring in
the majority's result, showed clearly the Court's "carefully crafted
nonabdication"!". Judge Shahbuddeen asked whether the authority of the Security
Council is unlimited, and stated that:
"The question now raised by Libya's challenge to
the validity of resolution 748(1992) is whether a
decision of the Security Council may override the
legal rights of States, and, if so, whether there are
any limitations on the power of the Council to
characterized a situation as one justifying the
making of a decision entailing such consequences.
Are there any limits to the Council's powers of
appreciation? In the equilibrium of forces
underpinning the structure of the United Nations
within the evolving international order, is there any
conceivable point beyond which a legal issue may
properly arise as to the competence of the Security
Council to produce such overriding results? If there
are any limits, what are those limits and what body,
if other than the Security Council, is competent to
say what those limits are? "187
The questions raised by Judge Shahabuddeen suggest that there should be
limits on the Security Council's decisions and acts. These limits cannot be left
exclusively to the Security Council powers of interpretation. Judge Weeramantry,
in his dissenting opinion, expressed the same views raised by Judge
Shahabuddeen. He questioned: "does...the Security Council discharger ] its
185 Ibid.
186 T. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" 86
AJIL 519 (1992) at 522
187 1992 IeJ Rep. 3 at 33 (Judge Shahabudeen separate opinion)
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variegated functions free of all limitations, or is there a circumscribing boundary
of norms or principles within which its responsibilities are to be discharged?"!"
Therefore, Marbury v. Madison and the Lockerbie cases have shared
characteristics. Most significant is the attitudes of the respective courts, or to put it
in another context, how the courts were able to avoid direct conflict with the
political branch, but at the same time, the US Supreme Court and the International
Court of Justice were able to raise the issue ofjudicial review in these two cases.
The United States Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison was, however, able to
raise the issue ofjudicial review and assert it aggressively.!" The International
Court of Justice in Lockerbie Cases, although the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Court's judges insisted on the need for some limits on the powers
of the Security Council, was able to raise the issue ofjudicial review without any
serious assertion of this power. 190
6 The International Court of Justice and the US Supreme
Court
The silence on the question ofjudicial review in both the United States
Constitution and the United Nations Charter is the only feature that unites the
United States Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice. Solely
because of that, many scholars have seen in the US Supreme Court the most
188 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 62 (Judge Weeramantry dissenting opinion)
189 K. L. Hall, The Supreme Court and Judicial Review in American History (1985) at 13
190 W. M. Reisman, "The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations" 87 AJIL 83 (1993) at 88-90
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appropriate model to compare with the International Court of Justice.!"
Nevertheless, others have argued that such a comparison is misplaced since each
Court has its own special different characteristics."? Each Court has its own
procedure, peculiar forms for its judgments, and operates in its own system. In
this section, the argument will be that it is difficult for the International Court of
Justice to follow footsteps of the US Supreme Court in asserting its competence
ofjudicial review. However, the focal point of this section will be that the
International Court has an alternative path through which it could establish its
power ofjudicial review.
To begin with, many scholars who have supported the comparison
between the US Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice see their
similarities lying in the ambiguity of the role they have to play.
Article III of the United States Constitution establishes that, "the judicial power of
the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court", and roughly outlines its
role in the government. The Supreme Court has the power over all cases, "arising
under th[e] Constitution", including controversies concerning the United States,
separate states, citizens of separate states, and foreign powers. This is certainly
ambiguous as the Supreme Court's role in the government is left otherwise
undefined.!" Nothing said about the Court's institutional role in the government,
19l T. Franck, "The 'Powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?" 86
AJIL 5 19 (1992), M. David, "Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine
for Application in the World Court" 40: 1 Harv.J. Int 't L. 8 I (1999)
192 1. E. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council?" 90 AJIL 1 (1996) at 5
193 US Constitution Article III § 2 stipulates: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to
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everything is left for interpretation. In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court
took the initiative and defined its role and position in the United States
government.
Similarly, Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter establishes the
International Court of Justice "as the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations". The International Court of Justice has the power to decide disputes
between States on questions concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any
question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established,
would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of
the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.!"
Moreover, the Court can give its advisory opinions to the United Nations organs
and its specialised agencies on legal questions raised within their scope of
activities and competence. It is certainly clear that the role of the International
Court of Justice (like that of the other UN principal organs) is left open for wide
interpretation. Unfortunately, the United Nations Charter says nothing about
judicial review, neither to reject it nor to accept it in the United Nations system.
However, the characteristics of each Court differ. One of the differences is that the
International Court of Justice, unlike the US Supreme Court, cannot admit other
organs of the United Nations as a party in contentious proceedings. 195 In other
words, the International Court of Justice cannot make the Security Council, for
which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a
State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
194 Article 36 of the International Court of Justice Statute
195 Article 34 of the International Court of Justice Statute
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example, aparty to a binding judgment. In addition, the Court relies on the
Security Council for the enforcement of its decisions.!" That difference makes it
rather difficult for the International Court of Justice to follow the path of the US
Supreme Court in asserting its power ofjudicial review, since the US Supreme
Court has a jurisdiction over cases that involve other branches of the government
and their officials."? It can be, however, argued that in Marbury v. Madison,
Congress was not a party to the case and the Court ruled against the
constitutionality of its act. However, the US Constitution does not restrain the
Supreme Court from admitting the executive and legislative branches in its
binding proceedings, as is the case in the ICJ Statute.!"
On the other hand, unlike the Supreme Court, which has no power of
rendering advisory opinions'", the International Court of Justice could have the
chance to challenge the validity of UN action through advisory proceedings. The
International Court of Justice can be requested by a counterpart UN organ to give
an advisory opinion concerning the acts of another UN organ."? However, such a
request will not result in a binding decision. The enforcement and the
196 Article 94 of the UN Charter
197 US Constitution Article III § 2
198 There is no prohibition in Article III § 2 of the US Constitution for the federal government to
appear before the Supreme Court. See for example, Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. 172 (1818).
United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338
(1888); United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888); United Steelworkers v. United
States. 361 U.S. 39 (1960), United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)
199 Chief Justice John Jay and his associates declined a request of President Washington to tender
him advice respecting legal issues growing out of United States neutrality between England and
France in 1793. B. Schwartz, A History ofthe Supreme Court (1993) at 25
200 D. Akande, " The International Court of Justice And the Security Council: Is there Room for
Judicial Control of Decision of the Political Organs of the United Nations?" 46 ICLQ 309 (1997)
at 327
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implementation of the International Court's opinions are left totally to the
concerned organ, because of non-binding nature of the advisory opinion.
Therefore, these limits of the IC] Statute, which rule out contentious cases
against UN organs, or against any international organisation, and vest the Security
Council with the responsibility for enforcement "make the judicial leap required
to reach the legality of action by the [Security] Council all the greater.'?"
Moreover, it is still unclear what the legal effects of the International
Court of Justice's determinations would be if the Court established the fact that a
certain act is illegal. That makes it more difficult for the IC] to adopt the practice
of the US Supreme Court. There is no clearly articulated theory of the legal effects
of an IC] decision that a certain organisational act is invalid. As Elihu Lauterpacht
argued decades ago, international law has barely developed the law concerning the
consequences of a determination of illegal action by an international organisation,
whether it will be null and void, or whether it will just be illegal.?" It is still
unclear whether the International Court could determine that a UN organ's act is
void with retroactive effect, void from the time of its decision, or just voidable at
the option of the organisation."? Since the chance of having an international
organisation in contentious proceedings is impossible, and since the International
201 J. E. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council?" 90 AJIL I (1996) at 5
202 E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations" 88 in
Cambridge Essays in International Law in Honour ofLord MacNair (1965); See above Chapter I
for more discussion on the issue
203 E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations" 88 in
Cambridge Essays in International Law in Honour ofLord MacNair (1965); V. Gowlland-
Debbas, "The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in
the Light of the Lockerbie case" 88 AJIL 643 (1994) at 669; D. Akande, "The International Court
of Justice And the Security Council: Is there Room for Judicial Control of Decision of the Political
Organs of the United Nations?" 46 ICLQ 309 (1997) at 327
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Court of Justice relies on the Security Council for the enforcement of its
judgments, the development of a clear theory of the legal effect of ultra vires acts
by the Court is difficult. The International Court of Justice often avoids answering
what the legal effects of illegal acts are, and it adopted "the presumption of
validity" as a way of avoiding this kind of determination.i" In the Certain
Expenses opinion, for example, the International Court of Justice stated clearly
that the international organisations' activities should have a presumption of
validity. The International Court, in replying to the objections of certain Member
States to the legality and validity of the acts, pointed out the fact that "when the
international Organisation takes action which warrants the assertion that it was
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations,
the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organisation.'?" The US
Supreme Court has not adopted the same approach, it directly tackled the legal
effects of illegal acts long ago. In Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall pointed
out that an unconstitutional act is void.?" John Marshall, before he had been
appointed as Chief Justice, insisted at the 1788 Virginia Ratifying Convention
that: "[i]f Congress were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers
enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the
204 E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations" 88 at III in
Cambridge Essays in International Law in Honour ofLord MacNair (1965)
205 Certain Expenses ofthe United Nations 1962 IC} Rep. 151at 168, See above for extensive
discussion on the issue in Chapter I
206 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)
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Constitution which they are to guard...They would declare it void.'?" And he
adopted the same approach in Marbury v. Madison.
Therefore, establishing judicial review as one of the competences of the
International Court of Justice, adopting the US Supreme Court's methods, could
be misleading. At the very least, it requires significant changes and reforms to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice to enable any international
organisation to become as a party in contentious proceedings.
The amendment of Article 34208 of the ICJ Statute has attracted a good deal
of debate. Many international law scholars and international law societies are and
were calling for the amendment of Article 34 of the Statute to grant ius standi to
international organisations before the International Court."? The issue was up for
debate in the fifty second session of the General Assembly in 1997 when two
working papers were submitted for discussion in the Special Committee on the
Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the
207 See K. L. Hall, The Supreme Court and Judicial Review in American History (1985) at I I
208 Article 34 of IC] Statue reads as follows:
"I. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.
2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international
organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented
by such organizations on their own initiative.
3. Whenever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public international organization or
of an international convention adopted thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the
Registrar shall so notify the public international organization concerned and shall communicate to
it copies of all the written proceedings."
209 See J. Sztucki, "International Organisations as Parties to Contentious Proceedings Before The
International Court of Justice?" 141 at 15 I- I54 in A.S. Muller et al.(ed.), The International Court
ofJustice at Fifty, (1997)
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Organisation."? The working papers asked for an amendment of Article 34
paragraph 1, but agreement was not achieved on that issue.":
Those arguing for this amendment claim that new developments in
international society definitely require international organisations to become
parties in contentious proceedings.i" They claim that the involvement of an
international organisation in relations with the Member States or other
international organisations necessitates the amendment of Article 34(1) to grant
access to international organisations to the International Court of Justice in
contentious proceedings.
Long ago, Jenks called for the amendment of Article 34 of the ICJ statute
to grant international organisations access to the International Court of Justice's
contentious jurisdiction.?" Since the days of the Permanent Court ofInternational
Justice?", there has been a persistent call for this amendment, but all those efforts
were rejected on the basis that the amendment was unnecessary.i" However, with
the new developments in the scope of international organisations' activities,
especially in the United Nations, the amendment of Article 34 appears to be rather
210 52 GAOR sup. 33(A/ 52/33)
211 S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice ofthe International Court 1920-1996 (1997) at 1865
212 "[Djisputes relating to the law governing co-operation will tend to become more numerous. As
a consequence of that development, such disputes will ever more frequently involve groups of
states and International Organisations as well as States individually." See UN Doc. A/45/430 at 66
and UN Doc. A/491 PV 29 at 5
213 e. W. Jenks, The Prospects ofInternational Adjudication (1964) at 220
214 P.e. Szasz, "Granting International Organizations Ius Standi in the International Court of
Justice" 169 at 169 in A.S. Muller et al.(ed.), The International Court ofJustice at Fifty, (1997)
215 For a comprehensive account of the attempts and proposals for the amendment of Article 34 of
the Statute See 1. Sztucki, "International Organisations as Parties to Contentious Proceedings
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necessary as long as controversies between States and international organisations
occur in practice.
Although international society has repeatedly called for the amendment of
Article 34, nothing has been done so far.!" There have been, and still are, doubts
whether the strengthening or expanding of the International Court of Justice's
jurisdiction to include international organisations as parties to its contentious
proceedings would be the right choice. For many, having international
organisations as parties to contentious proceedings before the International Court
of Justice would open the doors for the question ofjudicial review. Getting
international organisations to the stand as plaintiffs or as defendants would surely
lead to the issue of reviewing the legality of international organisations' decisions
or actions. Some scholars see the two questions are inseparable. Nonetheless,
others see that the two issues are related but not inseparable."? Their argument is
based on the fact that in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice
there have been incidents ofjudicial review raised in advisory opinions, e.g. in the
Admission to the United Nations, Effects ofAwards, UN Administrative Tribunal,
IMCO, Certain Expenses, and Namibia advisory opinions.?"
Therefore, the exclusion of international organisations from the
International Court of Justice's contentious proceedings does not rule out the idea
Before The International Court of Justice?" 141 at 148 -160 in A.S. Muller et al.(ed.), The
International Court ofJustice at Fifty (1997)
216 See J. Sztucki, "International Organisations as Parties to Contentious Proceedings Before The
International Court of Justice?" 141 at 154 in A.S. Muller et al.(ed.), The International Court of
Justice at Fifty, (I 997)
217 Ibid. at 158-159
218 Ibid. at 154
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ofjudicial review from the outset. On the contrary, that only means that the
International Court of Justice should follow a different path from that of the
United States Supreme Court to assert its right ofjudicial review. The
International Court of Justice could invalidate a decision of a UN organ through
its advisory opinion, as in the case of IMCO, but without any compulsory
outcomes. In the IMCO case'", the Court declared that an election was invalid.
The Court did not see the measures as null but rather voidable. As Lauterpacht
stated:
"It is evident.. .that if there had been no advisory
opinion, the Organisation would have proceeded, on
the basis that the election was valid and
effective .. .In other words, the Assembly action is
equally consistent with the view that until an
opinion has been obtained and accepted, the
allegedly unlawful act is effective. Thereafter, it
would seem that the task of the Assembly is to give
effect to the opinion as at the date when the opinion
is accepted."?"
It is clear that ifthere had been no advisory opinion and no members had
challenged the IMCO Committee election, the organisation would have proceeded
on the basis that the election was valid. So, the Court's findings are with certain
importance, though they are noncompulsory in nature. In addition, the
International Court of Justice does not have a direct jurisdictional connection with
the Security Councilor other UN organs, and is most unlikely to annul the
219 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (1959-1960) 1960 IC} Rep. 150 at 171
220 E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations" 88 at 105 in
Cambridge Essays in International Law in Honour ofLord MacNair (1965)
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decision?" However, it is unlikely for the United Nations organs to continue
maintaining a decision that the Court declares ultra vires. Akande pointed out:
"[ajny State seeking such a decision would probably be more interested in the
public relations effect of the decision of the Court than in its legal effect.'?" Thus,
the importance of any Court finding that a political organ's decision was illegal
does not lie only in its legal effects, but rather in its effect on the legitimacy of the
political organs' decisions.?"
Therefore, although the Court has not worked on developing the
consequences of the legal effects of ultra vires decisions, in contrast to the US
Supreme Court, whether they are null and void or just voidable, it still could
review the decision, and its findings will be treated with respect; otherwise the
concerned organ would lose its Iegitimacy.i" As Lauterpacht observed,
noncompulsory machinery ofjudicial review could be a middle way between no
review at all, and compulsory review.i"
221 Ibid. at 115
222 Ibid.
223 D. Akande, " The International Court of Justice And the Security Council: Is there Room for
Judicial Control of Decision of the Political Organs of the United Nations?" 46 ICLQ 309 (1997)
at 327, see also below the discussion on legitimacy in Chapter V.
224 V. Gowlland- Debbas, "The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice and the
Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie case" 88 AJIL 643 (1994) at 673
225 E. Lauterpacht, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations" 88 at 113 in
Cambridge Essays in International Law in Honour ofLord MacNair (1965)
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7 Conclusion
The idea of a World Court was born of the success of the United States
Supreme Court.?" The United States pushed hard to model the new World Court
as the Supreme Court. The Americans had fought to have a strong and
independent Court that would ensure the application of law and justice. The
impetus for the World Court came from lawyers who wanted the United States to
lead the quest for pacific settlement of international disputes.?" However, they
were reluctant to have their nation join in boldly innovative schemes of world
order involving potentially far reaching limitations on national sovereignty.i" The
United States failed to participate in the birth of the World Court, the Permanent
Court of Justice, because of the fear of the advisory function of the new Court.
The Americans feared that such competence would threaten their national
interests and sovereignty.229
The International Court and the United States Supreme Court continue to
be considered similar. The American influence was so obvious in modelling the
World Court. Nonetheless, the International Court has drifted away from the
Supreme Court due to the peculiar characteristics of the international community.
The international community was not ready to accept the idea that it should
226 D. F. Fleming, The United States and The World Court (1945) at 23
227 P. Jessup, Elihu Root (2nd ed.) (1964) at 423; M. Pomerance, The United States and The World
Court As A 'Supreme Court ofthe Nations ': Dreams, Illusions and Disillusion (I996) at 9-21
228 D. S. Patterson, "The United States and the Origins of the World Court", 91:2 Political Science
Quarterly 279 (1976) at 295
229 Ibid; For a summary account for the debate on the Court's advisory jurisdiction in the United
States see M. Pomerance, The United States and The World Court As A 'Supreme Court ofthe
Nations': Dreams, Illusions and Disillusion (1996) at 70-138
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subordinate its own sovereignty to the Court. The idea of litigation was
considered and is still considered as a threat to the sovereignty of the state.
Therefore, the International Court's competence was shaped in a way that suits the
international system.
In the Lockerbie Cases, the International Court of Justice faced the same
dilemma as that that faced the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v.
Madison. Both Courts chose to escape from being hostile to the "executive" or
political branch, but at the same they did not abolish their judicial power. Both
gave a decision with implicit indication ofjudicial review. They were able to
assert their judicial powers without risking any institutional conflict.
To follow the path of the US Supreme Court, the Statute ofInternational
Court of Justice would require significant amendments. Accepting UN organs or
any international organisation in the Court's contentious proceedings would be
one of the necessary changes. Nevertheless, any change will not be an easy task.
The UN members, especially the Security Council permanent members who are
happy with the current situation, will vote against this amendment. They will not
accept any changes; they will not change of the situation of "a strong Council and
a weak Court't.?"
However, that does not rule out the issue ofjudicial review from the
International Court of Justice's competence. The peculiarities of the International
Court of Justice leave it with no choice but to find its own way to assert its right
ofjudicial review. The International Court of Justice has often used its advisory
230 G. R. Waston, "Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court" 34 Harv. Int'!. L. J 1
(1993) at 40
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opinions to discuss the validity of organisations' acts. Although such
determinations have a noncompulsory character, and although the implementation
ofthe Court's opinion depends on the will of the concerned organ, such opinions
have usually an implemented authority. The non-compliance with the Court's
opinion will cost the organ concerned its legitimacy.
But still, as Zimmern explained almost fifty years ago, "the transformation
from the old-sovereign-ridden international law to become law for the peoples of
the United Nations in the true sense and be recognised'?" will take some time.
Moreover, he claimed that there would come the time when the International
Court of Justice would produce spokesmen that would do for it and for the world
what John Marshall had done for the Supreme Court.?" But the International
Court of Justice should wait for the right timing, and should work on a careful
interpretation for a document like the United Nations Charter, which is open for
wide and contradictory interpretations.i"
The discussion that has been advanced in the first two chapters on the
applicability ofjudicial review to the United Nations system and on the best
model that the International Court of Justice should follow to assert its
competence ofjudicial review, presupposes that there are limits on the United
Nations political organs, and presupposes that the International Court of Justice is
the potential branch to see if the UN organs have respected these limits in their
actions and decisions. The next chapter will discuss the limits, if there are any, on




the powers on the UN political organs, the Security Council in particular. From
that point, the discussion will explore the relationship between the International




The Relationship between the International Court of
Justice and the Security Council
1 Introduction
The Lockerbie Cases10pened the door for a surge of speculation on the
relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council.
The facts of the case were discussed in the previous chapters. The most important
and crucial part of the cases for the current purposes is the Court's order
concerning the Libyan request for provisional measures. The Court did not grant
Libya the provisional measures requested on the basis that the Security Council
Resolution 748 (1992) had been adopted. By this binding resolution, Libya's
rights under the Montreal Convention were overridden.
International law scholars divided into two schools of thought.' The first
school allied itself with the Security Council. This school invoked the idea that
the Security Council's decisions, adopted under Chapter VII, take supremacy over
other international treaty obligations, by virtue of Article 103 of the United
Nations Charter. Its decisions have a prima facie binding effect on the basis of
1 Lockerbie Cases 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 and 114
145
Article 25 of the Charter. For this school, the Security Council's decisions are not
subject to law. The Security Council has the sole authority to determine its
actions.' This school appears to believe that if the Security Council is in one way
or another policing international relations and it is acting under the restraints of
the urgency of the situation, so it cannot be bound by law since there are no legal
rules to review the legality of a Chapter VII determination. The Security Council
is a "law unto itself'; opportunistic flexibility is the key to its success.' Thus, for
this school, or as Alvarez called it the "realist?' school, the Charter is a
hierarchical collective security scheme with the Security Council at its apex. For
this reason, whenever the Security Council and the International Court of Justice
are seized of the same dispute and the Security Council acts under Chapter VII,
the International Court of Justice should decline to continue entertaining the case.
On the other hand, the other school of thought, termed "judicial romantic'"
by Alvarez, considers that the International Court of Justice is not subordinate to
the Security Council. For judicial romantics, the Court is the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations and it considers only what is "judicial". The Court
should not be involved in political controversies. The Court could entertain any
dispute that is legal simultaneously with the Security Council, which will be
2 lE. Alvarez, "Theoretical Perspectives on Judicial Review By the World Court" 85 ASIL
Proceedings 1995 at 85
3 D. Sarooshi, The United Nations And the Development ofCollective Security (1999) at 3
4 T.D. Gill, "Limitations on UN Enforcement Powers" XXVI NYIL 33 (1995)
S J.E. Alvarez, "Theoretical Perspectives on Judicial Review By the World Court" 85 ASIL
Proceedings 1995 at 85
6 Ibid.
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looking at the political aspects of the same dispute. The relationship between the
two organs is of a "functional parallelism" character.' However, the judicial
romantics find in the Court the last resort defender of the United Nations system's
legitimacy.' By virtue of this fact, the Court should have seized the opportunity in
the Lockerbie Cases to rule on the constitutionality of the Security Council
Resolution 748, as it is a court of international law and it is not concerned with
any political facts surrounding the disputes.
The judicial romantics are of the idea that the Security Council, even if it
is acting under Chapter VII, should take into account the principles and purposes
of the Charter, and the rules of general international law and jus cogens. They
have invoked the idea of strict control over the Security Council's actions, and
especially over its determinations under Article 39, by which the Security Council
has broad discretionary powers to characterise or not to characterise the situation
as threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
As this chapter will demonstrate, the two schools of thought are rather too
extreme and to a certain extent unrealistic. To begin with the arguments advanced
by the realist school, having the Security Council unbound by at least the
principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter defies what the nature of
the Charter would suggest. The UN Charter is a "constituent instrument" with
limited and enumerated powers. The Security Council was created by the UN
7 v. Gowlland-Debbas "The Relationship Between the International Court ofJustice And the
Security Council in the Light ofthe Lockerbie Case" 88 AJIL 643 (1994) at 658- 661
8 T. M. Franck, " 'The powers of Appreciation': Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?"
86 AJIL 519 (1992)
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Charter and it is under the obligation to observe the limitations on its delegated
powers. Besides, it cannot be argued that the Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII, could preclude the International Court of Justice from exercising its
jurisdiction, if it happened that both organs were simultaneously seized of the
same matter. It is an established fact that the UN system lacks hierarchy among its
principal organs. Each organ has different assigned functions, the Court was given
the function to deal with a "judicial" nature of the dispute while the Security
Council was given the function to deal with the dispute's "political" aspects. The
International Court has often rejected the doctrine of litispendency in its relation
with the Security Council."
Nevertheless, that does not mean that the arguments forwarded by the
judicial romantic school are fully persuasive. The judicial romantics have
approached the relationship between the International Court of Justice and the
Security Council from the perspective of the American Supreme Court, and its
decision in Marbury v. Madison," However, we have argued in the previous
chapter that the model of the Supreme Court should not be applied to the
International Court of Justice, as it has its own peculiarities, such as its advisory
competence, and the lack of locus standi for international organisations in its
contentious competence.
The arguments that will be advanced in this chapter are, however, that the
two schools of thought do not understand the scope of the relationship between
9 Aegean Sea Continental ShelfCase 1976 IC} Rep. 3, Hostages Case 1980 IC} Rep. 3, and
Nicaragua Case 1984 IC} Rep. 169
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the International Court of Justice and the Security Council. This chapter will show
that there should be a middle way between the two schools of thought. It is not
acceptable to have an unleashed Security Council, unbound by the law of the
United Nations Charter, or the rules of the general international law. An
unaccountable Security Council will hinder the legitimacy of the United Nations
as a whole. However, it is also unacceptable to go back to the days of the Cold
War, where the Security Council was crippled by the East-West rift. It has been
argued that too many constraints on the Security Council would hinder its
efficiency in responding to disturbances of international peace and security. This
chapter will argue that although the Security Council is the sole judge in its
determinations under Article 39, it is bound to observe the law in its
consequential measures taken under Chapter VII. II
The point of departure for this chapter is to determine the nature of the UN
Charter. It will be argued that the Charter is a treaty with special characteristics. It
is more than a treaty but less than a constitution." From that point, the discussion
that follows will focus on the fact that since the UN Charter is a multilateral
treaty, and the Security Council is the creation of this treaty, the Security Council
should be bound by the rules of its "constituent instrument".
After determining the competence of the International Court of Justice and
the Security Council, the relationship between the two organs and the doctrine of
10 Marbuy v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (Cranch) (1803)
II M.N. Shaw, "The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and
Judicial Function" 2 I9 at 227 in A.S. Muller et a!., The International Court ofJustice, (1997)
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litispendency will be discussed. The aim of the last section is to show that the two
organs have separate but complementary functions, and that the two organs need
to co-operate, and rather than compete, in order to achieve legitimacy in the
United Nations system.
2 The United Nations Charter: Treaty or Constitution?
Much discussion ofjudicial review presupposes the nature of the United
Nations Charter as a constitution that defines the powers and competence of the
relevant United Nations organs. One commentator pointed out:
"[t]he concern for the institutional balance within
the United Nations and the quest for justiciable
restraints upon the [Security] Council underlines a
"constitutional" approach to the United Nations
framework: the Charter is conceived as a kind of
constitution for the community of states with the
International Court of Justice as the ultimate
guardian of its legality vis-a-vis the Council."13
The issue of whether the United Nations Charter is a multilateral treaty or
a constitution has been debated in the past", and it has not yet been settled.
It is evident that the Charter was brought into existence in the form of an
international treaty. The Charter establishes the functions and the obligations of
not only the United Nations organs but also of other actors in international
society. It sets the organisation's obligations and rights in discharging its
121. Crawford, "The Charter of the United Nations as a Constitution" 3 in H. Fox (ed.), The
Changing Constitution ofThe United Nations (1997)
13 M. J. Herdegen, "The "Constitutionalization of the UN Security System" 27 Vand. 1. Trans. L.
135 (1994) at 135
14 A. Ross, Constitution ofthe United Nations: Analysis ofStructure and Function (1950)
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mandate, in particular, with regard to the maintenance of international peace and
security and the contributions ofthe United Nations to the development ofthe
international protection of human rights, including the right of self-determination.
The Charter establishes the sovereign rights of Member States including the rights
of self-defence, but at the same time it defines the obligations arising against
States which violate international law, and sets the collective obligations of
Member States to help the United Nations and the international community in
combating aggressor States.
It has been argued that the United Nations Charter has had a constitutional
quality ab initio." and that quality in the last fifty years has been strengthened and
confirmed. 16 Tomuschat noted that:
"It has become obvious in recent years that the
United Nations Charter is nothing else than the
Constitution of the international community ... Now
that universality has been almost reached, it stands
out as the paramount instrument of the international
community, not to be compared to any other
international agreement." 17
From that point of view, the question arises: to what extent does the
United Nations Charter exhibit the characteristics of a constitution? There are
main characteristics that the UN Charter should possess to be considered as a
15 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community"
36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998) at 531.
16 Ibid.
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constitution as this concept is understood in the municipal legal framework. The
constitution should correspond to the core elements ofnorrnativity, supremacy
and the separation of powers. 18
The concept of norrnativity poses the question whether the UN Charter
provides a defined structure for the powers and functions for the United Nations
which represents the international community. Besides, this concept is interrelated
to the question whether the UN Charter does embody all the "substantial
principles of paramount importance for the international community?", that will
provide sufficient guidance for international governance.
To begin with, it is a truism that the Charter defines the structure of the
organisation and sets forth the competences of its organs and the duties of the
Member States. Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter define the aims and principles of
the organisation." They deal with the maintenance of peace and security", which
17 C. Tomuschat (ed.), The United Nations at Age Fifty: A Legal Perspective (1995) cited in P. M.
Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited" 1 at 2 in 1.
A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum, I Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law (1997)
18 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community"
36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998) at 53 I, E. De Wet, "Judicial Review as an
Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the International Court of Justice"
XLVII NfLR 181 (2000) at 189; P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of
the United Nations Revisited" 1 in 1. A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum, 1 Max Planck Yearbook of
United Nations Law (1997)
19 P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited" 1
at 4 in 1. A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum, 1 Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law (1997)
20 P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited" 1
at Sin 1. A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum, 1 Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law (1997); E. De
Wet, "Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the
International Court of Justice" XLVII NfLR 181 (2000) at 190; B. Simma, "From Bilateralism to
Community Interest in International Law", 250 RDC 217 (1994-VI) at 261
21 Article 1 para. 1
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goes along with the prohibition of the use of force", the peaceful settlement of
disputes", the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples", the
principle of co-operation which extends to every field of international problems;
in particular those concerned with an economic, social cultural or humanitarian
character", the promotion of respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms without any form of discrimination"; and the respect of the sovereign
equality of all States."
The Charter has been supplemented by jus cogens, which is defined in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as peremptory norms of general
international law which are accepted by the international community of states as a
whole, from which no derogation is permitted, and which can only be modified by
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 28
From this definition, it could be argued that the scope of the rules that
these norms set is wider than those of the Charter." However, there is a partial
zz Article 2 paraA
23 Articles 1para. 1,2 para.3, and Article 33
24 Article 1 para.2
25 Article 1 para.3
26 Article 1 para.3
27 Article 2 para. 1
28 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, see B. Fassbender, "The United
Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community" 36 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 529 (1998) at 589
29 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community"
36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998) at 531, 589
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overlap between jus cogens and certain Charter norms." In some cases, a
principle may have developed as a peremptory norm because of its inclusion in
the Charter, as the case of the prohibition of the use of force." In other cases, a
norm could have existed as a peremptory norm before its enunciation in the
Charter, such as the right of self-defence and the sovereign equality of states." In
looking at the right of self-defence, the International Court of Justice, in the
Nicaragua case, did not explicitly qualify that right as a peremptory norm before
it stated that:
" ...with regard to the existence of [the right of self-
defence], [the Court] notes that in the language of
Article 51 ofthe United Nations Charter, the
inherent right which any state possesses in the event
of an armed attack, covers both collective and
individual self-defence. Thus, the Charter itself
testifies to the existence of the right of collective
self-defence in customary international law.''"
The Court did not say whether the right of self-defence belongs to the
category ofjus cogens. However, one commentator pointed out that: "the ICJ
30 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community"
36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998) at 531; E. De Wet, "Judicial Review as an
Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the International Court of Justice"
XL VII NILR 181 (2000) at 189; P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of
the United Nations Revisited" 1 at 7 in J. A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum, I Max Planck Yearbook of
United Nations Law (1997); E. De Wet, "Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of
Law and Its Implications for the International Court of Justice" XLVII NILR 181 (2000) at 191
31 P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited" 1
at 7-8 in J. A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum, 1 Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law (1997)
32 Ibid.
33 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States)
merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 95 at 102
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insists on the "inherent" character of that right, an affirmation which suggests that
this right could not be derogated by way of treaty.'?"
In other cases, a customary rule could become peremptory without being
enunciated in the Charter, as it is the case in the domain of human rights such as
the prohibition of slavery and genocide and apartheid." The Charter does not
contain all the norms and principles of general international law. However, one
scholar has stated that:
" ... even if it is true that the Charter cannot pretend
to list explicitly each and every existing peremptory
norm of modem international law, it remains
evident that all of them benefit from a substantial
link with [the Charter].'?"
This line of reasoning suggests that the rules could be derived from
"logical implications of the generic rules established in the Charter"." That is the
Charter provides the basis on which this kind of rules could develop, and the
Charter "is the ethical and legal matrix for every rule able to be qualified as
peremptory."38
34 P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited" 1
at 8 (Footnote) in 1. A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum, 1 Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law
(1997)
35 E. De Wet, "Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for
the International Court of Justice" XL VII NILR 181 (2000) at 191
36 P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited" 1




However, this claim begs the question. During the UN Charter drafting,
the notion ofjus cogens was still under development." The drafters were aiming
to have a Charter in the real sense of the word that it would give guidance to the
newly defined community, and that instrument would be supplemented by norms
ofjus cogens and the principles of general international law," The concept of
constitution, in municipal systems, has the element ofnormativity. It provides the
structure of rights and obligations for the State and the individuals." Most
municipal constitutions today provide a framework for the political life of a
community for an indefinite time." They present a complex of fundamental norms
governing the organisation and performance of governmental functions in a given
State and the relationship between State authorities and citizens."
However, the Charter, as noted, does not contain each and every peremptory norm
to govern the international community. With this observation, the Charter cannot
be considered as a "constitution", it does not fulfil the condition ofnormativity.
Moreover, for the Charter to be qualified as a constitution has to be
supreme; that is, it must of paramount importance for every member of the social
39 L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status (1988) at 151
40 G. Arangio-Ruiz, "The 'Federal Analogy' and UN Charter Interpretation: A Crucial Issue" 8
EJIL 1(1997) at 17
41 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community"
36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998) at 553
42 Ibid. at 536
431bid. at 534
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community ruled by it." The UN Charter enjoys some degree of supremacy in the
sense that it binds the UN Members. Article l03 of the UN Charter makes
obligations under the Charter superior to every other treaty obligation that States
may have incurred. Moreover, since the United Nations includes almost all States
and the few which remain outside 45 have recognised its fundamental principles,
the Charter would bind all members of the international community."
Here, the question manifests itself: what is the relation between Charter
obligations andjus cogens norms, in the sense of which rule should prevail. The
Charter is silent on the relation between Charter obligations and jus cogens
norms. It has been argued, however, that there is no possibility of having such a
conflict because:
"[T[he Charter was designed to serve as
comprehensive updating of previously established
customs. At the same time it would also inspire
future customary and peremptory norms, these rules
would never be substantially incompatible with the
norms established in the Charter."?
44 P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited" I
at 28 in 1. A. Frowein & R. Wolfrum, I Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law (1997); E.
De Wet, "Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the
International Court of Justice" XLVII NILR 181 (2000) at 193; 1. M. Franck, "The Political and
the Judicial Empires: Must there be a Conflict over Conflict Resolution?" 627 in N. AI-Nauimi
and R. Meese, (eds.), International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade of
International Law (1995)
45 The only countries that are not members of the United Nations are Switzerland (it has just voted
to join UN), Taiwan, State of the Vatican City, Kiribati, Tavula, Tonga and Nauru. See B.
Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community" 36
Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998) at 567
46 Ibid. at 542
47 E. De Wet, "Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for
the International Court of Justice" XL VII NILR 181 (2000) at 194
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The concept of jus cogens has long been part of international law."
However, as a result of its inclusion in 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties between States and in 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
between States and International Organisations or Between International
Organisations, the concept has been widely accepted."
Article 53 deals with the effect of derogation fromjus cogens norms. It
reads: "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law." However, for the sake of this
argument, the question arises whether the concept applies to acts of States and
international organisations. In other words, whether the concept operates in
international law within treaty law only or with regard to other sources of law as
well.
The terms of Article 53 prescribe the effect of invalidity for treaties only,
but perhaps it has expanded beyond treaty law. However, that should not lead to
the conclusion that the implications ofjus cogens norms are confined only to
invalidating treaties which are in conflict with them. During the drafting of 1969
Vienna Convention, the ILC stated in its commentary on Article 61(now Article
64)50 that "a rule ofjus cogens is an overriding rule depriving any act or situation
48 M. Byers, "Conceptual ising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules" 66
Nordic Journal ofInternational Law 211 (1997) at 213-14; See also M. Byers, Custom, Power
and the Power ofRules (1999) at 183
49 L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status (1988) at 2
50 Article 64 reads: "[i]f a new peremptory norm of general intemationallaw emerges, any existing
treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates."
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which is in conflict with it of legality":", That led Hannikainen to believe that '''the
prohibition of derogation' [under Article 39] .. .is to be understood to prohibit any
acts conflicting with a given norm.I'"
It has been suggested that an action, although taken in pursuant to a valid
treaty but in violation of ajus cogens norm, would be clearly contrary to
intemationallaw notwithstanding the validity of the treaty." This was the basis of
the separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Case Concerning Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide54. He
applied the concept ofjus cogens to the arms embargo that the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII, had imposed on Bosnia- Herzegovina." Lauterpacht
stated:
"[T]he prohibition of genocide... has generally been
accepted as having the status not of an ordinary rule
of international law but ofjus cogens... The relief
which Article 103 of the Charter may give the
Security Council in case of conflict between one of
its decisions and an operative treaty obligation
cannot-as matter of simple hierarchy of norms-
extend to a conflict between a Security Council
resolution and jus cogens?"
51 ILC Report 1966, UN Doc. A/63091 Rev. 1 at 89
52 L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status (1988) at 7
53 O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991) at 343-44
54 1993 ICJ Rep. 325
55 SC Res 713, UN SCOR(1991)
56 1993 ICJ Rep. 325 at 440 (Judge Lauterpacht separate opinion). For support that prohibition of
genocide is jus cogens norm see ILC Report on the Work ofits is"Session reprinted in 2
Yearbook ofthe International Law Commission 172 at 248; L. Alexidze, "Legal Nature ofJus
Cogens in Contemporary International Law" 172 RDC 219 (1981-III) at 262
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That will lead to the conclusion that in the case of a conflict between UN
organs' actions and decisions with jus cogens norms, the jus cogens norms have
supremacy. The United Nations organs cannot derogate fromjus cogens norms
for the reason that they are created by States. They derive their normative powers
from Member States." As States cannot transfer more powers than they possess
themselves, it would logically follow that they would not be able to permit organs
such as the Security Council to violate norms which they cannot violate
themselves." That means that the jus cogens norms have the supremacy over the
Security Council decisions.
Another essential element of the legal framework provided by the modern
municipal constitution is a separation of powers among the principal branches of
government. 59 In the municipal system, such a separation of powers is a necessary
prerequisite for having a system of checks and balances among the different
branches of the government. The question that arises here is whether the division
of functions that exists within the United Nations amounts to a separation of
powers.
One commentator, in discussing the Security Council's role within the
constitutional framework of the United Nations Charter, has stated:
"Constitutional lawyers accustomed to the checks
and balances and separation ofpowers ... willlook
57 T. M. Franck, "The Political and the Judicial Empires: Must there be a Conflict over Conflict-
Resolution?" 627 at 662 in N. Al-Naumi & R. Meese (eds.), International Legal Issues Arising
under the United Nations Decade ofInternational Law (1995)
58 E. De Wet, "Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for
the International Court of Justice" XLVII NILR 181 (2000) at 193-94
59 Ibid. at 194
160
in vain for parallel mechanisms in the United
Nations Charter.'?"
This argument for the lack of "separation of powers" is based on the fact
that the United Nations only exercises certain limited delegated functions that do
not amount to a complete set of competencies.61 The General Assembly and the
Security Council are not comparable respectively to the legislature and to the
executive in a domestic government system.
The General Assembly cannot be considered as a world legislature as it
has limited competence. Article 10 of the Charter confers on it the general
competence to make recommendations on all questions within the scope of the
United Nations Charter, with the exception of when the Security Council is seized
of a particular matter." The General Assembly exercises a certain degree of
control over the other organs through their annual and special reports submitted in
accordance with Article 15. Although as a general rule the General Assembly
recommendation can have no legally binding effect on the members, there are
some circumstances in which a recommendation may create direct legal
obligations for members, for example the Assembly's approval of the budget
which creates an obligation on a States to pay its contribution or by decisions on
elections to various organs or admission to membership. However, these matters
60 F. Patel King, "Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal's Development of Limits on the
Security Council's Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter" 10 Emory Int 'I. L. Rev. 2 (1996) at 4
<http://www.law.emory.edu/EILR/volumes/win96/king.html>
61 Ibid.
62 Article 12 of the UN Charter
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relate normally to the internal working of the United Nations, which are distinct
from a recommendation addressed to a member. Besides, the General Assembly
often assumes a "quasi-legislative" role in its resolutions. Although these
resolutions cannot create direct legal obligations for Member States, they can
embody a consensus of opinion about what the law is so that, indirectly, they
become evidence of international law," Generally speaking however, the General
Assembly cannot legislate for Member States, and hence, it is very difficult to
qualify the General Assembly as a legislature for the international community; it
does not have any direct control over the Security Council and the Member
States."
The Security Council cannot be considered as a world executive. It is a
truism that the Security Council can take binding decisions and by virtue of
Article 25 of the Charter, Member States are under responsibility to accept and
carry out the Security Council's decisions. However, there is no system of
compelling Member States to execute these decisions. No State can be obliged to
render military support." Contrariwise, under a national constitution, everybody
can be forced to participate in common affairs and efforts when the community
63 One of the clear examples is the right of Self-determination. See also resolution 1803 (XVII) on
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, resolution 2131 (XX) on non-intervention, and
resolution 2312 (XXIX) on territorial asylum
64 B. Simma, "From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law", 250 RDC 217
(1994-VI) at 262-63
65 See generally J. A. Frowein, "On Article 43" 636 in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter ofthe United
Nations: A Commentary (1994)
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cannot otherwise be protected against perils." Additionally, the Security Council
is under no strict duty to act when the community of nations is endangered; it is
left with wide discretion, unlike a national government which is always under the
duty to exercise its competences." The Security Council cannot be regarded as a
world government.68
Although the UN Charter prescribes and distributes the functions and
competence among the United Nations principal organs, it is still "far from a
closed system of competences in which the application of constitutional concepts
really makes sense?".
European Union experience could provide a clear example of what it is
meant by a complete set of competences. The European Union exercises
competencies conferred on it by Member States. The political organ is the
Council of Ministers, which makes decisions usually on the basis of majority rule.
The Community Treaties explicitly recognise the European Court of Justice as the
guardian ofthe legality of the actions of the Union organs. The European Court
possesses a clear-cut constitutional power to interpret the Community treaties and
66 K. Doehring, "Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal Consequences" I
Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law 96 (1997) at 97
67 Ibid.
68 B. Simma, "From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law", 250 RDC 217
(1994-VI) at 264
69 M. 1. Herdegen, "The 'Constitutionalization' of the UN Security System" 27 Vand. 1. Trans. L.
135 (1994) at 150
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to annul decisions adopted by other ED organs." In France v. Commission, the
Court stated that:
"Even though the Commission has the power,
internally, to take individual decisions applying the
rules of competition, a field covered by the
Agreement, that internal power is not such as to
alter the allocation of powers between the
Community institutions with regard to the
conclusion of international agreement, which is
determined by Article 228 of the Treaty.'?'
In this case, the EC] concluded that the action taken (concluding an
agreement) by the Commission was void. With system like that, it is plausible to
invoke the concept of separation of powers and what it entails of the system of
checks and balances, as the European Court has done to reinforce the judicial
protection of the European Parliament as the embodiment of democratic
principles."
In the UN system, the separation of powers is not, however, clear. For
example, in establishing UN forces, the General Assembly, when it was argued,
exceeded its functions and usurped other organs' responsibilities, namely the
Security Council", the IC] declared in its opinion, in the Certain Expenses, that:
"If it is agreed that the action in question is within
the scope of the functions of the Organisation but it
is alleged that it has been initiated or carried out in a
manner not in conformity with the division of
70 See above chapter I at 60-62
71 Case C-327/91, France v. Commission 1994 ECR 1-3641 at 3678
72 Case 138/79, SA Roquette Freres v. Council 1980 E.C.R 3333 at 3360; Case C-70/88, Council v.
Parliament 1990 ECR 2041 at 2072
73 Certain Expenses advisory opinion 1962 IC} Rep. 151 at 163-64
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functions among the several organs which the
Charter prescribes, one moves to the internal plane,
to the internal structure of the Organisation. If the
action was taken by the wrong organ, it was
irregular as a matter of that internal structure, but
this would not necessarily mean that the expense
incurred was not an expense of the Organisation."74
In short, the United Nations Charter does not possess any of the
characteristics necessary to qualify it as a constitution. However, giving it the
status of mere treaty would not do justice to its outstanding role in the
development of international peace and security after World War II till the present
time. The Charter should be characterised as more than a treaty but less than a
constitution.
The notion of a constitution has been introduced to the Charter as an
attempt to distinguish it from thousands of other international agreements."
Article 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, calls the
treaty establishing an institution a "constituent instrument". It has been agreed
that even the International Court of Justice "took into account that [the UN
Charter] was a constituent instrument... "76 That terminology does not change the
notion that the United Nations Charter is an international treaty and does not give
74 Ibid. at 168
75 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community"
36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998) at 531; E. De Wet, "Judicial Review as an
Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the International Court of Justice"
XLVII NILR 181 (2000) at 189. Here, the author pointed out that the notion of constitution
introduced to the international law to distinguish treaties establishing an institution from other
international agreements.
76 L. Gross, "The International Court of Justice and the United Nations" 120 RDC313 (1967-1) at
414
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the organisation the characteristic of a super-state or super-government." On the
other hand, it shows that the United Nations Charter is not a normal treaty and
that it has evolved beyond a mere treaty. Professor Rosenne pointed out that even
those who do not accept the implications of the Charter as a constitution usually
do not submit that it is for all purposes to be measured by the yardstick of the
normal law of treaties only." In Certain Expenses, the International Court of
Justice asserted the nature of the United Nations by stating:
" ...when the Court has had to interpret the Charter
of the United Nations, it has followed the principles
and rules applicable in general to the interpretation
of treaties, since it has recognized that the Charter is
a multilateral treaty, albeit a treaty having certain
special characteristics."?"
Thus, the United Nations Charter is a constituent instrument for the
international community of nations and for the United Nations and its organs. It is
not a normal treaty and it is not a constitution. The UN Charter brought into
existence the United Nations as an entity and it has a high degree of universality.
The UN Charter was created in the form ofan international treaty (as member
States agreed on the functions and powers to be delegated to the new
77 See Reparation/or Injuries advisory opinion 19491C) Rep. 174 at 179 See also, E. De Wet,
"Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the
International Court of Justice" XLVII NILR 181 (2000) at 189; P. M. Dupuy, "The Constitutional
Dimension of the Charter of the United Nations Revisited" 1 at 30 in 1. A. Frowein & R.
Wolfrum, 1 Max Planck Yearbook ofUnited Nations Law (1997)
78 S. Rosenne, Developments in the Law ofTreaties 1945-1986 (1989) at 194
79 Certain Expenses advisory opinion 1962 IC} Rep. 151 at 157
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organisation)." It establishes permanent organs and lays down the rules by which
they can function. In that sense, the UN organs are functioning in the scope of the
UN Charter as it establishes the competences that have been delegated to them.
The powers of the UN organs are based on a treaty. Therefore, there are
insurmountable limitations upon the conferment and the exercise of the
competence flowing from the Charter. 81 Judge El-Erian observed that:
"Whatever the legal nature of the powers attributed
to an international institution, they are specific in
the sense that they may be exercised only with
respect to certain subject matters prescribed by the
constituent instrument.'?"
On many occasions, the International Court of Justice has asserted that
UN organs are under an obligation to observe the UN Charter's provisions and
they cannot exceed the competence that has been delegated to them. Recently, in
the Legality ofthe Use ofNuclear Weapons Case (the WHO request), the Court
affirmed that: "[international organisations] are invested by the States which
create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common
interests whose promotion those States entrust to thern.?"
In the light of this, it must conclude that being delegated, the powers of
the UN organs are limited. UN organs are under obligations to observe the
80 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community"
36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998) at 531
81 M. J. Herdegen, "The 'Constitutionalizatiori' of the UN Security System" 27 Vand. 1. Trans. L.
135 (1994) at 156
82 A. El Erian, "The Legal Organization of International Society" 55 at 75 in M. Sorensen, Manual
ofPublic International Law (1968)
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provisions of the UN Charter. In addition, UN organs cannot exceed the
competence conferred on them by the constituent instrument, namely the United
Nations Charter."
3 The Competence of the ICJ and the Security Council
As a point of departure, and before discussing the competence of the
Security Council and the limitations on it, it is essential to tackle the competence
of the International Court of Justice as a way of paving the way to discussing the
relation between the principal organs of the United Nations. The determination of
the scope of the competence of UN organs and the way their powers is regulated
in the Charter facilitates the understanding of the relationship between the
principal UN organs and the International Court of Justice."
3.1. The Competence of the International Court ofJustice
The International Court of Justice is by virtue of the Article 92 of the
Charter and Article 1 of the Statute, "the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations." Its status as a "principal" organ places it on equal footing with all other
major organs of the United Nations." The International Court of Justice was
brought into being by the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 7(1), 36(3) and
83 The Legality ofthe Use by a State ofNuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (WHO Request) 1996
ICJ Rep. 66 at 79
84 The doctrine of implied powers was discussed Chapter I, and the conclusion that has been
reached that the UN has powers which are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being
essential to the performance of its duties.
85 V. GowIland-Debbas, "The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice And the
Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case" 88 AJIL 643 (1994) at 643
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92-96). A formal result of this organic relationship is that the Statute is an integral
,
part ofthe Charter. A substantive corollary is that all members of the United
Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the Court according to Article 93
(1) of the Charter. The essence of the Court's functions is to resolve disputes in
accordance with law and to apply intemational law." As the principal judicial
organ, the Court's sphere of responsibility is necessarily defined by a conception
of what is "judicial"; "the function of the Court is to state law?" and it can only
establish its decisions on the basis of law."
Peace and justice in international relations are the two primary objectives
of the United Nations expressed in the Article 1 of the Charter. Therefore, Article
33(1) of the Charter imposes an obligation on the Security Council to seek first of
all a peaceful solution by various means including judicial settlement. This surely
refers to settlement by the International Court of Justice. Besides, by virtue of
Article 33(2), when the Security Council deems it necessary, it shall call upon
disputant States to seek a settlement of their dispute by the peaceful means stated
in Article 33(l). In addition, the Security Council may make recommendations to
refer a dispute to the Court under Article 36(3). However, the Court ought not to
give an opinion that is tantamount to deciding an issue in dispute between States
86 S. Rosenne, The World Court: What it is and how it Works, (5th ed.) (1995) at 32
87 Article 38 of K'J Statute
88 The Northern Cameroons case 1963 IC) Rep. 15 at 33
89 The Lockerbie cases 1992 IC) Rep. 3 at 55
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where those States have not consented to its jurisdiction since the jurisdiction of
the Court in contentious cases depends on disputing States' consent."
Peaceful settlement of disputes through contentious proceedings is not the
only function of the judicial organ. Another aspect of the Court's competence is
the rendering of advisory opinions on legal issues, a competence specifically
granted under Article 96 of the Charter and 65 (l) of the ICJ Statute. Article 65(1)
of the Court's Statute empowers the Court to give an opinion on any legal
question at the request of whatever body is authorised "to make such a request"."
The authorisation referred to seems to relate both to the body and to the subject of
the question: in other words, the Court is authorised to answer any legal question
if the requesting organ is itself authorised to ask that question." However, the
Court is under no obligation to give an advisory opinion, even if the requesting
organ is fully intra vires in requesting it, the language of Article 65 of the Statute
is permissive rather than mandatory." The Court itself noted in the Interpretation
ofthe Peace Treaties that: "Article 65 of the Statute is permissive. It gives the
Court the power to examine whether the circumstances of the case are of such a
character as should lead it to decline to answer the Request.'?'
90 See for example, Status ofEastern Carelia 1923 PCIJ, Series B, No.5, 7; KJ. Keith, The extent
ofAdvisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court ofJustice, (1971) at 89
91 M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the legality ofits Acts,
(1994) at 85
92 Ibid. See also The Legality ofthe Use by a State ofNuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (WHO
Request) 1996 ICJ Rep. 66
93 D.W. Bowett, "The Court's Role in Relation to International Organisations" 181 at 186 in Lowe
& Fitzmaurice (ed.) Fifty Years of The International Court ofJustice (1996)
9~ Interpretation ofPeace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 ICJ Rep. 65 at 72
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However, the perception of the role of the International Court has changed
in the United Nations era in comparison with that during the League of Nations
days." Professor Bowett compared the use of the International Court in the
League of Nations and the United Nations eras, stating that: "the Permanent Court
ofInternational Justice acted as legal adviser to the Council of the League of
Nations in its handling of disputes, and the Council routinely adopted the Court's
advice in its reports on disputes before it.?" however, he continued "[tjhe Security
Council has never seen the role of the ICJ [as a legal adviser], nor has it wanted to
see such role for the Court."?' The comparative decline in the use of the Court's
advisory function was part of the Cold War tension. The Soviet Camp considered
the Court at the beginning of the Cold War as a Western Court whereas the
western camp made relatively more use of the Court." The turning point was
Nicaragua case, where there was a shift in the approach to the Court between
these two camps. Since this case, the United States has showed some ambivalence
towards the International Court, and it withdrew from the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction."
95 See below Chapter IV
96 D.W. Bowett, "The Court's Role in Relation to International Organisations" 181at 182 in Lowe
& Fitzmaurice (ed.) Fifty Years of The International Court ofJustice (1996)
97 Ibid.
98 S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice ofthe International Court 1920-1996 (1997) at 187- 194
99 D.W. Bowett, "The Court's Role in Relation to International Organisations" 181at 182 in Lowe
& Fitzmaurice (ed.) Fifty Years ofThe International Court ofJustice (1996)
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3.2. The Competence of the UN Security Council
The Security Council is the body upon which the UN Charter places the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The United Nations' founders devoted four Chapters to the role and the power of
the Security Council: Chapter Von its composition, functions and procedures;
Chapter VI on the pacific settlement of disputes; Chapter VII on threats to or
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression; and Chapter VIII on regional
arrangements. 100 Chapter VI and Chapter VII were designed to help the Security
Council to work effectively in achieving and maintaining international peace and
security either using peaceful means or enforcement measures respectively. As
Chapter VI of the Charter cannot produce a binding decision, the focus here will
be on Security Council decisions adopted under Chapter VII because of their
binding nature.
Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to take binding decisions in
situations where international peace and security are in danger. By virtue of
Article 25 of the Charter, Member States agree to "accept and carry out" these
decisions. Under Chapter VII, the Charter gives the Security Council a very broad
discretion, and there are no explicit limits on the exercise of this discretion. At the
core of the Security Council's authority in this realm is its powers under Article
39.
Article 39 provides that in order to take enforcement measures under
Chapter VII, the Security Council must follow a two-step process. It states:
172
"The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security."!"
Accordingly, the Security Council first must determine whether a threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression exists."? Thereafter, the
Council must decide what measures, if any, to take in order to maintain and
restore international peace and security. The permissible measures that the
Security Council could take under Chapter VII range from measures that do not
involve any use of force such as economic and diplomatic sanctions (Article 41)
to measures that entail the use of force (Article 42).
Article 39 has recently been the source of the controversy and debate in
scholarly international law circles. Article 39, on its face, does not put any
restrictions on the discretion of the Security Council to determine the existence of
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. 103 The terms "threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" are not defined in the
100 S. D. Baily & S. Daws, The Procedures ofthe UN Security Council, 3'd edition (1998) at 3
101 Article 39 of the UN Charter (emphasis added)
102 V. Gowlland-Debbas, "Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State
Responsibility" 43 ICLQ 55 (1994) at 61; B. Simma, The Charter ofthe United Nations: A
Commentary (1994) at 612-613; H. Freudenschuf3, "Article 39 of the UN Charter Revisited:
Threats to the Peace and the Recent Practice of the UN Security Council" 46 Austrian 1. Publ.
Int 'l. L. I (1993)
103 H. Kelsen, The Law ofthe United Nations, (1951) at 727
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Charter. While an "act of aggression" is amenable to legal determination, "threat
to the peace" is more of a political concept and it is at the Security Council's
discretion to determine its extent and scope.!"
The Security Council has found that a wide range of situations meets the
threshold of Article 39. On several occasions, the Security Council has found that
a threat to the peace exists in situations where there were massive violations of
human rights. The Security Council decided that Iraq's repression of its Kurdish
and Shiite minorities, and the resulting flow of refugees to neighboring countries
and cross-border incursions, was a threat to the peace. 105 It decided that the civil
war in Somalia, which involved "heavy loss of human life and widespread
material damage", was a threat to international peace. 106 The violation of
humanitarian law in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to
international peace and security. 107 The lack of democracy in Haiti was considered
to be a threat to international peace and security.!" Indeed, when Libya was
accused of bombing of Pan Am 103 flight and refused to hand over the two
accused, the Security Council found a threat to the peace existed even though the
incident happened four years before the Security Council considered the
104 See Resolution of General Assembly Concerning the definition of "Act of Aggression", GA
Res 3314 (XXIX) 1974; see S. Lamb, "Legal Limits to the United Nations Security Council
Powers" 361 at 375 in G.S. Goodwin-Gill & S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality ofInternational Law:
Essays in Honour ofIan Brownlie (1999)
105 SC Res. 688, UN SCOR (1991); See also S. D. Murphy, "The Security Council, Legitimacy,
and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War" 32 Colum . .J. Transnat'l. L. 201
(1994) at 230-231
106 SC Res. 733, UN SCOR (1992)
107 SC Res. 808, UN SCOR (1993)
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situation.'?" These situations, or as Franck calls them "hard cases"!", raised a
surge of debates on whether the Security Council determinations under Article 39
are unlimited. III
From this brief glimpse of the Security Council's recent practice it could
be assumed that if the Security Council makes a determination of the existence of
a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, it assumes an
unlimited consequential power. I 12 Nevertheless, and while it is clear from the text
that the Security Council exercises a wide discretion under Article 39, this does
not mean that its powers are unlimited. Professor Brownlie has noted that there is
no necessary dichotomy between discretionary powers and legality. Discretion
can only exist within the law.!" This means that the Security Council cannot
claim its discretion under Article 39 without exercising it within its legal limits.
On the other hand, it has been argued that as the Security Council is a
political organ it cannot be held to a strict observance of law, as this would hinder
108 SC Res. 841 UN SCOR (1993)
109 SC Res. 748 UN SCOR (1992)
110 T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (1995) at 224 Franck defined hard
cases as cases that the Security Council considered "as a threat to the peace even though they did
not involve actual or imminent international military hostilities".
III Among others, T.M. Franck, "The Security Council and "Threats To the Peace": Some
Remarks on Remarkable Recent Development" 83 in Rene- Jean Dupuy, The Development ofthe
Role ofthe Security Council (1993), V. Gowlland-Debbas, "The Relationship Between the
International Court of Justice And the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case" 88
AJIL 643 (1994), M. J. Herdegen, "The 'Constitutionalization' of the UN Security System" 27
Vand. 1. Trans. L. 135 (1994), P. H. Kooijmans, "The Enlargement of the Concept of "Threat To
the Peace" " III in Rene- Jean Dupuy, The Development ofthe Role ofthe Security Council
(1993), M. Koskenniemi, "The Place of Law in Collective Security" 17 Mich. 1. Int'!. L. 455
( 1996)
112 I. Brownlie, "International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, General
Course on Public International Law" 255 RDC 9 (1995) at 214
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its immediate reaction to urgent situations.!" Kelsen, in his oft- cited work, the
Law ofthe United Nations, pointed out that: "the purpose of the enforcement
action under Article 39 is not to maintain or restore the law but to maintain or
restore the peace ... ,,115 Rubin has also argued that "it is certainly within the legal
authority of the Security Council to act irrationally and make 'decisions' that
reflect its political balance in disregard of the substantive law".!" However, there
is no contradiction between the political character of the Security Council and its
obligation to respect applicable rules.F'As the International Court of Justice
stated, in its opinion in the Admission Case:
"The political Character of an organ cannot release
it from the observance of the treaty provisions
established by the Charter when they constitute
limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment.
To ascertain whether an organ has freedom of
choice for its decisions, reference must be made to
the terms of its constitution."!"
Moreover, in section 1, it was argued that the United Nations Charter is a
multilateral treaty, which delegates to UN organs certain powers and functions.
As the Security Council is an organ of the United Nations, established by an
113 Ibid. at217
114 D. D' Angelo, "The 'Check' on Intemational Peace and Security Maintenance: The
Intemational Court of Justice and Judicial Review of Security Council Resolutions" 23:2 Suffolk
Transnational Law Review 56 I (2000) at 590
115 H. Kelsen, the Law ofthe United Nations: A Critical Analysis ofIts Fundamental Problems,
(1951) at 294
116 A. P. Rubin, "Libya, Lockerbie and the Law" 4: I Diplomacy & Statecraft 1 (1993) at 10
117 L. Gross, "The United Nations and the Role of Law" 19:3 International Organizations 537
(I 965) at 538
118 Conditions ofAdmission ofa State to Membership in the United Nations 1948 ICJ Rep. 57 at
64
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international treaty, it is bound by the provisions of the UN Charter substantively
and procedurally.!"
This was clear in the opinion of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor
v. . The issues of this case were raised by the defence's challenge to the
competence of the Tribunal on the ground that the Security Council in
establishing the International Tribunal and in adopting its Statute has exceeded its
powers and hence the Tribunal was not duly established by law and could not try
the accused. In its opinion, in which it endorsed the possibility ofjudicial review
even when Chapter VII powers had been invoked by the Security Council, the
Appeal Chamber stated that:
"Obviously, the wider the discretion of the Security
Council under the Charter of the United Nations,
the narrower the scope for the International
Tribunal to review its actions, even as a matter of
incidental jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that the power disappears altogether,
particularly in cases where there might be a
manifest contradiction with the Principles and
Purposes of the Charter." 120
Nevertheless, although it can be agreed that some limitations on the
Security Council's powers must exist, there are still conflicting ideas on the
nature of these limitations. Are these limitations derived from the Principles and
Purposes of the Charter, from the principles of general international law andjus
119 B. Martenczuk, "The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What
lessons from Lockerbie?" 10:3 EJIL 517 (1999) at 54 I
120 Appeals Chamber in the Prosecutor v. (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, reprinted in 35
ILM 32 (1996) paras. 20-1
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cogens, or from the text of Article 39?12I The next section will explore the
limitations on the Security Council's powers of determination under Chapter VII.
However, it is important to make it clear that although it is self- evident that any
determination under Article 39 is of a political nature'", and the Security Council
under the Charter has been granted a wide discretion, whether the same discretion
extends to all actions taken consequent upon that determination is another issue.!"
The existence of these limitations will pave the path to judicial review,
although the argument will still be which organ has the competence to review the
legality of the actions and the binding decisions of the Security Council.
3.2.1. The Limitations on the Security Council's Powers:
3.2.l.a. The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter:
As discussed, the powers of the Security Council under Article 39 are
based on a broad discretion. Judge Weeramantry wrote in his dissenting opinion
in the Lockerbie Cases:
"the determination under Article 39 of the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach 0 f the
peace or act of aggression, is one entirely within the
discretion of the Council. It would appear that the
Council and no other is the judge of the existence of
the state of affairs which brings Chapter VII into
operation... Once that decision is taken, the door is
\2\ B. Martenczuk, "The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What
lessons from Lockerbie?" 10:3 EJIL 517 (1999) at 540
122 H. Freudenschul3, "Article 39 of the UN Charter Revisited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent
Practice of the UN Security Council" 46 Austrian 1. Pub!. Int'l. L. 1 (1993) at 36
123 M.N. Shaw, "The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and
Judicial Function" 219 at 227 in A.S. Muller et al., The International Court ofJustice, (1997)
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opened to the various decisions the Council may
make under that Chapter."!"
Nevertheless, it is self-evident that an organ created by a treaty is subject
to that instrument in its very existence, its mission and its powers. 125 Being the
creation of the United Nations Charter, being a principal organ of the United
Nations, the Security Council has to act in conformity with the goals and the
objectives of the UN Charter. Article 24 paragraph 2 of the UN Charter supports
this view: "the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and the
Principles of the United Nations for the discharge of these duties are laid down in
Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII".
The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations are stated in Article 1. Article
1(l) provides:
"the Purposes of the United Nations are: [t]o
maintain international peace and security, and that
end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace."
It has been argued that observing the principles of justice and international
law are applicable to the adjustment or settlement of international disputes by
124 Lockerbie Cases 1992 IC} Rep. 3 at 66
125 M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the legality ofits Acts,
(1994) at 14
179
peaceful means, but not to enforcement measures. 126 By this way of reasoning,
reading this Article with Article 24(2) of the UN Charter suggests that "when the
[Security Council] discharges its duties under its primary responsibility, it need
not act in conformity with international law or the principles of justice."127
Nevertheless, this interpretation is too wide. It is true that during San
Francisco Conference most attempts to limit the powers of the Security Council's
competence under Chapter VII were rejected on the basis that this would hinder
the effectiveness of the policing powers of the Council. Logically, it could not be
the intention of the drafters to exclude the Security Council's competence under
Chapter VII from respecting the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
Besides, it is well- known that powers attributed to United Nations organs may be
exercised only with respect to the subject-matter prescribed by the constituent
instrument.!" Moreover, in , the ICTY Trial Chamber affirmed that: "the
Security Council is an organ of an international organisation, established by a
treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organisation. The
126 G.H. Oosthuizen, "Playing the Devil's Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is
Unbound by Law" 12 UIL 549 (1999) at 552; See also, J.G. Gardam, "Legal Restraints On
Security Council Military Enforcement Action" 17 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 285 (1996) at 297
127 G.H. Oosthuizen, "Playing the Devil's Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is
Unbound by Law" 12 UIL 549 (1999) at 552
128 S. Lamb, "Legal Limits to the United Nations Security Council Powers" 361 at 370 in G.S.
Goodwin-Gill & S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality ofInternational Law: Essays in Honour ofIan
Brownlie, (1999)
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Security Council is thus subject to certain constitutional limitations, however
broad its powers under the constitution may be.,,129
Furthermore, the UN Charter sets borderlines on the power of the Security
Council. By virtue of Article 25 of the Charter members are obliged to carry out
the decisions of the Security Council. However, the Article provides a condition
for such obligation. Member States are obliged to carry out the Security Council
decisions only if they are taken in accordance with the Charter. 130 It, therefore,
seems clear that Article 25 does not mean that the Member States are obliged to
carry out all decisions of the Security Council. This reinforces the obligation upon
the Security Council to adhere to the legal limits set by the Charter. Thus, there is
room for the view that only resolutions that are intra vires the UN Charter acquire
binding force. This position is supported by Professor Bowett who notes that:
"when it [the Security Council] does act intra vires,
the members of the Organisation are bound by its
actions and, under Article 25, they agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the present Charter." 131
This implies that even though the Security Council has a wide and broad
discretion under Chapter VII concerning its determination of the existence of the
threat of the peace, it is not omnipotent. The Security Council has to observe the
129 Appeals Chamber in the Prosecutor v. (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, reprinted in 35
ILM 32 (1996) para. 28
130 See V. Gowlland-Debbas, "The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice And
the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case" 88 AJIL 643 (1994) at 662
131 D. Bowett, The Law ofInternational Institutions, (4th ed.) (1982) at 33
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principles and purposes of the UN Charter in its execution of its powers under
Chapter VII.
3.2.l.b. Norms of Jus Cogens:
Jus Cogens norms are peremptory norms of international law, from which,
by definition there is no derogation.!" They are overriding norms of the
international legal order that they take precedence over all other norms. It was
argued above that the effect ofjus cogens norms apply not only to agreements and
treaties, but also to all other acts and situations.!" This means that the acts of
States and international organisations must be in conformity with the norms ofjus
cogens:" The application of Chapter VII enforcement measures cannot, therefore,
be unfettered where the exercise by the Security Council of its coercive powers
conflicts with peremptory norms of international law.
Bosnia's challenge to the Security Council resolution 713 135 is a good illustrative
example of the potential conflict betweenjus cogens norms and the Security
Council's resolutions. In this case, Bosnia, by the virtue of the Genocide
Convention, asked the International Court of Justice to indicate provisional
132 Articles 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and identical Articles
of 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organisations and Between Organisations
133 See above at 145-151
134 L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status (1988) at 7
135 SC Res. 713 UN SCOR (1991)
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measures, on the basis that Resolution 713, as it imposed an arms embargo on
Bosnia, assisted in the commission of genocide in Bosnia. 136
Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, in his separate opinion, did consider the
consequences of a conflict between the exercise of Chapter VII coercive powers
and norms ofjus cogens. He noted that the prohibition of genocide has long been
accepted as a matter ofjus cogens, and the Resolution 713 "can be seen as having
in effect called on members of the United Nations, albeit unknowingly and
assuredly unwillingly, to become in some degree supporters of genocidal activity
and in this manner and to that extent to act contrary to a rule ofjus cogens/?" He
concluded that:
"[I]n strict logic, when the operation of paragraph 6
of the Security Council Resolution 713 (1991)
began to make members of the United Nations
accessories to genocide it ceased to be valid and
binding in its operation against Bosnia Herzegovina
and that members of the United Nations then
became free to disregard it."138
It was argued that the norms of jus cogens could not prevail over the
Security Council's power of appreciation by virtue of Article 103 of the UN
Charter. 139 However, Judge Lauterpacht pointed out that the effect of Article 103
could not be extended to norms ofjus cogens, as they are at the apex of the
136 Application ofthe Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina) v. (Serbia and Montenegro) 1993 IC] Rep. 325 at 328
137Application ofthe Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide




hierarchical pyramid of international legal norms."? In addition, it is commonly
accepted that jus cogens norms constrain the Security Council's actions because
these peremptory norms are by their very nature binding on States. As the
Security Council derives its powers from Members States, and as States cannot
derogate from jus cogens norms themselves, States cannot transfer powers that
they do not possess.": The advocate general of the European Court of Justice
affirmed, in SAT Fluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol, that what States cannot do
individually, they cannot do through international organisation. He stated:
"if...Member States themselves, in so far as they
carryon an economic activity, are under an
obligation to respect the provisions of Article 85 et
seq. of the [EEC] Treaty, they might not escape that
obligation by entrusting that activity to an
international organization." 142
To sum up, Article 103 is much more straightforward where the
countervailing rights in question are ordinary principles of international law. One
commentator has noted that:"[s]hould a clash occur between a binding Security
139 G.H. Oosthuizen, "Playing the Devil's Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is
Unbound by Law" 12 UlL 549 (1999) at 558-9
140 Application ofthe Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina) v.(Serbia and Montenegro) 1993 IC] Rep. 325 at 411 (Lauterpacht
Separate Opinion) See also Lockerbie Cases 1992IC] Rep. 3 at 47 (Judge Bedjaoui Dissenting
Opinion)
141 1. Brownlie, Principles ofPublic International Law, (4th ed.) (1990) at 513 who notes that, jus
cogens are "rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only
by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect."; See also F. Patel King,
"Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal's Development of Limits on the Security Council's
Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter" 10 Emory Int 'I. L. Rev. 2 (1996) at 22
<http://www.law.emory.edu/EILRlvolumes/win96/king.html>, See also the discussion above at
137
142 Case C-364/92 SAT Fluggesellschaft MBH v. European Organisation for the Safety ofAir
Navigation (Eurocontrol) 1994 ECR 1-43 at 49
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Council resolution and peremptory norm of international law, the entire question
of the hierarchy of norms within the United Nations system would thus have to be
carefully rethought."!"
3.2.l.c. Principles of General International Law:
An example of where the Security Council adopted a measure that was
incompatible with general international law is provided in the demarcation of
boundaries following the Gulf War. The Security Council in the aftermath of the
conflict, determined that the situation constituted a "threat to the peace", and was
thus entitled to adopt a whole array of measures in response, including the
direction that the question of boundary between Kuwait and Iraq be settled. The
Security Council has been criticised on seizing this question as the demarcation
of boundaries is once again an area which is carefully regulated by well-
established principles of international law.144 As Professor Brownlie has noted:
"it is probable that the alignment as such was
disputed and that, therefore, the adoption of a
particular alignment by the Security Council
involved rather more than a 'demarcation'. If this is
correct, then the Security Council adopted a role
which is inappropriate and incompatible with
general international law.. .It is one thing to effect a
restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty on the basis of
the status quo prior to Iraq's invasion. It is quite
another to impose a boundary in the absence either
of bilateral negotiation and agreement or an
143 S. Lamb, "Legal Limits to the United Nations Security Council Powers" 361 at 374 in G.S.
Goodwin-Gill & S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality ofInternational Law: Essays in Honour ofIan
Brownlie (1999)
144 K. Harper, "Does UN Security Council Have the Competence to Act as Court and
Legislature?" New York University Journal ofInternational Law and Politics 103(1994-1995); W.
Wengler, "International Law and the Concept ofa New World Order" 122 at 124-125 in
McWhinney, Zaslove, Wolf (eds.), Federalism-in- the- Making: Contemporary Canadian and
German Constitutionalism, National and Transnational (I 992)
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arbitration or reference to the International
Court."!"
This opinion presupposes that the Security Council is bound by general
international law. As discussed earlier, Article 24 of the UN Charter obligates the
Security Council to act in accordance with the "Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations". This refers back to Article 1(1) of the Charter, which makes it
clear that the action of the Security Council must be pursued "in conformity with
the principles ofjustice and international law" .
In the Lockerbie Cases, Judges Weeramantry and Bedjaoui specifically
referred to these provisions and expressed the view that they require the Security
Council to respect and to act in accordance with the fundamental principles of
international law. 146 Kelsen argued, however, that the Security Council is not
under an obligation to observe the principles ofjustice and international law when
it is under an obligation to decide on collective measures for the maintenance or
restoration of peace, i.e. when it is acting under Chapter VII. 147 In such a situation
the Security Council may wish "to enforce a decision which it considered to be
just though not in conformity with existing [international] law."!" Judge Oda, in
his declaration in the Lockerbie Cases (provisional measures), stated:
145 I. Brownlie, "International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, General
Course on Public International Law" 255 RDC 9 (1995) at 220
146 Lockerbie Cases 1992 IC] Rep. 114 Judge Weeramantry (dissenting Opinion)at 171; Judge
Bedjaoui (dissenting opinion) at 155-56
147 H. Kelsen, The Law ofthe United Nations (1951) at 294
148 Ibid.
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"[U]nder the positive law of the United Nations
Charter, a resolution of the Security Council may
have binding force, irrespective of the question
whether it is consonant with international law
derived from other sources. There is certainly
nothing to oblige the Security Council, acting
within its terms of reference, to carry out a full
evaluation of the possibly relevant rules and
circumstances before proceeding to the decisions it
deems necessary ... "149
This argument was based on the ground that the urgent nature of the situation,
which constitutes "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression",
would not allow the Security Council to determine the legal position of the
parties. 150
Nevertheless, being an organ of the United Nations, the Security Council,
as all the principal organs of the United Nations, must not only respect the Charter
but also international law itself because they do not possess the power to create
new rules of law. 151 The Security Council must act in accordance with
international law because it lacks the authority to create international law. That
1-19 Lockerbie Cases, 1992 IC} Rep. 114 at 129 (Judge Oda Declaration)
150 B. Martenczuk, "The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What
lessons from Lockerbie?" 10:3 EJIL 517 (1999) at 545
151 M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the legality of its Acts,
(1994) at 32; G. Tunkin, "Legal Bases of International Organization Action" 261 in R. 1. Dupuy
(ed.), A Handbook ofInternational Organizations (1988) who argued that States create norms of
International law. Compare with H. G. Schermers, "The Legal Bases of International Organization
Action" 401 in R. 1. Dupuy (ed.), A Handbook ofInternational Organizations (2nd ed.)(1998) who
rejected this idea and found it inapplicable for the contemporary international legal system. "there
are rules of international law which States cannot amend, which are valid not only between States
but above them."
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authority rests exclusively with States. 152 Bedjaoui asserted that there is no
indication in the Charter to show that States "abdicated to the organs of the United
Nations their exclusive power to create new customs through their concordant,
consistent and undisputed practice."!"
Additionally, the United Nations organs have international personality,
and as a result, they are subject to international law. Judge Fitzmaurice expressed
the view in Namibia opinion": that because the United Nations is itself a subject
of international law, the Council is as much subject to the principles of
international law as any individual Member States. ISS He observed that:
"Even when acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter itself, the Security Council has no power to
abrogate or alter territorial rights, whether of
sovereignty or administration... [T]his is a principle
of international law that is well-established... and
the Security Council is as much subject to it.,,156
The implication of this view is that the Security Council is bound by the
boundaries of its competence drawn by the UN Charter, and it is bound to respect
general international law.
152 M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the legality of its Acts,
(1994) at 32
153 Ibid.
154 Legal Consequences for States ofthe Continued Presence ofSouth Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 1971 ICJ Rep. 16
155 Legal Consequencesfor States ofthe Continued Presence ofSouth Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 1971 ICJ Rep. 16 at 294
(Judge Fitzmaurice, dissenting opinion)
156 Ibid.
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3.2.l.d. Textual Approach to Article 39:
It was advanced earlier that the limitations on the Security Council's
powers under Chapter VII only apply to the enforcement measures adopted rather
than to its initial determination of the existence of a "threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression". It has been argued that these terms cannot be
subject to legal determination. Rather, they are subject to political appreciation."?
Few have discussed any limitations on the Security Council's power
arguing through the terms of Article 39. One commentator has explained that
"international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 only refers to
the absence of armed violence in international relations."!" In that sense, the
Security Council is the guardian of the minimum conditions of peaceful
coexistence in the international community; it is not a super-government. 159 For
this reason, the Security Council can act under Chapter VII only when there is "a
demonstrable link to the use of armed force in international relations"!". It has
been argued that the Council should wait until an armed conflict takes place.
However, the competence of the Security Council under Chapter VII does have a
157 T.O. Gill, "Limitations on the UN Enforcement Powers", XXVI NYIL 33 (1995) at 39- 46
158 B. Martenczuk, "The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What
lessons from Lockerbie?" 10:3 EJiL 517 (1999) at 543; Ciechanski pointed out that: cc ••• the UN
founders ... had a clear sense of the material limits of the Security Council actions under Chapter
VII, which were to be restricted to transborder aggressions among sovereign nations." J.
Ciechanski, "Enforcement Measures Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: UN Practice after the
Cold War" 3:4 International Peacekeeping 82 (1996) at 83
159 B. Martenczuk, "The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What
lessons from Lockerbie?" 10:3 EJiL 517 (1999) at 543 at 544
160 Ibid.
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preventive component'?', which means that a certain use of force may constitute a
degree of "threat to the peace" if it is of a seriousness that might increase the
possibility of the likelihood of armed international conflict. In this sort of
situation, the Security Council could employ Chapter VII enforcement measures.
According to this interpretation, the textual approach to Article 39 would not
restrict the competence of the Security Council, and the term "threat to the peace"
is still flexible enough to include all major forms of "international misconduct".
On this basis, it should be accepted that the determination under Article 39
is of a political nature, and a legal interpretation to these terms is precluded. What
could be controllable are the measures taken as a consequence to the existence of
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". As Shaw explains:
"It could well be argued that some of these
consequential activities, more correctly defined as
secondary level actions after the initial response has
been taken to restore international peace and
security, should not also fall within the wide
discretion of the Council.. ." 162
To sum up, the Security Council appears to have its unlimited powers in
its determinations under Article 39. However, the realist school arguments of
unlimited powers of the Security Council are not totally correct as it has been
shown that the Security Council is bound by law in dealing with the consequential
measures of these determinations. It is essential now to turn and discuss the shape
of the relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security
161 Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Selfdefence, (2nd ed.) (1994) at 279
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Council to see whether the arguments of the judicial romantic school could fit into
the UN system.
4 The Relationship between the International Court of
Justice and the Security Council
4.1 The Relation in the context of the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute:
The relationship between the International Court of Justice and the United
Nations is a relation with special characteristics. The International Court of
Justice is in an organic relation with the United Nations. It is the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. Its Statute forms an integral part of the United
Nations, but it is controversial whether the United Nations Charter is a part of the
ICJ Statute.!" This organic relation between the International Court of Justice and
the United Nations has been seen as a step forward in more coherent and legalistic
United Nations in comparison to the relation between the Permanent Court of
International Justice and the League of Nations.!" The founders of the United
Nations asserted the fact that an effective organisation should have its judicial
organ, which must be kept independent in the exercise of its substantive
functions, but at the same time, it must have a close relation with the other
organs. 165
162 M. N. Shaw, "The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and
Judicial Function" 219 at 227 in A.S. Muller et aI., The International Court ofJustice, (1997)
163 L.Gross, "The International Court of Justice and the United Nations" 120 RDC 313 (1967-1) at
'"'?'"'
.)-.)
164 S. Rosenne, The Law and the Practice ofthe International Court 1920-1996, (1997) at 104
165 17 UNCIO 37, 47, 49, 408; see also S. Rosenne, The Law and the Practice ofthe International
Court 1920-1996, (1997) at 104
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It has been argued that the Permanent Court of International Justice was
closer to the League of Nations, in the context of the course of activities, than is
the case between the International Court of Justice and the United Nations. 166 As
the League of Nations approached the Court for legal advice and guidance, the
Permanent Court of International Justice "had to playa dual role. It was available
as a part of the machinery at the League's disposal, a role that was mainly
performed through the advisory opinions."!" For Professor Rosenne, the
"organic" link between the League and the Court existed, but in the United
Nations system, this link is much more pronounced. 168 During the days of the San
Francisco Conference, it was stressed that the International Court was not
established upon any different basis than the General Assembly and the Security
Council.!" It was integrated into the organisation, it did not form a "autonomous
institution" in the real sense of the word.
As mentioned earlier, the International Court of Justice is empowered to
render advisory opinions to the United Nations principal organs and its
specialised agencies by virtue of Article 96 of the United Nations Charter, and
Article 65(1) of the ICJ Statute. The Court is to give legal guidance to the United
Nations on any legal issue raised within the activities and the competence of UN
166 L.Gross, "The International Court of Justice and the United Nations" 120 RDC313 (1967-I)at
324
167 S. Rosenne, The Law and the Practice ofthe International Court 1920-1996, (1997) at 101
168 Ibid. at 102-104
169 17 UNCIO 37, 47, 49, 408
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organs and the specialised agencies.!" The International Court of Justice
considers itself as a UN organ such that it must participate in the organisation's
activities and co-operate in the attainment of the aims of the organisation. Judge
Azevedo observed that the Court "has been raised to the status of a principal
organ and thus more clearly geared to the mechanism of the United Nations
Organisation", and that it "must do its utmost to co-operate with the other organs
with a view of attaining the aims and principles that have been set forth."!"
During the Cold War era, the Court was not popular with UN organs.!"
The Court did not have the opportunity to fully participate in the United Nations,
the use of the Court by the UN principal organs, in particular the Security
Council, was minimal. 173 The Security Council has made a recommendation under
Article 36 (3) of the UN Charter to refer a legal dispute to the International Court
of Justice only once. 174 The Security Council exercised its competence to ask for
the Court's advisory opinion on any legal question only in one instance, in the
Namibia opinion.
In this section, we are not dealing with the relationship between the
Security Council and the International Court of Justice in the context of the
170 The Legality ofthe Use by a State ofNuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (WHO Request) 1996
ICJ Rep. 66
171 Peace Treaties (lSI Phase) 1950 ICJ Rep. 65 at 82 Judge Azevedo (Separate Opinion)
172 See generally S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice ofthe International Court 1920- 1996 (1997)
at 121-138
173 Under the League of Nations, over a period of nineteen years, twenty-nine requests were
received by the Permanent Court of International Justice, and twenty-seven opinions were
delivered. Under the UN and over a period of fifty-five years, twenty-three opinions were
requested and delivered.
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requests for advisory opinions175, but rather with the simultaneous consideration
of the same dispute, where both organs could render binding decisions. The
Charter implies no hierarchical relationship between the principal organs. This
indicates that the simultaneous consideration of a dispute does not bar any organ
from dealing with a dispute within its sphere of competence. Procedures before
the International Court of Justice and any UN political organ "are complementary
and can be pursued simultaneously or successively."!" It has been excessively
discussed in scholarly works that there is no problem of having a simultaneous
consideration of the same dispute, as the Court and the Security Council operate
on different planes that complement each other.!" The Court would deal with the
dispute from the legal perspective, while the political organs deal with the dispute
adopting political methods. Both organs should co-ordinate and co-operate rather
than compete. That was the essence of Judge Lachs' opinion. For him, the Court
174 Corfu Channel Case 1947 ICJ Rep. 4
175 This will be discussed below in Chapter IV
176 T. 1. H. Elsen, Litispendence between the International Court ofJustice and the Security
Council, (1986) at 49
177 Among others, D. Akande, "The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is
there a Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?" 46
ICLQ 309 (1997), M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the
Legality ofits Acts (1994), M.N. Shaw, "The Security Council and the International Court of
Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial Function" 219 in A.S. Muller et al. The International Court of
Justice (1997), K. Skubiszewski, "The International Court of Justice and the Security Council"
606 at 606-610 in V. Lowe & M. Fitsmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years ofThe International Court of
Justice (1996), T. Sugihara, "The Judicial Function of the International Court of Justice with
respect to Disputes Involving Highly Political Issues" 117 in A.S. Muller et al. The International
Court ofJustice (1997), E. Zubel, "The Lockerbie Controversy: Tension Between the International
Court of Justice and the Security Council" 5 Annual Survey ofInternational & Comparative Law
259 (1999)
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and the Security Council could perform their "separate but complementary
functions with respect to the same events."!"
However, certain arguments have been advanced to argue that the Court
cannot consider a dispute already seized by the Security Council under Chapter
VII, since the UN Charter confers on the Security Council the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 179 This kind
of argument is based on the allocation of responsibilities between the organs of
the United Nations. Nevertheless, it can be counter-argued that the Charter
confers on the Security Council the primary but not the exclusive responsibility
for the maintenance of peace and security.!" Certainly, there are no provisions in
the Charter, which suggest that, in cases where the Security Council is seized of
the matter under Chapter VII, the Court should be constrained not to assume
jurisdiction.": The Court, as will be shown below, has rejected this kind of
objection, and it has insisted that even in disputes involving a threat to
international peace the Court will not defer to the Security Council. 182 However, in
a situation where the Security Council is acting under Chapter VII, there is a
178 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 1978 ICJ Rep. 3 at 52 (Judge Lachs separate opinion)
1791. Delbruk, "Article 24" 397 in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter ofthe United Nations: A
Commentary (1994); G.H. Oosthuizen, "Playing the Devil's Advocate: the United Nations
Security Council is Unbound by Law" 12 Llll: 549 (1999) at 551
180 Nicaragua Case 1984 ICJ Rep. 392 at 434-35; see also Lockerbie Cases 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 22
(Declaration of Judge Ni)
181 T. Sugihara, "The Judicial Function of the International Court of Justice with respect to
Disputes Involving Highly Political Issues" 117 at 125 in A.S. Muller et ai. The International
Court ofJustice, (1997)
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possibility that the two organs could reach different and conflicting conclusions,
with both potentially having a binding force upon the States concerned. In that
case, does the concept of litispendency apply? i.e. Does the Security Council's
seizure of the dispute bar the International Court of Justice from exercising its
competence to determine the same dispute?
4.2 The Relation in Practice:
The UN Charter's drafters intended to create a functional separation
among the different UN principal organs.!" The principal organs were designed to
have separate but complementary functions. These functions are different in
nature and methods of operation. 184 The differences are as Professor Gowlland-
Debbas pointed out, reflected in the nature of their responsibilities, composition,
methods of operation and power. 185 There is a clear division of responsibilities.
The Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, set up to function
in accordance with its Statute, and it has to deal with everything that is of a legal
nature. 186 On the other hand, the Security Council is a political organ, it has the
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under
Article 24 of the Charter, and the General Assembly is a political and
182 For example, Aegean Sea Continental ShelfCase, the Hostages Case, Nicaragua Case, See
Also T. J. H. Elsen, Litispendence between the International Court ofJustice and the Security
Council, (1986) at 63
183 Doc.933 IV/2/42 (2), I3 UNCIO Docs. 703 at 709
184 Lockerbie Case 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 96 Judge EI-kosheri (dissenting opinion)
185 V. Gowlland-Debbas, "The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice And the
Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case" 88 AJII 643 (1994) at 653
186 Article 92 of the UN Charter
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administrative organ of the United Nations. However, the intention of the United
Nations founders was not "to encourage a blinkered parallelism of functions but a
fruitful interaction"187.
Therefore, it is not unusual!" for a dispute to be entertained by the judicial
organ and the political organs ofthe UN. 189 As noted in the previous section, it is
possible to have the simultaneous consideration of a dispute in two organs and it
has its basis in the law of the United Nations. The International Court of Justice
appears to have approached the issues in a spirit of "co-operation with the
Security Council, not of competition, and not on the basis of any hierarchical
relationship between [these] two principal organs,"!" which are the only organs of
the United Nations with the power to make decisions which are binding on States.
However, the relationship is given a different shape with the concept of
litispendency blooming in the air. It has been argued that the concept of
litispendency has no place in the United Nations system.": However, it has been
claimed that the existence of Article 12 of the Charter means that the Charter
187 Lockerbie Cases 1992/CJ Rep. 114 at 138 (Judge Lachs separate opinion)
188 Professor Shaw has pointed out: " ... co-ordinate or parallel consideration of the same factual
situation by different legal and political organs is the rule rather than the exception". M. N. Shaw,
"The International Court of Justice: A Practical Perspective" 46 ICLQ 831 (1997) at 835
189 Article 12 of the UN Charter restrains the General Assembly from considering a dispute that
the Security Council is dealing with. But there is no provision in the Charter to regulate the
relation between the International Court of Justice and the political organs.
190 S. Rosenne, The Law and the Practice ofthe International Court 1920-1996, (1997) at 137
191 Rosenne and Gill, The World Court What It is and How It works (4 th ed.) (1989) at 32-33; D.
Ciobanu, "Litispendency Between the International Court of Justice and the Political Organs of the
United Nations" 209 at 219 in L. Gross (ed.), The Future ofthe International Court ofJustice
(1976) (stating that "It is not certain that the doctrine of litispendence is a component part of the
law of the United Nations")
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embodies a concept of litispendency that co-ordinates the jurisdiction of the
principal political organs of the United Nations. 192 By definition, the concept of
litispendency legally precludes an organ from exercising jurisdiction in its
respective sphere of activity simply because the other organ is simultaneously
seized of the same question.193
However, in relation between the Court and the Security Council there is
no such a provision as Article 12 of the Charter. Leo Gross stated: "[n]o
comparable provision (Article 12) has been inserted with respect to matters
pending before the political organs and the judicial organ."!" That indicates that
the concept of litispendency does apply to the relationship between the political
organs, but not to the relationship between the International Court of Justice and
the political organs of the United Nations. The Charter opens the possibility of
numerous cases of simultaneous seizing of the same dispute. 195 A party to a
dispute or any other State'" or the Secretary- General!" may bring a dispute to the
attention of the Security Council, which might embark on enforcement action
192 T. J. H. Elsen, Litispendence between the International Court ofJustice and the Security
Council, (1986) at 49
193 Rosenne and Gill, The World Court What It is and How It works (4th ed.) (1989) at 32-33; See
also T. 1. H. Elsen, Litispendence between the International Court ofJustice and the Security
Council, (1986) at 1
194 L. Gross, "The International Court of Justice and the United Nations" 120 RDC 313 (1967- I)
at 328
195 M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the legality ofits Acts,
(1994) at 61
196 Article 35 (1) (2) of the Charter
197 Article 99 of the UN Charter
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under Chapter VII, and at the same time the party or parties may refer the dispute
to the Court.
The simultaneous consideration of a dispute arose in the Aegean Sea
Continental ShelfCase. In this case, while the Security Council was dealing the
dispute between Turkey and Greece concerning the Aegean Sea continental shelf,
the Court simultaneously entertained proceedings in the dispute.!" Objections
were raised against such concurrent jurisdiction. However, the Court expressed its
belief that the simultaneous treatment of one matter by multiple UN organs was
unproblematic, and "neither ofthose two organs must wait for the other to assert
jurisdiction over a case."!"
Similarly, the objection of litispendency was raised by the respondent, the
United States, in the Nicaragua Case. The facts of the case have already been
discussed in an earlier Chapter. The United States argued that the Court should
decline to entertain the case as the Security Council was dealing with the dispute
at the same time. The Court denied that the mere presence of an issue before any
other United Nations organ should preclude another organ from simultaneously
considering the issue."? It was argued that when the Security Council seized the
matter under Chapter VII, the International Court of Justice should decline to
198 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey) 1976 ICJ Rep. 3
199 D. E. Acevedo, "Disputes Under Consideration By the UN Security Councilor Regional
Bodies" 242 at 255 in L.F. Damrosch. (ed.), The International Court OfJustice at Crossroads,
(1987); see also Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey)1976 ICJ Rep. 3 at 11
200 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Jurisdiction
and Admissibility) 1984 ICJ Rep. 392 at 432-5
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entertain the dispute.?" However, Rosenne observed that: "[t]here is... no express
authority in the Charter or in the Statute for the proposition that, if a case
submitted to the Court should constitute a threat to world peace, the Security
Council may seize itself to the case and thereby put an end to the Court's
jurisdiction."202
It is obvious and normal that in the Court the relief sought is always legal,
which on the other hand, in the Security Council the remedy sought is political in
nature. It is understood that a degree of complementary exists between those
organs from the perspective of their powers and competence.i" Mr. Owen, the
agent of the United States, stated in the United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran Case:
"The Security Council is a political organ which has
responsibility for seeking solutions to international
problems through political means. By contrast, this
Court is a judicial body with the responsibility to
employ judicial methods in order to resolve those
problems which lie within its jurisdiction. There is
absolutely nothing in the United Nations Charter or
in this Court's Statute to suggest that action by the
Security Council excludes action by the Court, even
if the two actions might in some respects be
parallel."204
The International Court itself asserted this conclusion, and observed that:
201 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Provisional
Measures) 1984 ICJ Rep. 169 at 185
202 S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice ofthe International Court 1920- 1996 (1997) at131
203 V. Gowlland-Debbas, "The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice And the
Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case" 88 AJIL 643 (1994) at 648
204 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Pleadings 1 at 29
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"it does not seem to have occurred to any member
of the [United Nations Security] Council that there
was or could be anything irregular in the
simultaneous exercise of their respective functions
by the Court and the Security Council. Nor is there
in this any cause of surprise ... It is for the Court, the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to
resolve any legal questions that may be in issue
between parties to a dispute; and the resolution of
such legal questions by the Court may be important,
and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the
peaceful settlement of the dispute. This is indeed
recognised by Article 36 of the Charter. .. "205
This case, as noted earlier, showed that even in disputes that involve a threat to
international peace, the Court will not defer to the Security Council.206 A division
of functional responsibilities between the International Court and the other UN
organs does not preclude the simultaneous application of political and legal
methods to a given dispute.
Nevertheless, the most debatable situation is when the two organs reach
conflicting or contradicting conclusions. The Security Council, in the Lockerbie
Cases, suppressed or restricted the decision of the Court by the adoption of the
Resolution 748. This case certainly presented a situation in which the binding
determinations of the Court and the Security Council could be in conflict with
respect to the same matter. The political processes of the Security Council had
produced a decision, Resolution 748, that obliged Libya to extradite its two
accused suspects, while a judicial pronouncement on the interpretation of the
205 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v. Iran) 1980
IC} Rep. 3 at 21-2
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Montreal Convention of 1971 could, supposing that the Court had not adopted the
tentative approach of denying Libya provisional measures, have held that Libya
was under no legal obligation to extradite the suspects contrary to its domestic
law?" It is striking, however, that the International Court, in its opinion, left this
issue unclear and opened speculations as to whether the Court was right in
exercising self-restraint.
Professor Macdonald observed that the reason behind the reason for the
Court's rejection of Libya's request for provisional measures could be either that:
"[t]he rationale of the decision could have been
either that an indication of the provisional measures
requested would have had no effect or that the
Court felt that it should avoid making a
determination that would conflict with a binding
resolution ofthe Security Council.'?"
As the functions and the spheres of competence of the International Court and the
Security Council are different, there was no clear reason why contrary
determinations should undermine the decisions of either body. The Court could
have decided the legal extradition issue while the Security Council was dealing
with the State's international terrorism.?"
One commentator argued that the Court's decision in the Lockerbie Cases
(provisional measures) helped in defining "the hierarchy of competence in the
206 T. 1. H. Elsen, Litispendence between the International Court ofJustice and the Security
Council, (1986) at 63
207 R. St..J. Macdonald, "Changing Relations Between The International Court Of Justice and The
Security Council of The United Nations" 31 Can. 1'. Int'l L. 3 (1993) atl?
208 Ibid. at 21
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United Nations, and held that certain resolutions of the Security Council
precluded the Court from taking judicial action.'?" However, as mentioned above,
the Charter does not create any hierarchical relationship between the principal
organs of the United Nations. Besides, the precedents of the relation between the
International Court and the Security Council established the fact the doctrine of
litispendency does not apply to their relation. Instead, the simultaneous and
concurrent jurisdiction on the same dispute is what colours that relation.
However, it is essential to note that the Court's order not to grant Libya
the requested provisional measures does not mean that the Security Council did
preclude the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. The Court did not find that
Libya's rights under Montreal Convention could not be protected. The Court
could have given a different conclusion had Libya used its rights under general
international law as the basis for its request for provisional measures."!
This section rejects the arguments that deny the Court's capabilities of
handling the same dispute simultaneously with the Security Council. However, it,
at the same time, raises the problem of the non-justiciability that is often
advanced against the Court's jurisdiction and competence to settle disputes. For
more than a century, the justiciability of international disputes has been among
209 Lockerbie Cases 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 34 (Judge Bedjaoui dissenting opinion)
210 S.l. Bortz, "Avoiding a Collision of Competence: The Relationship between the Security
Council and the International Court of Justice in the Light of Libya v. United States" 2 Journal of
Transnational Law and Policy 353 (1993) at 353
211 Judge Oda's Declaration, Lockerbie Cases, 1992 ICJ Rep. 3 at 18-19
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the most vigorously debated issues in international Iaw.i" The essence of the
doctrine ofjusticiability is that there are some disputes that are too political, or
too complex and remote from the legal forum, to be comprehended through the
ordinary judicial process. This relates to the nature of the questions that the Court
is able to entertain. It has been argued that the Security Council is deemed
competent to decide political matters, whereas the Court is accorded primacy in
legal matters. The International Court of Justice has often mentioned that the
political aspects of a particular dispute do not preclude it from entertaining the
legal aspects of the dispute.!" The next section will give a wider picture of the
doctrine of non-justiciability. In the light of this, it will then examine the
jurisprudence of the International Court dealing with this issue.
5 Dichotomy Between the Legal and Political Disputes
5.1 The Philosophy behind the Doctrine of Non-Justiciability:
The doctrine of non-justiciability is an expression of the doctrine of state
sovereignty. A sovereign state does not acknowledge any authority above itself; it
recognises itself as a sole judge of its actions, especially in matters concerning its
relations with other sovereign states. As early as the First Hague Conference
212 H. Lauterpacht, The Function ofLaw in the International Community, (1933); R.Y. Jennings,
"Reflections on the Term 'Dispute'" 401 at 405 in R. St. J. Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honour of
Wang Tieya (1994); R. Higgins, "Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process" 17
ICLQ 58 (1968); T. Sugihara, "The Judicial Function of the International Court of Justice with
Respect to Disputes Involving Highly Political Issues" I 17 at 117 -1 19 in A.S. Muller et ai. (eds.),
The International Court ofJustice (1997)
213 See for example the International Court of Justice Opinions in United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran) 1980 ICJ Rep. 3 at 20; Case Concerning Military
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when the idea of compulsory arbitration began to emerge, the distinction between
legal and political disputes was introduced. It was thought that such a distinction
might help to overcome the general unwillingness of States to submit their
disputes to an international tribunal for judicial settlement and to preserve the
sovereignty of States.!"
It has been noted that the doctrine of non-justiciability connotes that, by
the very nature of international relations, there are certain types of international
disputes that are not suitable for judicial settlement, "in particular for judicial
settlement following upon obligation undertaken in advance within the framework
of so-called "compulsory" or "obligatory" arbitration.'?"
The notion of inherent limitations on the scope of the international judicial
process is comparatively recent. Lauterpacht has traced this notion to a distinction
first drawn in the mid-eighteenth century by the Swiss jurist Vattel. In his attempt
to reconcile the right of sovereignty with the recognition of a legal order among
nations, Vattel' s views were that the possibility of arbitration could be seen only
in disputes that did not affect the safety of the States.!" It therefore becomes
necessary to distinguish essential rights and less important ones in order to
determine where arbitration would be useful. In practice, essential rights were
construed as only those that would constitute threats to a State's very survival.
Governments have frequently held to the view that judicial settlement of disputes
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States ofAmerica)
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 1984 IC} Rep. 392 at 433
214 H. Lauterpacht, The Function ofLaw in the International Community (1933) at 5
215 Ibid. at 4
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must be confined to small issues that do not affect the vital interests of States.
However, the use of the concept of vital interests is very problematic. A State
may subjectively determine the scope of its vital interests."? It is capable of being
expanded to include any dispute to which that State does not want to see the
application of intemationallaw. Justifying the doctrine of non-justiciability on the
basis of important issues or the vital interests of a State aims to reserve to that
State the freedom of action of which it alone the judge.?"
Towards the beginning of the twentieth century, international legal
scholars sought to revive Vattel' s views by enhancing the class of essential rights,
substituting broader notions of sovereign prerogative for that of national survival.
The distinction between political and legal disputes has, however, been given
other connotations. In his 1873 speech at the first meeting of the Institute of
International law, Goldschmidt believed that: "there are no grounds for a judicial
decision, nor consequently for an arbitral decision, in differences which are not of
a legal character... and whose nature does not admit of a judgement according to
rules of law,'?" Accordingly, legal disputes are those in which rules oflaw can be
applied and political disputes are those in which the rule of law finds no place. In
216 Ibid.
217 See the United States' practice in Nicaragua and how wide was the interpretation of"vital
interests". Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States ofAmerica) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 1984 IC] Rep. 392 at 398-99
218 H. Lauterpacht, The Function ofLaw in the International Community (1933) at 61
219 "Draft Regulations for International tribunals. Preliminary Remarks" cited in J.B.Scott
Resolutions ofthe Institute ofInternational Law (1916) at 207 cited in H. Lauterpacht, The
Function ofLaw in the International Community (1933) at 52
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other words, arbitration is suitable only for matters that are capable ofjuridical
analysis.f"
Since 1899, this distinction has been included in most international
conventions for the peaceful settlement of disputes.221 It appeared in Article 13 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations whose substance was incorporated in
Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. This
Article became in turn, with slight modification, Article 36(2) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Despite the distinction's complexity and longevity,
neither the UN Charter nor the ICJ Statute explicitly define the term "legal
disputes", and nor are there objective criteria in either instrument by which such
"legal disputes" can be distinguished from others. Article 36(2) of the Statute
simply lists the categories of "legal disputes" in respect of which the obligation of
compulsory adjudication exists.?"
Implementing objective criteria for distinguishing between what is a legal
dispute and what is a political dispute is rather controversial. The parties in
dispute are always independent States asserting public claims, implicating the
policy choices of their respective sovereign governments. It is impossible to
qualify any dispute to be legal, because States do not have clear criteria of when
220 H. Lauterpacht, The Function ofLaw in the International Community (1933) at 140
221 Compare with Article 15 of the Hague Convention For the Pacific Settlement of Disputes,
1899. H. G. Darwin, "General Introduction" 57 at 58-62 in International disputes: the legal
aspects .. report ofa study group ofthe David Davies Memorial Institute ofInternational Studies
(1972)
222 E. Gordon, "Legal Disputes Under article 36(2) of the Statute" 183 at 183 in L.F.
Damrosch(ed.) The International Court ofJustice At A Crossroads (1987)
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they will give a dispute the qualifier "political". Instead, Lauterpacht pointed out
that any dispute is a combination of legal and political aspects:
"While it is not difficult to establish the proposition
that all disputes between states are of a political
nature, inasmuch as they involve more or less
important interests of states, it is equally easy to
show that all international disputes are disputes of a
legal character in the sense that, so long as the rule
of law is recognised, they are capable of an answer
by the application of legal rules."223
Lauterpacht observed that by looking at the international community's
practice one could easily be struck by two contradictory sets of facts. One tended
to show that international disputes, while capable of legal decision, are of a
political nature; the other that important political disputes are amenable to a legal
process. This controversy relies on the fact that there is no clear definition of the
terminology of what constitutes a legal dispute. Lauterpacht saw the real
definition of a legal dispute as rooted within the will of States. It is the refusal of
the State to submit the dispute to judicial settlement, and not the nature of the
conflict, which makes it political. The willingness of the State to submit the
dispute to a third party settlement is the only test ofjusticiability of the dispute.:"
On the other hand, scholars have argued that there is no difference
between legal and political questions. As Higgins explains "what is relevant is the
223 H. Lauterpacht, The Function ofLaw in the International Community (1933) at 158
224 Ibid. at 164
208
distinction between a political method and a legal method of disputes.v'" Judge
Jennings has also noted that:
"the rubric of 'legal dispute' should be understood
as indicating not only something about the objective
character of a dispute submitted to a court, but
much more the highly technical procedure whereby
the court and the parties together reduced their
dispute into a form which renders it manageable in
an adversarial procedure in a court of law; in a
word, made 'justiciable' ..."226
Accordingly, there seems to be no category of exclusively political or non-
justiciable disputes.?" If a claim is brought before the Court, it can be refined and
reduced to specific facts of law so that rational argument and judicial
determination can be applied.?"
The International Court of Justice has never accepted the political question
doctrine as an excuse to preclude it from exercising its competence. The
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice is full of cases in which there
are political overtones significant enough to raise a question over the ability to
accept "political" question. It has consistently rejected the assertions that the
combination of legal and political issues in a request for advisory opinion or in a
particular dispute brought before the Court would constitute a legitimate reason to
225 R. Higgins, "Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process" 17 ICLQ 58 (1968)
at 74
226 R.Y. Jennings, "Reflections on the Term 'Dispute'" 40 I at 405 in R. St. J. Macdonald (ed.),
Essays in Honour ofWang Tieya (1994)
227 See generally M. Koskenniemi, "The Politics of International Law" I EJIL 4 (1990)
228 T. Sugihara, "The Judicial Function of the International Court of Justice with Respect to
Disputes Involving Highly Political Issues" I 17 at 128 in A.S. Muller et al. (eds.), The
International Court ofJustice, (1997)
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refuse to decide the legal issues presented. The following section will discuss an
expose of the Court's jurisprudence to explore the International Court's approach
to the doctrine of non-justiciability.
5.2 The International Court ofJustice and the Doctrine of non-
Justiciability:
The International Court of Justice did not have to wait long to get its first
case with important political issues. In 1948, the Conditions ofAdmission ofa
State to Membership in the United Nations case arose out of disagreement among
the members of the Security Council over the admission of five states to the
United Nations. The majority of the Security Council agreed to admit Italy and
Finland, but was not in favour of admitting Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The
Soviet Union agreed to give its vote in favour of admitting all five- conditioning
its affirmative vote on the first two on the admission of the last three. The debate
was highly political, revolving around the increasing polarisation of the post-war
period. The General Assembly asked the International Court to give an advisory
opinion. The question posed was:
"Is a Member of the United Nations which is called
upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to
pronounce itselfby its vote, either in the Security
Councilor in the General Assembly, on the
admission of a State to membership in the United
Nations, juridically entitled to make its consent to
the admission dependent on conditions not
expressly provided by paragraph I of the said
Article? In particular, can such a Member, while it
recognizes the conditions set forth in that provision
to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its
affirmative vote to the additional condition that
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other States be admitted to membership in the
United Nations together with that State?'?"
Many participants contended that the dispute was a political one falling
outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court responded:
"The Court cannot attribute a political character to a
request which, framed in abstract terms, invites it to
undertake an essentially judicial task, the
interpretation of a treaty provision [Article 4(1) of
the Charter]. It is not concerned with the motives
which may have inspired this request, nor with the
considerations which, in the concrete cases
submitted for examination to the Security Council,
formed the subject of the exchange of views which
took place in that body.'?"
In his concurring opinion, Judge Azevedo observed that the then-
prevailing opinion was that "the abolition of non-justiciable dispute has not yet
been obtained.'?" However, he added: "[b]y applying an objective criterion
faithfully, any legal question can be examined without considering the political
elements which may in some proportion, be involved.r?"
This quotation confirms what Judge Jennings observed. The International
Court of Justice applied a "value free" or objective approach to the problem. It
had shorn the question of its political context and reduced it into a justiciable
form, i.e. the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the United Nations Charter. The
229 Conditions 0/Admission 0/a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 ofCharter),
1948 ICJ Rep. 57




Court analysed Article 4(1) and found that the Member States were not permitted
to make their consent to membership dependent on any other conditions than
those provided in Article 4.233
A similar approach was adopted in the Certain Expenses opinion, when it
was argued that the question put to the Court was intertwined with political
questions and that for this reason the Court should refuse to give an opinion. The
General Assembly asked the Court to give its opinion on whether the United
Nations peacekeeping operations in Congo and the Middle East were normal
expenses of the Organisation within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Charter.
In responding to the quotation, the Court ruled:
"It is true that most interpretations of the Charter of
the United Nations will have political significance,
great or small. In the nature of things it could not be
otherwise. The Court, however, cannot attribute a
political character to a request which invites it to
undertake an essentially judicial task, namely, the
interpretation of a treaty provision."?"
The Court had once again reduced the question to be one of law, and
deprived it of its political context. It showed that a dispute could be separated into
political and legal components, each to be dealt with separately.
In the Namibia opinion, the Court was asked to give its advisory opinion
on the following question: "[w]hat are the legal consequences for States of the
233 Ibid. at 65
234 Certain Expenses ofthe United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 ofthe Charter), 1962ICJ
Rep. 151 at 155
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continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council
resolution 276 (1970)?"235 The Court decided that the
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal and that South Africa
was under an obligation to withdraw its administration immediately. It went
further to declare that Member States of the United Nations were under an
obligation to recognise the illegality of the South African presence and to provide
no assistance or support to this presence and administration.?"
During the course of the advisory opinion, the Government of South
Africa contended, however, that, as a matter ofjudicial propriety, the Court
should refuse to exercise its competence since the question of the South African
presence in Namibia would involve "political pressure" to which the Court had
been or might be subjected?" In rejecting this contention, the Court affirmed that
as a court of law, it could act only on the basis of law, "independently of all
outside influences or interventions whatsoever, in the exercise of the judicial
function entrusted to it alone by the Charter and its Statute.'?"
The International Court of Justice has maintained the same attitude in
exercising its competence in contentious proceedings. It has frequently stated that
235 Legal Consequences for States ofthe Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (/970), 1971 IC} Rep. 16
236 Ibid. at 58
237 Written Statement of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, Namibia Pleadings 337,
at 425-450
238 Legal Consequences for States ofthe Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (/970), 1971 IC} Rep. 16 at 23
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the mixture of legal and political issues in a dispute brought before it would not
prevent it from exercising its competence as ajudicial body, and addressing the
legal issues involved.
The alleged unsuitability of the International Court to deal with political
questions was advanced in the case concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran (US v. Iran). On November 4th, 1979, several hundred young supporters
of a theologically- based political faction in Iran took control of the American
Embassy compound in Tehran and the sixty-three Americans inside, most of them
accredited diplomats. After making sure that there was no other possible way to
handle the issue through the United Nations Security Council because of the
Soviet veto?", the United States instituted proceedings against Iran before the
International Court of Justice, which unanimously made an order on December
151\ 1979, indicating provisional measures pending the Court's final decision.!"
That Order provided that: "the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran should
ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United
States nationality who are or have been held in the Embassy of the United States
of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or have been held as
hostages elsewhere. "241
239 The United States drafted a resolution under which the Security Council should impose a
sweeping embargo on Iran. This resolution failed of adoption because of the negative vote of the
Soviet Union. See A. P. Rubin, "The Hostages Incident: The United States and Iran" 36 YearBook
ofWorld Affairs 213 (1982) at 216
240 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran) (provisional
measures) 1979 IC] Rep. 7
241 Ibid.
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The non-justiciable character of the dispute was underscored by the
Government ofIran in its letter of December 9,1979, to the Court. Iran urged the
Court "not [to] take cognisance of the case" which "only represents a marginal
and secondary aspect of an overall problem." Iran argued that the problem is "not
one of interpretation and application of the treaties upon which the American
Application is based" and that any examination of the numerous repercussions of
the Islamic revolution is "a matter essentially and directly within the national
sovereignty of Iran."242 The Government of Iran further considered that the Court
"cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context,
namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United
States."243
On Dec.15th, 1979, the Court decided on the Government ofIran's
preliminary objection and found that it did indeed have the right to deal with this
question which fell within its competence. In the words of the Court:
"The seizure of the United States Embassy and
consulates and the detention of internationally
protected persons as hostages cannot be considered
as something "secondary" or "marginal", having
regard to the importance of the legal principles
involved. "244
The Court pointed to the fact that no provision of the Statute or Rules
contemplates that it should decline to take cognisance of one aspect of a dispute
242 Ibid. at 8-9
243 Ibid.
244 Ibid. at 19
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merely because that dispute has other aspects, however important.i" It continued
to maintain that since this dispute involved the interpretation or application of
multilateral conventions, it was "one which by its very nature falls within
international jurisdiction.'?" In its 1980 judgment, the Court emphasised that:
"Legal disputes between sovereign states by their
very nature are likely to occur in political disputes,
and often form only one element in a wider and
longstanding political dispute between the states
concerned. Yet never has the view been put forward
before that, because a legal dispute submitted to the
Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the
Court should decline to resolve for the parties the
legal questions at issue between them. Nor can any
basis for such a view of the Court's functions or
jurisdiction be found in the Charter or the Statute of
the Court; if the Court were, contrary to its settled
jurisprudence, to adopt such a view, it would
impose a far-reaching and unwarranted restriction
upon the role of the Court in the peaceful solution
of international disputes.'?"
This answer fits the Court's previous pronouncements in this issue very
closely. Even where there is a political context to a dispute, the Court will deal
with those legal aspects presented to it. The International Court of Justice showed
that it is willing to separate the two spheres.
245 Ibid at 15
246 Ibid at 16
247 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran)
1980 IC} Rep.3 at 20
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The Nicaragua case was highly political and volatile. The political
intensity in this case led the United States to question the professional quality of
the Court's judicial work. 248
Nicaragua charged the United States with using military force against
Nicaragua and intervening in its internal affairs in violation of Nicaragua's
sovereignty, territorial integrity and principles of international law. In May 1984,
the International Court, at the request of Nicaragua, indicated provisional
measures.i"
The United States Government contended that the Nicaraguan application
should be declared inadmissible on the ground that the dispute involved an
ongoing armed conflict involving the use of force contrary to the United Nations
Charter. The US claimed that this was an issue with which the Court could not
deal effectively without overstepping proper judicial bounds.i"
The Court unanimously, in its provisional measures order, ordered the
United States to cease and refrain from its military activities in the Nicaraguan
ports and requested the parties not to undertake action that might aggravate the
situation or prejudice the rights ofthe other party?" In November 1984, the Court
decided on the preliminary objections raised by the United States. The Court
248Abram Chayes, "Nicaragua, The United States, and the World Court" 85:2 Colum. L. Rev.
1445(1985) at 1447 See Judge Lachs' Reply, M. Lachs, "A Few Thoughts on the Independence of
Judges of the International Court of Justice" 25 Colum. 1. Transnat'l. L. 593 (1987)
249 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of




found that it did indeed have jurisdiction in tenus of Article 36(2) and (5) of its
Statute, and also in tenus of the US-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation of 1956.252
By a vote of 15 to 1 (with the US judge dissenting), the Court asserted that
it had jurisdiction to proceed to the merits stage and thus to the hearing of the
substantive international law issues involved in the Nicaraguan complaint against
the United States. The Court, at the same time, directed that its interim Order of
early 1984 and the provisional measures indicated in it should remain in force
pending the final judgement on the merits.?" At the merits stage, the US
Government announced, in January 1985, that the United States would not
participate any further in the case and that it would reconsider the United States
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court?" The text accompanying
its announcement of January 1985 declared that those proceedings constituted:
"[a] misuse of the Court for political purposes ... the
Court lacks jurisdiction and competence over such
case. The Court's decision ofNovember 26,1984,
finding that it has jurisdiction, is contrary to law
and fact...
The conflict in Central America... is not a narrow
legal dispute; it is inherently political problem that
is not appropriate for judicial resolution. The
conflict will be solved only by political and
diplomatic means ... not through a judicial tribunal.
The International Court of Justice was never
intended to resolve issues of collective security and
252 Ibid. at 180
253 Nicaragua Case, (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 1984 IC} Rep. 392
254 "Statement of Department of State on US Withdrawal from Nicaragua Proceedings, 18 January
1985" reprinted in 24 International Legal Materials 246 (1985)
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self-defence and is patently unsuited for such a
role.'?"
The US Government went further to charge the Court with making:
"a marked departure from its past, cautious
approach to jurisdictional questions. The Court's
decision [ofNovember 26,1984, on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility] raises a basic issue of
sovereignty. The right of a state to defend itself or
to participate in collective self defence against
aggression is an inherent sovereign right cannot be
compromised by an inappropriate proceedings
before the World Court... the decision of November
26 represents an over-reaching of the Court's limits,
a departure from its tradition of judicial restraint,
and a risky venture into treacherous political
waters."256
The United States Government argued that such a dispute is non-
justiciable because only the state concerned can decide on the necessity and
proportionality of its defensive action. The US Government considered that the
dispute fell rather under its inherent rights of self- defence. Rostow'" argued that
there are political-legal "No Man's Lands", involving what States may choose to
consider as touching their own vital interests, into which the Court will venture
only at its extreme legal, and political, peril. Nevertheless, it is recognised that
self-defence is a legal right, which constitutes a deviation from the general
prohibition on the use of force. The question of the legality of self-defence loses
255 "Statement of Department of State on US Withdrawal from Nicaragua Proceedings, 18 January
1985"79 AJIL 438 (1985) at 441
256 Ibid.
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its essential meaning ifthe answer is left solely to the judgement of the State
purporting to use this right.i" As Judge Schwebel maintained in his dissenting
opinion, Article 51 "cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean that only the State
exercising a claimed self-defence is the judge of the legality of its actions."259
Moreover, the US Government raised an objection on the ground that the
Court lacked the competence to deal with disputes involving the use of force and
armed attack. But the use of force against a sovereign State violates a legal
obligation, which gives rise to international responsibility, which is on its face, a
legal question.i"
One author questioned the impartiality of international adjudication. He
argued that States prefer to use other means of dispute resolution other than
adjudication, because of the potential risks, especially "some [ICJ] judges take
direct orders from their respective ministries'?" , which led many States not to
trust international adjudication. Judge Lachs, in his reply to these allegations,
argued that the Court's bench consisted of well-accredited judges, and that the
lack of confidence in international courts stems from "the nature of the State
257 E. Rostow, "Disputes Involving the Inherent Right of self-defence" 81 AJIL 264 (1987); see for
critcism E. McWhinney, "Judicial Settlement of Disputes Jurisdiction and Justiciability" 221 RDC
9 (1990) at 67
258 O. Schachter, "Disputes Involving The Use Of Force" 223 at 230 in L.F. Damrosch(ed.), The
International Court ofJustice At A Crossroads (1987)
259 Nicaragua case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) 1984 ICJ Rep. 392 para 46 at 558 (Judge
Schwebel dissenting opinion)
260 Ibid. See also para.45 and 47-50 at 591-593 (Judge Schwebel dissenting opinion)
261 P. M. Norton, "The Nicaragua Case: Political Questions Before the International Court of
Justice" 27 Va. J Int'[ L. 459 (1987) at 502
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parties involved, which traditionally recognised no superior authority.t'""
Therefore, not to resort to international adjudication has nothing to do with the
ICJ judges and their "biased" attitude, it is rather another way for States to show
their unwillingness to apply legal rules to their disputes.
Just as the Court rejected the Iranian objections for the non-justiciability
of the dispute in the Hostages case, it rejected the US objections in the Nicaragua
case. It disregarded the US refusal to participate in the proceedings, and the Court
proceeded to hear the Nicaraguan argument on the merits. In June 1986, the Court
announced its judgment on the Merits, in which, by 12-to-3 vote on the main
issues, the Court upheld the substance of the Nicaraguan legal charges against the
US Govemment.i"
It can be concluded that the claim of non-justiciability of a dispute is
nothing but an expression of the wish of a State to substitute its own will for its
legal obligation. The cases examined, especially the Hostages case and the
Nicaragua case verify what Lauterpacht had established long before. All conflicts
in the sphere of international politics can be reduced to contests of a legal nature;
and that the only decisive test ofjusticiability of disputes is "the willingness of
the disputants to submit the conflict to the arbitrament of law."264
262 M. Lachs, "A Few Thoughts on the Independence of Judges of the International Court of
Justice" 25 Colum. J. Transnat'l. L. 593 (1987) at 594
263 Nicaragua case (merits) 1986ICJ Rep. 14
264 H. Lauterpacht, The Function ofLaw in the International Community (1933) at 158,164
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to delineate a middle way approach between
the realist school and judicial romantic school. The chapter started with the
premise that the UN Charter is a treaty but has developed well beyond any normal
multilateral treaty. 265 It established an organisation that in one way or another is
doing its best to gear the international community towards peace and security.
The UN Charter created UN organs and delegated powers to assist them in
achieving common interests.i" UN organs cannot act outside the contours ofthe
powers delegated to them. UN organs should act in accordance with the
objectives of their constituent instrument. Besides, as the United Nations has been
granted international personality", the United Nations and its organs, by this fact,
are subject to international law. Therefore, they have to observe the rules ofjus
cogens and general international law.
However, the realist school, as mentioned in the introduction of this
chapter, advanced the argument that the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, does not have to be bound by law. To certain degree, it
was accepted that the Security Council under Article 39 enjoys a broad
discretionary power, and it is difficult to apply legal means for such
265 B. Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community"
36 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 529 (1998)
266 S. Lamb, "Legal Limits to the United Nations Security Council Powers" 361 at 370 in G.S.
Goodwin-Gill & S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality ofInternational Law: Essays in Honour ofIan
Brownlie, (1999); see also I. Brownlie, "International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
United Nations, General Course on Public International Law" 255 RDC 9 (1995) at 220
267 Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations 1949 ICJ Rep. 174
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determinations. However, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. indicated
that the Security Council cannot act arbitrarily or for an ulterior purpose while
determining the existence of the threat of the peace.i" Although the array of the
meaning of "arbitrary" and "an ulterior purpose" is still broad enough to
accommodate any international situation, these standards mark the start of the
belief that "neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security
Council as Legibus Solutus (unbound by law)'?".
This makes our argument drift towards the judicial romantic school. The
judicial romantic school looked at the recent situation of the United Nations from
domestic legal system perspective. This school saw in the International Court of
Justice the new "World Supreme Court". The followers of this school looked at
the relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security
Council from the angle of the municipal constitutional system, where the
separation of powers is much clearer, and the judiciary has its share of checks and
balances.?" It is repeatedly noted that the United Nations system does not provide
for a system of hierarchy. The UN system constitutes a system of separate
functions. Each organ has its own competence and functions. Nevertheless, this
system could be characterised as a system of separate but complementary
functions. Each organ employs its function in co-ordination with other organ's
268 See also F. Patel King, "Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal's Development of Limits
on the Security Council's Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter" 10 Emory Int 'I. L. Rev. 2
(1996) at 16 <http://www.law.emory.eduIEILRlvolumes/win96/king.html>
269 Appeals Chamber in the Prosecutor v. (Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, reprinted in 35
ILM 32 (1996) at 42
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functions in order to achieve the UN objectives. Thus, it is not unusual to have the
International Court and the Security Council'" simultaneously seized of the same
matter.?' The Charter has opened the channels for such interactions'" as a way of
settling all the legal and political, aspects of the dispute.
Therefore, the "middle way" approach argued for throughout this chapter
is for more co-operation between these two principal organs. The "middle way"
approach argues that albeit the Security Council's determinations under Article 39
are of a political nature, the consequential measures of such determinations are
subject to law. The question here is: which organ could be competent to make the
Security Council accountable to its limits? The obvious and potential organ is the
principal judicial organ ofthe United Nations. Nevertheless, we have argued that
there is no hierarchical relation between the International Court and the Security
Council. Each organ is on equal footing with the other organ. The discussion on
the competence of the International Court showed that it has not been granted the
competence to judicially review the Security Council's actions. The discussion,
however, led us to explore that the Court has the function, that is usually
overlooked, the advisory competence of the Court.
270 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (Cranch) (1803)
271 Article 12 precludes the General Assembly from intervening in the Security Council's
prerogatives.
272 J. Stanczyk, "The International Court of Justice on the Competence and Function of the
Security Council (Related to the Cases brought before it)" 15 Polish Yearbook ofInternational
Law 193 (1986) at 206
273 Article 36 (3) of the UN Charter, See also D.W. Bowett, "Judicial and Political functions of the
Security Council and the International Court of Justice" 73 at 73 in H. Fox (ed.), The Changing
Constitution ofthe United Nations (1997)
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From that point, the advisory competence could be the starting point of
having an accountable Security Council and that will not undermine the matrix on
which the United Nations system operates. The Court, under this jurisdiction, will
not disturb the no-hierarchy foundations in the United Nations and at the same
time it will strengthen the legitimacy of the United Nations.
The next Chapter will argue that judicial review could be realised through
the Court's advisory jurisdiction. To accomplish this, a comparison between the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and that of its predecessor, the
PCIJ will be the starting point. The aim of this comparison is to show the
difference in the approach towards this function by their respective political
organisations, the United Nations and the League of Nations. Through this, the
discussion will show that during the League of Nations, the Court was used as a




The United Nations, the International Court of
Justice and its Advisory Jurisdiction
1 Introduction
The earlier chapters rejected the arguments ofmodelling judicial review
powers of the International Court on the basis of the experience of national
municipal systems, in particular that of the United States Supreme Court. Further,
the previous chapters argued that international organisations can act ultra vires
and there are limits on the actions of United Nations organs in general, and on
those of the Security Council in particular. However, the argument from the start
has been that judicial review can be realised through the Court's advisory
jurisdiction. The aim was that since the Charter and Statute do not provide for
judicial review in the domestic legal system sense, the International Court should
use its advisory jurisdiction as a means of clarifying any legal doubts regarding
UN organs' actions, instead of providing a compulsory judicial review which
would require a revision of the Charter and Statute.
The advisory function's roots go back to Article 14 ofthe League of
Nations Covenant. During the drafting of the Covenant, proposals were advanced
to initiate a sort of reference to the Court by one or more organs of the League of
Nations. Among the others, the British proposal implanted the seeds of the Court's
advisory jurisdiction. The British draft convention of 1919 was:
"Where the Conference or the Council finds that the
disputes can with advantage be submitted to a court
of international law, or that any particular question
involved in the dispute can with advantage be
referred to a court of international law, it may
submit the question or the particular question
accordingly, and may formulate the questions for
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decision, and may give such directions as to
procedure as it may think desirable. In such case,
the decision of the Court shall have no force or
effect unless it is confirmed by the Report of the
Conference or Council." 1
However, provision for an advisory function did not appear in any of the
early working drafts of the League Covenant.iThe idea of advisory jurisdiction
was not left dormant for long, as the Wilson-Cecil proposal put forward an
addition to Article 12 of Hurst- Miller draft', which was as follows: "[t]he
Executive Council will formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent
Court of International Justice, and this Court will be competent to hear and
determine any matter which the parties recognise as suitable for submission to it
for arbitration under the foregoing article." The words to be added were "and also
any issue referred to it by the Executive Councilor Body of Delegates."
However, there was no mention of the effect of the Court's pronouncements in an
advisory form, which led Miller, the American Member in the Commission on the
League of Nations, to be with the view that the new provision went "the whole
length of permitting the Executive Councilor Body of Delegates to compel
arbitration. "5
Upon these objections, a revision was introduced for the provision to read
as: "and also to advise upon any legal questions referred to it by the Executive
I D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (1928) vol. 2 at 111
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. at 311
4 Ibid. at 585
5 Ibid. vol. 1 at 290
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Councilor Body of Delegates." However, as advisory jurisdiction was still not
mentioned, Miller remained dissatisfied, because he thought that the language of
the clause would have made the Court a legal adviser of the Councilor the Body
of Delegates, a function that did not envisage the duty to give advisory opinions.'
Moreover, he saw that the function to be exercised was to be a judicial one, but at
the same time the pronouncement would not constitute a judgment and thus
would not attract the obligation of compliance.8 As a result, the term "advisory
opinion" was introduced to read as "[t]he Court may also give an advisory opinion
upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Assembly". The incorporation of
this sentence as a separate addition in the Court's competence provision indicated
that the advisory jurisdiction was to be distinct from its primary jurisdiction of
deciding disputes brought directly by States."
In the view of the history of the drafting of Article 14, the advisory
jurisdiction was "derived from the political jurisdiction of the League" 10, in the
sense that the intention behind granting the advisory jurisdiction was to assist the
League Council and Assembly 'in the discharge of their duties of conciliation'!'.
Michla Pomerance has maintained that "at the very outset the Permanent Court's
advisory function was to aid the League in the settlement of disputes that had
6 Ibid. at 290, 391; Ibid. vol. 2 at 662
7 Ibid. vol.I at 391-2
8 Ibid. at 406
9 Ibid.
10 D. Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court (1972) at 5
II D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (1928) vol. 1 at416
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already arisen."" This view has changed in the Permanent Court's successor, the
International Court of Justice. Although the contours of the advisory jurisdiction
have not changed, except of the scope of the authorisation to request has been
enlarged, UN organs have not made use of this function to the same extent as was
the case in the days of the League. The League Council used the Court's advisory
jurisdiction to settle peacefully disputes between States and questions arising
within the activities of the organisation, and within the activities of other
international bodies. In addition, the League Council referred to the Court cases
that involved a challenge to its own competence."
The focal point of the argument, advanced in this chapter, is that the
League Council referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice critical
questions and disputes, and the Permanent Court was able to settle the legal issues
of disputes peacefully without jeopardising its judicial character. Referring legal
doubts and legal questions arising from actions taken by the political organs to the
Court proved that it was a successful means to determine the legality and validity
of the actions already taken. 14
The point of departure is the practice of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, and how the League of Nations Council made use of that
Court's advisory jurisdiction. Following this, the International Court of Justice's
practice and how UN political organs approached this function will be discussed.
12 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 9
13 See Eastern Carelia opinion 1923 PCIJ, Series B, No.5, 7; Mosul Question opinion 1925 PCIJ,
Series B, No. 12,6
14 See for example Settlers ofGerman Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland
opinion & the Mosul Question opinion. In those opinions, the League Council's competence was
challenged. The Council resorted to the Court to determine the appropriateness of its actions.
These opinions will be discussed below
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This chapter aims at determining the possibility of having the International Court
act as a legal adviser to the UN. To accomplish this, a selective expose of both the
Permanent Court of International Justice's, and the International Court of
Justice's jurisprudence will be discussed. The purpose of this discussion is to
show the difference of approach toward the Court's advisory jurisdiction in the
League of Nations and the United Nations periods.
Then the discussion will lead us to the reasons of why the general
perception of the advisory opinions has changed, away from its original idea to
"aid [the organisation] in the settlement of disputes". The conclusion to be
reached is that judicial review or the function of legal adviser could be realised
through the advisory jurisdiction (as it was used in the League of Nations era) if
the political organs changed their approach to this function to rebuild the
confidence of Member States in the Court's advisory jurisdiction.
2 The Permanent Court of International Justice: Advisory
Jurisdiction
The bare outlines of the advisory jurisdiction were given in Article of 14
of the Covenant of the League ofNations, it provided:
"The Council shall formulate and submit to the
Members of the League for adoption plans for the
establishment of a Permanent Court of International
Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and
determine any dispute of an international Character
which the Parties thereto submit to it. The Court
may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute
or question referred to it by the Councilor by the
Assembly." [Emphasis added]
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The third sentence of Article 14 was rather the start of controversies and
confusions. 15 The advisory jurisdiction was an innovation in the field of
international law. 16 It was something new introduced to international judicial
tribunals, but the first Statute of the Permanent Court contained no provisions
concerning its advisory jurisdiction. When the Court, therefore, started to
function, it was faced with many questions and controversies regarding the scope
and nature of the advisory jurisdiction. Many questions were raised whether the
opinions the Court would give would have a binding nature or an advisory one.
Also, if the opinions had no binding effect, what would the effects on the Court's
judicial character be? However, these profound hesitations and confusions faced
earlier the distinguished 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists", appointed by the
League Council to draft the Statute to "put flesh on the skeleton provision in
Article 14 ofthe Covenant" 18, and they could be found later in the League
Assembly's deletion of the Committee's provision from the original Statute."
The 1920 Advisory Committee of Jurists' proposed article on advisory
jurisdiction was as follows:
"The Court shall give an advisory opinion upon any
question or dispute of an international nature
referred to it by the Councilor Assembly. When the
Court shall give an opinion on a question of an
international nature which does not refer to any
15 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 5
16 D. Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court (1972) at I
17 It is worth mentioning that the Committee also faced uncertainties concerning the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction. See for more details L. Lloyd, Peace Through Law: Britain and the
International Court in the 1920s (1997) at 1-20
18 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 10
19 M. O. Hudson, The Permanent Court ofInternational Justice 1920-1942: A Treatise (I 943) at
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dispute that may have arisen, it shall appoint a
special Commission of from three to five members.
When it shall give an opinion upon a question
which forms the subject of an existing dispute, it
shall do so under the same conditions as if the case
had been actually submitted to it for decision.?"
The Advisory Committee of Jurists thus proposed dual advisory procedures. First,
the Committee proposed that the Court, when considering a request concerning an
existing dispute, follow the same procedure as if the matter had been submitted to
it for a decision in the contentious proceedings. Although the opinion would not
be binding, it would have the moral force attaching to all the Court's decisions, so
the procedure had to be assimilated to that followed in contentious cases." On the
other hand, the Committee proposed a different procedure for hypothetical
questions, which would be considered by a special commission ofthree to five
members which would not use a trial-like procedure. The intention appears to
have been to prevent the Court being embarrassed if that question were
subsequently brought before the Court in an actual dispute." In other words, that
was to give the Court a leeway to reconsider, if it had to, its opinions."
However, this distinction and the consequential differences in procedure
were deleted from the Court's Statute by the Assembly of the League. The major
reason for the rejection of the proposal was on the ground that such differentiation
20 Minutes of the 1920 Committee of Jurists, PCIJ Series D, No.2 at 732
21 Ibid. at 731
22 Ibid. at 731
23 As yet, it has not happen that the Court has changed its previously taken opinions. However, the
Court has mentioned, in South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa)
(Preliminary Objections) case, that it might, upon providing new facts, change its opinion. 1962
ICJ Rep. 319 See below the discussion on the question of res judicata at 274- 278
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was "lacking clearness and likely to give rise to practical difficulties" .24 Some
voiced reservations against the full assimilation of one category of advisory
opinions to judgments, and others opposed the apparently non-judicial character
ofthe other category of the advisory opinions. But almost all agreed on the point
of the vagueness of the criteria of differentiating the two categories.
Upon the decision of the League Assembly to delete the draft article and
not to provide an alternative article, the Court left with no option except to
"grapple with the questions left unresolved earlier'?' when the time came to draft
the Rules of Court.
This soon arose for the Court. The uncertainties on the advisory function
highlighted during the Statute's drafting were mirrored during the framing of the
1922 Rules of Court. Fears and uncertainties formed the focal points of Judge
Moore memorandum on the "Question of Advisory Opinions". Judge Moore
commenced his statement:
"No subject connected with the organisation of the
Permanent Court of International Justice has caused
so much confusion and proved to be so baffling as
the questions whether and under what conditions
the Court shall undertake to give 'advisory'
opinions. This state of doubt and uncertainty may in
large measure be ascribed to the nature of the
proposal. ,,26
24 Documents on Adoption of PCIJ Statute. at 211 reproduced in M. Pomerance, The Advisory
Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras (1973) at 13
25 M. Pomerance, "The Advisory role of the International Court of Justice and its 'judicial'
Character: Past and Future Prisms" 271 at 274 in A.S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court
ofJustice (1997)
26 'The Question of Advisory Opinions', Memorandum By Mr. Moore, 18 Feb. 1922, Permanent
Court of International Justice, Acts and Documents Concerning the Organisation ofthe Court,
Series D, No.2 at 383
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Judge Moore maintained that the rendering of non-binding advice was
incompatible with the judicial character of the Court as that function would tend
to frustrate the realisation of its primary function of adjudicating disputes and
developing international law. He argued that:
"The emission... of opinions avowedly have no
binding force, would tend not only to obscure but
also to change the character ofthe Court... [It]
would necessarily diminish the opportunities for the
exercise by the Court of its judicial functions, since,
if the opinions were treated by the Court as binding
upon it, they would tend to preclude the subsequent
submission of disputes for decision, while, if treated
as mere utterances and freely discarded, they would
inevitably bring the Court into disrepute ...The
emission of such opinions would, for the same
reasons, also tend to prevent the Court from
performing what had been conceived to be one of
its primary functions- that of contributing through
its jurisprudence, to the development of
international law.':"
While the Court had the power to render advisory opinions, Moore insisted that
there could be no question of any obligation to do so, particularly given the
absence of any provision on advisory function in the Statute and with the
permissive language of Article 14 of the Covenant." Judge Moore went on to
propose omitting any reference to advisory opinions in the Rules to discourage
requests, and leaving the Court to deal with an application for an advisory opinion
'according to what should be found to be the nature and merits of the case'."
The Court did not accept Moore's suggestions. It rejected proposals would
have resulted in a sharp distinction between the advisory and contentious
27 Ibid at 397- 398
28 Ibid at 384-385
29 Ibid at 398
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jurisdictions. Thus, secret requests and secret opinions were ruled out. The view
of rendering secret opinions was put forward by Judge Anzilotti, who argued "that
the Council should, in the interests of the peace of the world, have the right to ask
the Court for secret advice". However, Judges Finlay and Moore rejected this
view and considered that rendering secret decisions by the Court was
incompatible with the Statute, and such practice "would be a death blow to the
Court as a judicial body" .30 Also, the Court did not accept the possibility of
opinions to be given by less than a full quorum ofjudges. Accordingly, the Court
adopted four provisions on the advisory jurisdiction. The Rules specified that
advisory opinions were to be given after deliberation by the full Court (Article
71); notice of the request was to be given to members of the Court, members of
the League, and any international organisation likely to be able to furnish
information on the question (Article 73); and that advisory opinions were to be
published in a special collection (Article 74).
The Court's refusal to make a distinction between advisory opinions and
judgments in the matter of the Court's composition, and also its refusal to accept
secret requests and render secret opinions, were intended to protect the judicial
character of the Court, as noted by Moore during the revision of the Rules in
1926:
"By the rules adopted at its Preliminary Session in
1922 the Court unmistakably indicated that in
rendering advisory opinions it would follow judicial
methods and preserve the same independence as the
world would necessarily expect it to maintain in
deciding differences brought before it in a
contentious case.'?'
30 1922 PCIJ, Series D, No.2 at 160
31 1926 PCIJ, Series D, No.2 (Add.) at 294
235
Despite this uncertain beginning, the very large majority of cases brought
to the Court in its earliest years were requests for advisory opinions." That led the
Court to codify some of its advisory practice in the 1926 revision of the Rules.
The Court had established a well- defined advisory practice, and many provisions
of the Statute and the Rules related to contentious cases were applied by analogy
to advisory requests. InEastern Carelia case the Court refused the Council's
request for an advisory opinion on the ground ofRussia's non-consent." The
consensual requirement for the Court to give an advisory opinion was a notable
degree of assimilation to contentious proceedings."
With the 1926 revision, notice of the request was now to be given to the
additional category of "any States entitled to appear before the Court", and
besides the general notice, "a special and direct communication" was to be sent to
any State "admitted to appear before the Court, or "to any international
organisation considered" as likely to be able to furnish information on the
question," as notification that the Court would be prepared to receive written
statements and to hear oral statements relating to the question." A State which
failed to receive such a communication might "express a desire to submit a
written statement, or to be heard", and the Court would decide." States and
32 Between 1922 and 1926, the Court delivered 12 advisory opinions in comparison with only 7
judgments.
33 1923 PCIl, Series B, No.5, 7
34 See the discussion in M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the
League and UN Eras (1973) at 16
35 1926 PCIl, Series D, No.2 (add.) at 226
36 Ibid at 295
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organisations which had presented statements were to be admitted to comment on
the statements of other States or organisations, and, to this end, the Registrar was
to communicate those statements to them."
Pomerance, commenting on 1926 revision of the Rules, has stated that:
"In adopting the limited revision of its Rules, the
Court rejected, on the one hand, suggestions that it
reverse its course of assimilation and establish a
clearer distinction between the advisory and
contentious functions, and, on the other hand, the
suggestion that it crystallise its previous practice
more fully by enumerating the articles of the Statute
and Rules which were applicable by analogy to
advisory procedure .. .in 1926 the Court manifested
satisfaction with the way it had handled its advisory
function in the past and the desire to maintain a
measure of freedom and flexibility in the future. "38
By 1929, when the revision to the Statute was undertaken, it was accepted
that it should be amended to incorporate the substance of the provisions of the
Rules of Court respecting advisory opinions. In addition, Article 68 was accepted;
it provided that" [i]n the exercise of its advisory functions, the Court shall further
be guided by the provisions of the Statute which apply in contentious cases to the
extent to which it recognises them to be applicable."
The revised Statute of 1929 entered into force in 1936, as did the revised
Rules of Court of 1936 which brought the process of assimilation of the advisory
to contentious procedure as close to completion as was possible." They provided
for full publicity of requests for opinions, the opportunity to be heard, the right to
appoint a judge ad hoc to the Court, written and oral proceedings, that opinions
37 Ibid. at 303-316
38 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 18
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were to be given by the full Court, after secret deliberation and by majority vote,
and to be read in open Court after notice had been given, and for the Court's
power to decide disputes as to whether it had jurisdiction in any given advisory
case."
The practice of the Court in its first sixteen years explained to a certain
extent the notion behind the 1936 revision of Rules, in particular Article 82, that
led to the progressive assimilation of its advisory jurisdiction to the contentious
one in matters of procedure and judicial guarantees." This led Hudson to note
that:
"on the actual record one may say that the Court
itself has conceived of its advisory jurisdiction as a
judicial function, and in its exercise of this
jurisdiction it has kept within the limits which
characterise judicial action."?
As we shall see in the next section, the practice of the Permanent Court of
International Justice formed to a certain degree the contours of the Court's
advisory jurisdiction in respect to procedure, nature and judicial safeguards.
3 Practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice
With this uncertain start, the Permanent Court of International Justice was
occupied to establish a stable ground for its advisory jurisdiction and to keep this
jurisdiction away from any abuse or misuse on the part of the League of Nations.
39 D. Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court (I 972) at 35
40 For more information see M. O. Hudson, The Permanent Court ofInternational Justice 1920-
1942: A Treatise (1943) at 293-300
41 G. Abi- Saab, "On Discretion: Reflections on the Nature of the Consultative Function of the
International Court of Justice" 36 at 41in L. B. de Chazournes & P. Sands (eds.), International
Law, the International Court ofJustice and Nuclear Weapons (I 999)
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It maintained its liberal but at the time cautious approach in dealing with requests
for advisory opinions. The reasons behind this approach, as Professor Abi-Saab
points out, were: "this new activity ofthe Court was not clearly perceived. There
were doubts as to its compatibility with the judicial function and whether it
constituted part of that function, and fears lest it would undermine the credibility
and prestige of the Court, particularly if it had to answer any question put to it by
[the League ofNations] political organs in whatever form and on whatever
subject'!".
The League Council often tended to refer legal issues of disputes between
States to the Court's advisory jurisdiction, as it was the case in Nationality
Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) case", The case arose as a
result of nationality decrees issued in the French protectorates of Tunis and
Morocco which would have had the effect of conferring French nationality on
persons born in those protectorates but regarded by Great Britain as British
nationals (in particular the Anglo-Maltese community). Britain strongly opposed
these measures and it suggested submitting the dispute to the Court. However,
this proposal was rejected by France.
When Britain decided to resort to the League Council by the virtue of Article
15(1) of the Covenant, France contended that in accordance with Article 15(8)-the
domestic jurisdiction clause- the Council was incompetent to deal with the
dispute. However, when the Council met, both governments agreed on submitting
42 M. 0. Hudson, The Permanent Court ofInternational Justice 1920-1942: A Treatise (1943) at
511
43 G. Abi- Saab, "On Discretion: Reflections on the Nature of the Consultative Function of the
International Court of Justice" 36 at 38 in L. B. de Chazoumes & P. Sands (eds.), International
Law, the International Court ofJustice and Nuclear Weapons (1999)
44 1923 PCIJ, Series B, No.4, 7
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the preliminary question of domestic jurisdiction to the Court for an advisory
opinion and agreed to attribute a binding effect to the resultant opinion. They
further agreed that if the opinion declared that the matter was not solely one of
domestic jurisdiction, the whole dispute would be referred to arbitration or
judicial settlement under conditions to be agreed upon between the two
governments." The Court gave its opinion that this dispute was not by
intemationallaw solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The importance of this
case lies not in the Court's opinion but rather in the parties' approach to the Court.
The parties agreed to resort to the Court's advisory jurisdiction as a substitute to
contentious proceedings as a peaceful means of dispute settlement.
The League Council showed a tendency to refer to the Court under its
advisory jurisdiction, disputes that involved challenge to the Council's
competence. In the Settlers ofGerman Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany
to Poland case", for example, the dispute involved questions regarding the
competence of the League Council under the Polish Minorities Treaty of 1919.
The question was whether the Polish government, in view of the provisions of the
Polish Minorities Treaty, was entitled to take certain measures of expulsion with
regard to the settlers and leaseholders of German origin in the territories that had
passed from Germany to Poland.
The matter was brought before the League Council by Germany. The
League Council devoted its efforts toward gathering more information on the
question, and toward clarification of the legal issues through the employment of a
Committee of Jurists. The Committee of Jurists dealt with the legal questions
45 Ibid at 7-8
46 1923 PCIJ, Series B, No.6, 6
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involved in the disputes, its opinion was unfavourable to Poland, which made it
clear that Poland would not accept the Committee's opinion and it would refuse to
grant any respite to the petitioners. Upon that, Poland challenged the competence
of the League Council to deal with the dispute. Poland claimed that the League
Council was incompetent because the minorities matter had not been brought
before the Council by a Member of the Council as the Covenant and Minorities
Treaty required."
Before answering the question advanced to it by the Council, the Court
dealt with Poland's contentions. The Court said:
"If, as Poland has claimed, the subject-matter of the
controversy is not within the competency of the
League, the Court would not be justified in
rendering an opinion as to the rights of the settlers.
The Court therefore will first consider the question
of competency. "48
The Court stated that matters covered by a resolution of the Council involved
international obligations of the kind referred to in the Polish Minorities Treaty
and therefore came within the competence of the League of Nations."
The Court went on to answer the question at hand in the negative, stating that the
measures taken by the Polish government "[were] not in conformity with its
international obligations.':" Poland accepted the opinion and the Council adopted
a resolution stating that the question would be settled on the basis of the Court's
47 Ibid at 21-23
48 Ibid at 19
49 Ibid at 21-23
50 Ibid at 6-7
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opinion. Negotiations ensued under the guidance of the Council. In 1924, the
Council took note of a settlement of the question."
The importance of this case lies in the Court's initial determination of
whether the Council had competence or not. That could be interpreted that unless
the Council was competent, the Court would not be justified in delivering
opinions." In other words, the Court asserted the Council and the Assembly could
ask the Court for advisory opinions only on matters that they had competence to
deal with.
The Eastern Carelia case played a major role in shaping the Court's
advisory jurisdiction and its relation with the League organs 53. In this case, the
Court refused for its advisory function to be used as a "roundabout means of
introducing compulsory jurisdiction" by which it maintained the integrity of its
judicial function." The League Council was concerned with the question of
whether Article 10 and 11 of the Peace Treaty between Finland and Russia
concluded on 14 October 1920 at Dorpat, as well as the related declaration of the
Russian delegation concerning the autonomy of Eastern Carelia, formed
obligations of an inter- State character which obliged the then Soviet Union vis-a-
vis Finland to observe the provisions. The League Council made an attempt to ask
for the Court's opinion with respect to a Finno-Soviet dispute without Russia's
51 League of Nations Official Journal, 1924, at 359-66
52 H. Lauterpacht, The Development ofInternational Law by the International Court (1958) at
107; see also K. J. Keith, The Extent ofthe Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court of
Justice (1971) at 125-126
53 1923 PCU, Series B, No.5, 7
54 G. Abi- Saab, "On Discretion: Reflections on the Nature of the Consultative Function of the
International Court of Justice" 36 at 41 in L. B. de Chazournes & P. Sands (eds.), International
Law, the International Court ofJustice and Nuclear Weapons (1999)
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consent, which was not a member of the League. The Court refused to render an
opinion as it considered that the Council's incompetence to recommend any
solution in a dispute in which a non-consenting non-member of the League was
involved a major obstacle to answer the request for an advisory opinion. The
Court additionally found it difficult to elucidate disputed facts without Russia's
testimony."
It is difficult to understand the importance of this opinion without
discussing briefly" the general political scene that was prevailing at that time.
There was then an overwhelming debate on the United States joining the
Permanent Court of International Justice. The main obstacle to this was the
Court's advisory function. There were fears that this function was the other side
of the "compulsory jurisdiction" coin." Also, through this function, the Court was
seen as the League's Court not as the World Court." However, with the Eastern
Carelia opinion, the Court asserted its independence and pacified the fears and
the uncertainties. As Judge Moore noted, the decision:
"refut[ed] the forecasts and ...dispel[ed] the
apprehensions of those who have reiterated that the
Court would, as the creation or creature of the
League, enforce the League's organic law, the
Covenant, above all other law, without regard to the
rights under international law of nations not
members of the League. "59
55 1923 PCIJ, Series B, No.5, 7 at 8
56 See the discussion on the debate in the United States on the Court's advisory jurisdiction in
Chapter II
57 M .Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1935 (1988) at 110- III
58 Ibid.
591.8. Moore, Collected Papers (1944) Vol. VI at 103 See also Vol. V at 360-370
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Thus, ensuring its independence, the Permanent Court was able to raise
confidence in its ability to be an impartial forum. Although the United States did
not join the Permanent Court, this opinion gave an interesting twist to the debate
that was then going on in the United States." The opinion was often used as an
assurance that the advisory function would not be used to introduce compulsory
jurisdiction in a roundabout way." In other words, the Eastern Carelia opinion
reduced the degree of uncertainty towards the exercise of the advisory
jurisdiction.
Political organs were ready to utilise the advisory function of the
Permanent Court to deal with disputes. Not only had inter-state cases been
referred to the Court, but also disputes and questions that arose within the
activities of international organisations and commissions, had been referred to the
Court for clarification. Although only the League Council and Assembly had been
authorised to request an advisory opinion, international bodies and organisations
used the forum ofthe two organs" as a conduit to request the Court's opinion." In
the Exchange ofGreek and Turkish Populations case", the Court's opinion was
requested by the Council of the League ofNations at the request of the Mixed
Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, with the
purposes of clarifying the Article 2 of the Convention of Lausanne of 1923. At
issue was the interpretation of Article 2 which provided exemption from
60 See M. Pomerance, The United States and the World Court as a 'Supreme Court ofthe
Nations': Dreams, Illusions and Disillusion (1996) at 77-78 & at 98-100
61 Ibid. at 98
62 All the requests for advisory opinion were channelled through the Council.
63 S. M. Schwebel, "Was the Capacity to request an advisory opinion wider in the Permanent
Court ofInternational Justice Than it is in the International Court of Justice?" 62 BY/L 77 (1991)
at 84
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compulsory exchange for two classes of persons: Greeks "established" in
Constantinople before certain date and Muslims "established" in Western Thrace.
The term "established" was the centre of this controversy. While the
Turkish delegates in the Mixed Commission maintained that the term
"established" equated to the legal term "domiciled" as it was applied in Turkish
law, the Greek delegates saw the term related solely to a situation of facts. With
these divergent views, the three neutral members ofthe Commission were called
to give their opinions." They upheld the Greek point of view unanimously. The
Turkish delegation rejected the opinion and requested that the matter be referred
to the legal section of the Commission. The Commission complied with the
request. The legal section confirmed the previous opinion. Turkey rejected the
legal section's opinion. As tension arose between the two parties and no
agreement was reached on the meaning of "established", the Commission decided
to ask the Council to request an advisory opinion. The Court gave its opinion
confirming the earlier interpretation of the term "established", and considered that
it referred to a situation of facts.66
It is interesting to note the confidence and trust that had been vested in the
Court in general and in its advisory jurisdiction in particular. It is apparent that the
Commission referred to the Court for legal advice on a question of treaty
interpretation. With the referral to the Permanent Court, the Commission hoped to
draw not only on the Court's greater judicial knowledge but also on that Court's
authority, "an authority which might cause the Court's pronouncement to be more
64 1925 PCIJ, Series B, No.10, 6
65 Ibid. at 18-19
66 Ibid. at 20-21
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favourably received than were the earlier opinions ofthe Mixed Commission and
its Legal Section" .67
The relationship between the Permanent Court of International Justice and
the League ofNations Council was well- defined. Organs were ready to
compromise their decision-making power for a dispute to be settled. For example,
in the Polish Postal Service in Danzig" case, the League Council delegated its
own powers as a court of appeal in Polish- Danzig differences to the Permanent
Court of International Justice.
The subject of controversy was the nature and the extent of the postal
service which Poland was entitled to establish in the port of Danzig. In particular,
the question was raised as to whether the Polish postal service in the port of
Danzig had the right to be extended beyond the building assigned to it and
whether it could be open to the public as well as to Polish authorities and
officials. The matter was intensified when Poland, without prior consultation with
the Danzig Senate, set up mailboxes in the streets of Danzig bearing the Polish
emblem. The controversy revolved on the Free City's sovereignty and Poland's
right of access to the sea, its only outlet on the Baltic." The Free City
immediately asked the League's High Commissioner at Danzig for a decision on
the matter. The High Commissioner stated that the matter had already been settled
in Danzig's favour by the preceding High Commissioner. Poland appealed this
decision to the Council. The Council's Rapporteur suggested that an advisory
67 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 73
68 1925 pelJ, Series B, No.ll, 6
69 Ibid. at 11
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opinion be requested. Poland had some misgivings about the request for an
advisory opinion, as it was argued by Poland that Article 39 of Treaty of Paris"
was clear and that it was only to the Council, not to the Court that the parties
could appeal. In replying, the President noted that what was involved "was not an
appeal by Poland or Danzig to the Permanent Court of International Justice but a
point of great difficulty on which the Council desired to have the advice of the
Court. It would be for the Court to call before it anyone whom it wished to hear
before giving its opinion. "71
However, the Court did play the role of court of appeal, as is evident in its
opinion. The Court held that the points at issue had not been covered by the
decision of the High Commissioner. It pointed out that Poland had the right to set
up the mailboxes and collect and deliver postal matters outside its premises, and
finally the use of such service could be opened to the public and was not confined
to Polish authorities and officials."
Interpretation ofArticle 3, Paragraph 2, ofthe Treaty ofLausanne
(Frontier between Turkey and Iraq)" was related to a territorial dispute, however,
its similarities with Eastern Carelia could not be missed. The opposition by one
of the disputants to request an advisory opinion; and the opposing State's
nonmembership in the League were the key points of similarities. Nevertheless,
70 The Article provided for the submission of Polish- Danzig differences to the decision of the
High Commissioner; the right of the parties to appeal from that decision to the League Council;
and the right of the High Commissioner to submit controversial matters to the Council. (The Peace
Treaty of Paris of 1920 [6 League of Nations Treaty Series 189]) Poland did not seriously object
the request for the advisory opinion.
71 League of Nations Official Journal, 1925, at 472
72 1925 PCU, Series B, No.ll, 6 at 41
73 1925 rcu, Series B, No.12, 6
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the Court's examination of the case produced quite a difference between the two
cases.
In this case, the Court had to settle the disposition of the region of Mosul
between Great Britain (as mandate power for Iraq) and Turkey. By virtue of
Article 3(2) of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Iraqi-Turkish what was supposed to be
settled by direct negotiation between the parties, and in the case ofthe failure to
reach an agreement within five months, the matter was to be referred to the
League Council. After the negotiations reached a deadlock, the British
government asked the Council to consider the matter. Turkey accepted that the
matter should be considered in the Council and participated in the proceedings."
The Council decided to set up a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the local
conditions and the sentiments of the local population in the disputed territory.
The Commission's report indicated two solutions: either to give the entire
territory to Iraq, provided Iraq continued under a mandatory regime for another
twenty five years, or if the mandate was to be terminated, that Turkey should be
awarded the territory. However, Turkey showed no satisfaction with the
Commission's report."
When the Council came to consider the Commission's report, the Turkish
representative challenged the Commission's report on the ground that the
conclusions reached were ultra vires, and he also denied the Council could
exercise anything more than a mediatory role. He firmly maintained that no
binding decision could be taken without the consent of the parties involved in the
74 Ibid. at 15-17
75 Ibid. at 17
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dispute." While the British representative maintained that the Council should "act
as arbitrator", the Turkish representative saw the submission of the question was
rather an "impartial examination" by the Council. Given these views, the Council
appointed a subcommittee to examine the Commission's report. With Turkey's
challenge to the Council's competence, the subcommittee recommended the
referral of two questions to PCIJ for an advisory opinion." The questions put
forward to the Court were:
II 1. What is the character of the decision to be taken
by the Council in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of
the Treaty of Lausanne- is it an arbitral award, a
recommendation, or a simple mediation?
2. Must the decision be unanimous or may it be
taken by a majority?
3. May the representatives of the interested Parties
take part in the vote??"
The proposal was strongly opposed by the Turkish representative." For him, there
was no necessity to request judicial advice, since the drafting history of the Treaty
of Lausanne clearly indicated that the good offices of the League Council were
contemplated. Moreover, the question was extremely political." With these
considerations, Turkey put the Council on notice that it would not accept any
opinion unfavourable to its contentions. However, the Council proceeded to
request the Court's opinion.
76 Ibid. at 18
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid. at 6-7
79 League ofNations Official Journal, 1925, at 1307-37
80 League of Nations Official Journal, 1925, at 1380-81
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The Court in the Mosul Question drifted from its previous attitude in the
Eastern Carelia case, with respect to the necessity of the consent of the disputants
to the request for the Court's advisory opinion. However, the context of the
Council's motives and competence were different with comparison with Eastern
Carelia. In the Eastern Carelia case, the Council in requesting the advisory
opinion aimed at getting a kind of declaratory judgment regarding Russia's
obligations without Russia's consent. Moreover, the Council's incompetence to
recommend any solution to the dispute was another issue, on the basis of which
the Court rejected the Council's request for an advisory opinion. But in the Mosul
Question, although Turkey was not a member of the League and it did not consent
to the request for an advisory opinion, the Court did not find these issues as
precluding it from giving an advisory opinion. What mattered for the Court was
that the Council had competence to deal with the issue and its opinion was likely
"to aid in the solution of the substantive problem of the dispute"!'. In other words,
the Permanent Court ofIntemational Justice stressed the necessity for it, before
rendering its opinion, to establish the competence of the requesting body."
So far, in most of the cases that the Permanent Court had to deal with,
political implications were there but not as evident as in Customs Regime between
Austria and Germany case", The Permanent Court ofIntemational Justice had
hardly dealt with such controversial and difficult circumstances as it did in the
81 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 78
82 H. Lauterpacht, The Development ofInternational Law by the International Court (1958) at
107; see also K. 1.Keith, The Extent ofthe Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court of
Justice (1971) at 126
83 193 1 PCIJ, Series AlB, No.41, 37
250
Customs Regime between Austria and Germany case." The case began with the
announcement in March 1931 that Germany and Austria had signed a Protocol
designed to institute a customs union between them. This move was seen by many
European States as a disturbance to the existing balance of power; and that this
economic unity was an intended prelude to political unity- Anschluss- that the
Allied Powers had prevented in 1919.
As such, it would have been possible for the European States concerned,
most notably France and Czechoslovakia, to deal with the problem in the
Council's forum as a political matter, which "threaten[ed] to disturb international
peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. "85
However, they laid the matter before the Council as a legal question, as an
interpretation of specific treaty provisions. The States concerned turned to the
treaty obligations designed to preserve Austrian independence and to bar the
dreaded political unity. Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint Germain was the starting
point; it stipulated:
"The independence of Austria is inalienable
otherwise than with the consent ofthe Council of
the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria
undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said
Council to abstain from any act which might
directly or indirectly or by any means whatever
compromise her independence, particularly, and
until her admission to the membership of the
League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of
another Power. 1186
84 J.H. W. Verziji, The Jurisprudence ofthe World Court: a case by case Commentary (1965) at
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85 Article 11(2) of the League of Nations Covenant
86 193 1 PCIJ, Series AlB, No.41, 37
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The government of Austria, moreover, declared, upon the acceptance of financial
aid from the League ofNations, in Protocol No.1 of 1922, that it:
"undertakes, in accordance with the terms of Article
88 of the Treaty of Saint Germain, not to alienate its
independence; it will abstain from any negotiations
or from any economic or financial engagement
calculated directly or indirectly to compromise this
independence. This undertaking shall not prevent
Austria from maintaining, subject to the provisions
of the Treaty of Saint Germain, her freedom in the
matter of customs tariffs and commercial or
financial agreements, and, in general, in all matters
relating to her economic regime or her commercial
relations, provided always that she shall not violate
her economic independence by granting to any State
a special regime or exclusive advantages calculated
to threatened this independence. "87
However, the debate in the Council intensified with the idea of the Council
dealing with the "legal" question. The French memorandum to the Council
entered into a lengthy discussion of the consequences of the customs union and
gave an indication of the considerations with which the Council would be forced
to grapple should it attempt to resolve the matter itself." The British
representative spoke of the necessity of referring the matter to the Permanent
Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion even though the matter
borne important economic and political questions." Everyone in the League
Council agreed that the Court was the proper forum for the consideration of the
question at hand." Moreover, France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia
maintained that the 'legal' question was a preliminary one and that would leave
87 Ibid.
88 League of Nations Official Journal, 1931, at 1163-72
89 Ibid. at 1068
90 See Mr. Briand Statement Ibid. at 1079
252
the Council free subsequently to deal the issue on a political basis." The British
draft resolution was unanimously adopted, requesting the Court's opinion on the
compatibility of the proposed customs regime with Article 88 of the Treaty of
Saint Germain and Protocol No.1 of 1922.92
The Court found that the provisions of the 1922 Protocol created for
Austria obligations not to compromise its independence through any kind of
economic or financial arrangements." The Court confirmed that Austria still
maintained its independence although it shared with Germany uniform tariffs and
customs." However, it went further to state that: "if the regime projected by the
Austro-Gennan Protocol of Vienna in 1931 be considered as a whole from the
economic standpoint adopted by the Geneva Protocol of 1922, it is difficult to
maintain that this regime is not calculated to threaten the economic independence
of Austria,'?" and to declare the incompatibility of the customs regime with
Article 88 and Protocol No.1.
Two days before the opinion handed down, the representatives of
Germany and Austria informed the Committee of Enquiry for European Union
that it was not their intention to proceed with the establishment of the proposed
customs regime."
As a way of recapitulation, the issues that faced the Permanent Court of
International Justice shaped the contours of the advisory jurisdiction. Maintaining
91 League of Nations Official Journal, 1931, at 1072-73,1075-80
92 Ibid at 1080
93 1931 PCIJ, Series AlB, No.41, 37 at 49
94 Ibid at 52
95 Ibid
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its judicial character was the main goal of the Court. Even though it was advisory,
the advisory jurisdiction was to be based on the consent of the parties involved as
long as the requesting organs had the competence to deal with the issue, and
advisory opinions could not be given on abstract questions." The Permanent
Court did not allow itself to slide into the trap of being a private lawyer to the
Council, as it was evident in the Eastern Carelia case. Full publicity was to be
given to the request and the opinion, notices would be given to States and
international organisations, and all advisory opinions were to be given after
deliberation by the full Court. No distinction was made between "disputes" and
"questions" .98
It was successful in preserving the judicial character of the advisory
jurisdiction throughout its short life. The Court moved progressively in its
practice toward eliminating the line between its advisory function and its
contentious function. It maintained the necessity to establish the consent of the
States involved in a certain dispute before dealing with the matter. Besides, it
increasingly looked behind the facade of the dispute and to the real interests
involved.
The exercise of the advisory jurisdiction vanquished all the uncertainties
that accompanied its beginning. The Court handled well this revolutionary new
insertion in the international legal field. It built confidence in judicial advisory
96 League of Nations Official Journal, 1931, at 2185-2190
97 The Pennanent Court refrained from answering abstract questions in these opinions: Monastery
ofSaint Naoum, 1924 PCIJ, Series 8., No.9, 6 at 21; Polish Postal Services in Danzig, 1925 PCIJ,
Series 8., No.ll, 6 at 32; Jurisdiction ofthe European Commission on the Danube, 1927 PCIJ,
Series B, No. 14,6 at 37 See also, H. Lauterpacht, The Development ofInternational Law by the
International Court (1958) at 79
98 K. 1. Keith, The Extent ofthe Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court ofJustice (1971)
at 80; S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice ofthe International Court, 1920- 1996 (1997) at 279-286
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procedure as a peaceful means to settle international disputes. International bodies
and States through the League ofNations Council turned to the Court to clarify
legal aspects of disputes. Hardly any advisory opinion was disregarded. The
Court's advisory opinions were granted the authoritative force of a decision, as the
President of the Greco-Bulgarian Mixed Emigration Commission stated that,
thanks to the Court's advice", the Commission was in possession of an
"authoritative opinion which would be of great assistance in its work." 100 The
advisory jurisdiction of the Court was utilised to get an authoritative
determination ofthe legal aspects of highly volatile political issues.
When the time came for the creation of the International Court of Justice,
the satisfaction that the PCIJ was able to achieve in its exercise of the advisory
jurisdiction led for this jurisdiction to be bequeathed to the new Court. The PCIJ's
practice in handling requests for advisory opinions and its success in dealing with
this innovation made the continuation of this function in the new Court more
feasible. The discussion was, as we shall see, tense when the time came to
determine whether or not to keep the advisory function. Some considered the
advisory function caused more harm than good to the Court's judicial character.
Others regarded the function as rather useful but that more safeguards should be
considered.
4 The International Court of Justice: Advisory Jurisdiction
The first stage of the reconsideration ofthe Court's Statute took place in
the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of
99 Greco-Bulgarian 'Communities' opinion, 1930 peu, Series B, No.17, 4
100 League of Nations Official Journal, 1930, at 1300
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International Justice which met in London in 1943-44. 101 Among members of the
Committee, there were some who felt that the advisory jurisdiction was
"anomalous and ought to be abolished, mainly on the ground that it was
incompatible with the true function of a court of law, which was to hear and
decide disputes." It was argued that "the existence of this jurisdiction tended to
encourage the use of the Court as an instrument for settling issues which were
essentially of a political rather than of a legal character." Other objections argued
that the advisory jurisdiction had been used to promote "a tendency to avoid the
final settlement of disputes by seeking opinions"; and the rendering of "general
pronouncements of law ... not (or not sufficiently) related to a particular issue or
set of facts" 102. Notwithstanding these contentions and arguments, the Committee
concluded that the advisory jurisdiction should be not only retained but also
enlarged 103, by granting the right to request opinions to "all international
associations of an inter-State or inter-governmental character possessing the
necessary status" and to "any two or more States acting in concert" 104. It was noted
that, in several municipal systems, the advisory jurisdiction was deemed judicial
and was "of undoubted utility"; and that the new general international
organisation would undoubtedly require "authoritative legal advice on points
affecting its constitution". Empowering States to request opinions would give
them the opportunity of clarifying their legal rights before differences "ripened
into an issue or definite dispute"; of aiding them to reach a firm basis for
101 HAC Report, 10 February 1944 issued as British Parliamentary Paper, Cmd. 6531, Misc.




negotiations; and of achieving all this without incurring the hostilities often
imputed to litigant States in contentious proceedings. lOS
Accompanying these recommendations were some suggestions to prevent
the abuse of the advisory jurisdiction and to preserve the judicial character of the
Court. The Court was not to be asked questions of"general or abstract" nature.
The questions to be referred should be related "to some definite issue or
circumstance, and be based on an agreed and stated set of facts". Otherwise, the
Court might "be used for making pronouncements on political issues, or in a
semi-legislative capacity for making general statements or declarations oflaw".
Above all, the Court was to be granted the requisite jurisdiction to decline to deal
with inappropriate and "non-justiciable" matters- including questions "oftoo
general" character; and requests presented to the Court "as a means of reopening
questions already judicially determined" 106.
On the relationship between the new Court and the new general
international organisation, the Committee believed that the Court had "to some
extent suffered in the past from its organic connection with the League, which,
whether logically or not, resulted in its prestige being dependent to some extent
upon the varying fortunes of the League". And that close connection was
responsible for the unwillingness of some States to join the Court and its
Statute. 107 It therefore recommended that the new Court would not have that
"organic connection". Instead, the Court was to be regarded"as part of the
104 Ibid. paras. 142-143
105 Ibid. paras. 66-68
106 Ibid. paras. 69-75 and 144-145
107 Mainly the United States of America. See above the discussion in Chapter III
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machinery at the disposal of the Organisation". 108 The Court would be open for
the new organisation to make use of it through the advisory jurisdiction or
through referring disputes among States, assuming that they were justiciable. 109
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in 1944, which came next, contained a
chapter on the pacific settlement of disputes, the sixth paragraph of which stated
that:
"Justiciable disputes should normally be referred to
the International Court of Justice. The Security
Council should be empowered to refer to the Court
for advice legal questions connected with other
disputes. 11110
The refinement of the bare and vague Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was left to the
Washington Committee of Jurists, which convened two weeks before the San
Francisco Conference.
When the United Nations Committee of Jurists (known the Washington
Committee of Jurists) came to consider the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, it did not
find any difficulties in recommending that the authorisation to request an advisory
opinion be extended to the General Assembly as well as the Security Council.'!'
This proposal was advanced by China, and it was accepted unanimously. At the
same time, however, the Committee of Jurists recognised that it was for the
108 HAC Report, 10 February 1944 issued as British Parliamentary Paper, Cmd. 653 I, Misc.
No.2(I944) reproduced in 39 AJIL I, Supp. (1945) paras.12-20 and para. 116
109 Ibid. para. 17
110 3 UNCIa at 14
III 14 UNCIa at 177,445-7
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Charter and not for the Statute to determine which organs of the United Nations
would be qualified to request advisory opinions.!"
A further proposal was put forward by Venezuela!" and the United
Kingdom 114 to empower specialised agencies and States to request advisory
opinions, but this was not approved.!" Objections were raised by various
representatives on the grounds that the proposed authorisation would overload the
Court's docket with "trivial" individual applications, detract the Court from its
more important duties; and that the function of the Court was not to play the role
of general adviser. I 16 In addition, the proposed authorisation would jeopardise the
work of the Security Council and the General Assembly in their handling of
disputes, and the result of direct requests to the Court might be confusion and
chaos.!"
At the San Francisco Conference on International Organisation, the draft
prepared by the Washington Committee of Jurists was considered by Committee I
of Commission IV (Commission on Judicial Organisation). It was agreed to add
to the Charter the provision, now Article 96(1), providing that: "the General
Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice
to give an advisory opinion on any legal question". 118 It was likewise agreed to
112 Ibid. at 179, 850
113Ibid. at 373, 447
114Ibid. at 182, 319
1151bid. at 183
1161bid. at 181
117 Comments By Mr. Hackworth (the Chairman of the Committee) Ibid. at 183
118 13 UNCIa at 241
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insert a complementary provision in the Court's Statute (now Article 65).119 It was
also agreed on empowering agencies authorised by the General Assembly to
request advisory opinions, but it was restricted to intergovernmental agencies
brought into a formal relationship with the United Nations (i.e. Specialised
Agencies). 120 Article 96 (2) was considered an innovation although it was based
on the experience of the League of Nations, especially with respect to the ILO
requests.!" The provision for such an authorisation was approved but with a
safeguard of "within the scope of their activities".122
The Venezuelan proposal for empowering two or more States acting in concert to
request advisory opinions was renewed 123, but it failed for the lack of a two-thirds
majority. 124
The Charter, as adopted, empowered the General Assembly and the
Security Council to request advisory opinions "on any legal question", a broader
formulation than that of the League Covenant. However, the Specialised Agencies
could only request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising
within the scope of their activities. Although it could be considered a limitation,
the idea behind this was to provide the Court with safeguard against any abuse of
119 Ibid at 242
120 9 UNCIO at 161-2, & 13 UNCIa at 298
121 M. Pomerance, "The Advisory role of the International Court of Justice and its 'judicial'
Character: Past and Future Prisms" 271 at 288 in A.S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court
ofJustice (1997)
122 13 UNCIO at 247
123 It was first introduced in Informal Inter-allied Committee. See HAC Report, 10 February 1944
issued as British Parliamentary Paper, Cmd.6531, Misc. No.2 (1944) reproduced in 39 AJIL 1,
Supp. (1945) at 68- 75
124 HAC Report 39 AJIL 1, Supp. (1945) at 235
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its advisory jurisdiction, and to leave the necessary control to be exercised by the
Court itself. 125
The most important change introduced at the San Francisco was the
formal relationship between the Court and the new international organisation.
Although it was not directly linked to the advisory jurisdiction, here it has had the
most effect as can be seen in the subsequent practice of the Court. Under Article
92, the International Court is now "the principal judicial organ ofthe United
Nations". This new status provides the basis for "a judicialduty-to-co-operate'
doctrine which entailed the overlooking and overcoming of difficulties" 126 to
assist the organs and the agencies of the UN. One commentator interprets the new
status of the Court was as an evidence of "the intentions of the founders of the
United Nations to emphasise to a much greater degree ... the extent to which the
judicial process should be considered an avenue for peaceful resolution of
disputes ... "127
One could not have expected any drastic change in the exercise of the
advisory function, if anything, corresponding to the introduction of the new
provisions broadening the scope of the advisory jurisdiction, extensive use of this
function could be predicted. However, the UN practice was to prove these
expectations wrong.
125 Ibid. paras. 69, 73
126 M. Pomerance, "The Advisory role of the International Court of Justice and its 'judicial'
Character: Past and Future Prisms" 271 at 290 in A.S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court
ofJustice (1997)
127 T. J. Bodie, Politics and the Emergence ofAn Activist International Court ofJustice (1995) at
58
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5 The Practice of the International Court of Justice
The numerical decline of the requests for advisory opinions during the
days of the United Nations has been remarkable. In nineteen years of active life
(1922-1940), the Permanent Court of International Justice gave twenty-seven
advisory opinions, while the International Court of Justice in its fifty-five years
has given twenty- three advisory opinions. This is despite the fact that the
capacity to request advisory opinions is wider under the United Nations Charter
and the ICJ Statute than it was under the Covenant of the League ofNations and
the PCU Statute.
The first case to face the new Court was highly political and volatile. It
was the Conditions ofAdmission ofa State to Membership in the United Nations
(Article 4 ofthe Charteri'", The question that was put to the Court concerned the
interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter. The whole new international
organisation was caught in between the divergent views of the two camps of the
Cold War. Each camp within the UN employed its weapons at its disposal for
excluding the admission of members of the other Camp; the West used its
majority in the General Assembly, while the East used the veto weapon in the
Security Council.
A surge of opposition was raised against the request of the Court's advisory
opinion. The objection concerned the motivation behind the request, claiming that
it was political and the request dealt with an abstract interpretation of the Charter.
128 1948 ICJ Rep. 57 at 60
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Assertions were made that the request was just "an effort to clarify the conduct of
certain Members rather than ...to interpret the Charter."129
Despite these objections, the General Assembly proceeded to request the
Court's opinion. However, the bloc opposing the request informed the Assembly
that it would not accept the judicial clarification, and thus that clarification, under
these circumstances, was bound to be pointless. 130
The Court started off its opinion by determining the objections. It
maintained that it had competence to deal with the question even if it was
abstract. It stated: "Article 96 ofthe UN Charter and Article 65 ofthe Statute
[established that] the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question,
abstract or otherwise." 131 As for the motives behind the request, the Court said
that: "it is not concerned with the motives which may have inspired this request,
nor with the consideration which, in the concrete cases submitted for examination
to the Security Council, formed the subject of the exchange of views which took
place in that body."!" The Court went on to give its opinion stating that the
conditions of admission under Article 4 were exhaustive, and no State was
obliged to explain its vote in any case. The Court pointed out that the matter went
down to the question of good faith and motives, neither of which was subject to
judicial control.!"
129 GAOR (II), Plenary, 118th Mtg., 17 November 1947, at 1071
130 See the statement of the representative of Poland GAOR (II), Plenary, 99th Mtg., 7 November
1947 at 345 and GAOR (II), Plenary, 117th Mtg., 17 November 1947 at 1046; See the statement of
the representative of USSR GAOR (II), Plenary, 117th Mtg., 17 November 1947 at 1048
131 1948 ICJ Rep. 57 at 61
132 Ibid.
133 H. Lauterpacht, The Development ofInternational Law by the International Court ofJustice
(1958) at 150
263
The International Court of Justice was bound to be involved in Cold War
tensions as was the United Nations in general. Interpretation ofPeace Treaties
with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania'? was rather an explicit attack from one
camp on the other through the International Court, as the Court was used for
propaganda purposes. 135 In 1949, the United Kingdom and the United States had
addressed notes to the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, alleging
violations of human rights provisions of their respective Peace Treaties. All
efforts for settling the human rights questions in accordance with the dispute-
settlement procedures of the Peace Treaties had proven unsuccessful. 136 The three
"communist" governments denied the allegations and rejected all western
diplomatic interference in their domestic affairs."? Similarly, they denied the
existence of any dispute between them and the Allied and Associated Powers and
refused to designate representatives to the treaty commissions provided for in the
Peace Treaties. 138
Under these circumstances, the General Assembly led by the "western"
camp decided to continue the consideration of the issue in the area of public
opinion. 139 It turned to the Court to request an advisory opinion. Four questions
were to be put to the Court. First, did the diplomatic exchanges between the three
States and certain Allied and Associated Powers disclose disputes subject to the
134 1950 /CJ Rep. 65 OSI phase)
135 S. Rosenne, "On the non-use of the Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice"
39 BYIL I (1963)
136 For diplomatic exchanges, see Peace Treaties Pleadings at 30-69, and 77-104
137Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 A/Res/272 (III) (4th mtg), see also 1950 /CJ Rep. 65 at 66
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provisions for the settlement of disputes contained in the Treaties? Second, in the
event of an affirmative reply, were the three States obligated to carry out the
provisions of the Articles in the Peace Treaties for the settlement of disputes,
including the provisions for the appointment of their representatives to the
Commissions?
Third, in the event of an affirmative reply to the second question and if
within thirty days from the date when the Court delivered its opinion the
designation has not been made, was the Secretary-General of the United Nations
authorised to appoint the third Member of the Commissions? Fourth, in the event
of an affirmative reply to the third question would a Commission so composed be
competent to make a definitive and binding decision in settlement of a dispute'Z'"
The competence of the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion,
and even to consider the matter at all, was challenged by the then Soviet bloc. The
grounds that they based their challenges on were: first, the right to interpret, or
seek interpretation of a treaty appertained exclusively to the parties. Without the
consent of all the parties the Assembly could not seek, and the Court could not
render an interpretation.':" Second, since peace treaties were involved, the UN
was barred, under Article 107 of the Charter, from dealing with the issue. 142 Third,
the peace treaties contained their own procedures for dispute settlement, and these
procedures had not been exhausted. 143 Fourth, the dispute settlement procedures
were applicable only when all the Allied and Associated Powers (including the
140 1950 ICJ Rep. 65 at 67-68
141 Ibid. at 70-71
142 Peace Treaties Pleadings at 92-93
143 Ibid.
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then Soviet Union) were in dispute with the defeated States. 144 Fifth, as was
already mentioned, the General Assembly's discussions and dealings with the
matter constituted interference in domestic affairs of Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Romania. 145 Finally, it was objected that political elements rather than legal
elements were decisive in the subject matter of the controversy, and it was for
political reasons and motives that the matter found its way to the Court. 146
In defence of the General Assembly's competence to seek advice from the
Court, it was argued that the questions which were put forward to the Court were
not substantive questions of human rights, but rather they were procedural
questions concerning the applicability of the treaties' dispute settlement
procedures. 147 It was argued that referring the issue to the Court should not be
considered as interference with the domestic jurisdiction of States, since the
observation of treaties' obligations was not a domestic rnatter.!" By promoting
respect for treaties and facilitating the use of the dispute settlement mechanism
provided for in the treaties, it was claimed that the General Assembly was not
only acting within its competence, but also it was discharging a positive duty
under Article 33 of the Charter."?
Moreover, it was argued although it could be thought that the recourse to
the International Court could be thought of as a political action, this political
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid. at 52
146 Ibid. at 199
147 1950 Ie] Rep. 65 at 70
148 Ibid.
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action was based on undoubted legal foundations, which would be efficacious in
impressing on the three governments the propriety as well as the strength of the
World's interest in their behaviour. 150 With these divergent views, the Assembly
proceeded to adopt the resolution asking the Court for an advisory opinion.
In the first phase of the case, the Court answered in affirmative the first
two questions, but it did not proceed to answer the last two questions."! The Court
pointed out on the one hand that disputes existed because certain charges had
been brought against certain States, which the latter rejected, and on the other
hand that these disputes were subject to the provisions of the Articles for the
settlement of disputes contained in the Peace Treaties. In answering the second
question, it stated that Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were under an obligation
to carry out the Articles of the Peace Treaties concerning the settlement of
disputes, including the obligation to appoint their representatives to the Treaty
Commissions. 152 In the second phase, the Court answered the third question in the
negative and held that it was not necessary to deal with the fourth question. 153
The request in the Certain Expenses ofthe United Nations (Article 17(2)
ofthe Charter/ 54 opinion was stamped with an "organisational" character as, to
great extent, was the Admission opinion. It dealt with the interpretation of Article
17(2) of the Charter. The subject matter of the controversy was disagreement over
149 See the representatives' arguments, GAOR(IV), Ad Hoc Political Committee 7th Mtg. 1949 at
27-31; GAOR (IV) 9th Mtg. 1949 at 36-39; GAOR (IV) lOth Mtg. 1949 at 41; GAOR(IV) n"
Mtg. 1949 at 44, 56
150 see for example the statements of the British representative GAOR(IV) 9th Mtg. 1949 at 36;
Lebanese representative GAOR (IV) 11th Mtg. 1949 at 46
151 1950 IC) Rep. 65 at 70-77
152 Ibid. at 77
153 1950 IC) Rep. 221 (2nd phase) at 230
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the organisation's finances, and the UN role in peace keeping. This case also fell
in the Cold War tensions category. There was East- West conflict of interests with
regard to the two areas of the UN peace keeping operations in the Middle East
and Congo.
The International Court of Justice was asked to give its opinion on
whether certain expenditures, which were authorised by the General Assembly to
cover the costs of the United Nations operations in the Congo and in the Middle
East, constituted "expenses of the Organisation" with the meaning of Article 17
para.2 of the UN Charter. It was argued before the Court that the expenses, that
resulted from operations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
were not "expenses of the organisation within the meaning of Article 17 para.2 of
the Charter, inasmuch as they fell to be dealt with exclusively by the Security
Council, and more especially through agreements negotiated in accordance with
Article 43 ofthe Charter't.!" It was argued further that since the General
Assembly's power was limited to discussing, considering, studying and
recommending, it could not impose an obligation on members to pay the expenses
which resulted from the implementation of its recommendations.
The Court started its opinion by discussing and rejecting all the contentions. The
Court examined the view that it should take into consideration the rejection of a
French amendment to the request for advisory opinion. The amendment would
have asked the Court to give an opinion on the question whether the expenditures
related to the indicated operations had been "decided on in conformity with the
154 1962 ICJ Rep. 151
155 Ibid. at 162
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provisions ofthe Charter". On this point the Court observed that the rejection of
the French amendment did not
"constitute a directive to the Court to exclude from
its consideration the question whether certain
expenditures were 'decided on in conformity with
the Charter', if the Court found such consideration
appropriate. Nor could the Court agree that the
rejection of the French amendment had any bearing
upon the question whether the General Assembly
had sought to preclude the Court from interpreting
Article 17 in the light of other articles of the
Charter, that is, in the whole context ofthe
treaty. "156
The Court rejected the objections and answered the question at hand in the
affirmative.
Despite the Court's opinion, the opposing States continued to refuse to pay
their contribution of the organisation's budget.157 With this opinion and the Peace
Treaties opinion, it was clear that recalcitrant attitude of States would not be
likely to be overcome by legal opinions.
After the Certain Expenses opinion, the International Court of Justice
went into a period of disuse, which lasted till 1970. With the Legal Consequences
for States ofthe Continued Presence ofSouth Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970/ 58 opinion, the
Court marked the renewal in the use of its advisory function. Moreover, this case
demonstrated the use of the Court's advisory function by the Security Council. It
156 Ibid at 157
157 France and the Soviet Union refused to accept the ICJ opinion: See for in depth analysis 1. E.
Alvarez, "Legal Remedies and the United Nations' it la Carte Problem" 12 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 229
(1991) at 282; L. Gross, "Expenses of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping Operations: the
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice" 17 International Organization 1 (1963) at
4
158 197 1 ICJ Rep. 16
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was the first time, in nearly a quarter century of its existence, that the Security
Council employed its powers to ask the International Court for its opinion.
The South West Africa dispute between the Republic of South Africa and
the United Nations, which was on the Court's docket in one form or another for
more than two decades. The matter was brought before the Court in the form of
four advisory opinions, and one contentious proceeding.
In 1949, when the first opinion'" was requested, the Western powers
sought clarification of the legal issues on the status of South West Africa, and
other States favoured submission to the Court apparently because they wanted to
have the doubts of the Western States resolved. After the International Status of
South West Africa opinion, the General Assembly requested two advisory
opinions on Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions
concerning the Territory ofSouth West Africa'", and on Admissibility ofHearings
ofPetitioners by the Committee on South West Africa'", These two requests
involved attempts at the interpretation and clarification of the main ruling and
initially concerned with procedural matters regarding the administration of South
West Africa.
The contentious South West Africa case should be briefly noted. Ethiopia
and Liberia raised claims related to the continued existence of the Mandate for
South West Africa and the duties and performance of South Africa as Mandatory
assuming that the Mandate for South West Africa was still in force. Under such
circumstances, the Court was asked whether the Mandatory's obligation to furnish
159 International Status ofSouth West Africa opinion 1950 Ie] Rep. 128
160 1955 ICJ Rep. 67
161 1956 ICJ Rep. 23
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annual reports on its administration to the Council of the League ofNations had
become transformed into an obligation so to report to the General Assembly of
the United Nations. They also questioned whether the respondent had, in
accordance with the Mandate, promoted to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory. The
applicants also questioned whether South Africa had contravened the provision in
the Mandate that it (the Mandate) could only be modified with the consent of the
Council of the League ofNations, by attempting to modify the Mandate without
the consent of the United Nations General Assembly by failing to transmit
petition from the inhabitants of South West Africa to the General Assembly, and
to render to the General Assembly Annual Reports.162 In 1962, the Court in the
Preliminary Objections found its jurisdiction to "adjudicate upon the merits of the
dispute" 163. However, in 1966, the Court rejected the claims of the two States on
the basis that they could "not be considered to have established any legal right or
interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present claims" 164.
After considering the Court's pronouncement, the General Assembly
adopted resolution 2145 (XXI) of 1966, indicating that South Africa had violated
its obligations under the mandate. The Assembly declared that South Africa did
not live up to its obligations and had thus disavowed the mandate. The General
Assembly went further to declare that the mandate was terminated and that
henceforth, South West Africa "comes under the direct responsibility of the
162 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (Preliminary
Objections)case 1962 IC) Rep. 319 at 324-25
163 Ibid. at 347
164 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (second Phase) case 1966
IC} Rep. 6 at 51
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United Nations" .165 Six subsequent Security Council resolutions were adopted
within three years. 166 These resolutions took note of the General Assembly's
resolution and stated the measures were taken to implement the resolution.
Upon the non-compliance of South Africa, the Security Council
threatened to apply Chapter VII measures. However,the Council did not get the
necessary support of three permanent members, namely France, the United
Kingdom and the United States, which abstained in the vote of resolution 269 to
adopt enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 167 Thus, the Security Council
turned to ask the International Court for an advisory opinion, seeking "legal
sanctions for political decisions which had already been taken"!". The Court
complied with the Council's request and found that South Africa maintained an
illegal situation and it was under "obligation to withdraw its administration from
Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the territory" 169, and
that United Nations members were under obligation to recognise the illegality of
the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia and to refrain from giving any
support or assistance to the South Africa administration. 170
It was clear that there was not any high expectation that any judicial
pronouncement would succeed in solving the matter, as South Africa remained
165 GA Res 2871 (XXVI) 20 Dec. 1971 reprinted in 11 I.L.M 220 (1972)
166 S.C. Res. 301 UN SCOR(1971), 309 UN SCOR(1972); 310 UN SCOR(1972); 319 UN
SCOR (1972); 323 UN SCOR (1972); 342 UN SCOR (1973)
167 S.c. Res 269 UN SCOR (1969) 1497th mtg adopted with 11 votes and 4 abstentions (Finland,
France, United Kingdom, and the United States of America).
168 G. Weissberg, "The Role of the International Court of Justice in the United Nations System: the
First Quarter Century" 131 at 141 in L. Gross (ed.),The Future ofthe International Court of
Justice (1976)
169 197 1 ICJ Rep. 16 at 55
170 Ibid.
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determined not to accept any international solution to the dispute. I71 In addition,
the Security Council sought the Court's opinion just to legitimise its actions, not
to seek advice for what would be the best solution. The opinion was sought as "a
means of strengthening the Council's efforts and of adding to their
legitimisation" 172.
The advisory function of the International Court was not used as a
clarification for a genuine legal problem, or as a means of problem solving. It was
used instead as a means of propaganda between the two Cold War blocs.
However, with the demise of the Cold War, expectations were raised to
have the advisory jurisdiction as a means to guide the international organisations
in executing their duties legally, 173 and hopes were raised to have the rule of law
in international relations. 174 However, the advisory jurisdiction has seen another
twist toward political struggle, as it was evident in the Legality ofthe Threat or
Use ofNuclear Weapons proceedings 175. Two advisory opinions were requested
from the Court; by the World Health Organisation, and by the United Nations
General Assembly.
The International Court exercised its discretion to reject an advisory
opinion request, and it refused to answer the WHO request on the ground that the
171 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 157
172 Ibid.
173 L. B. De Chazournes & P. Sands, "Introduction" 1 at 16 in L.B. De Chazournes& P. Sands
(eds.), International Law, the International Court ofJustice and Nuclear Weapons (1999)
174 Ibid. at 19; see also D. D. Caron, "Iraq and the Force of Law: Why Give a Shield ofImmunity"
85 AJIL 89 (1991); 1. J. Gassama, "World Order in the Post- Cold War Era: the Relevance and the
Role of the United Nations" 20 Brook. J Int'l. L. 255 (1994); R. L. Gaines, "On the Road to a Pax
U.N.: Using the Peace Tools at our Disposal in a Post-Cold War World" 25 N.Y. U J. Int'l. L. &
Pol. 543 (1993); W. M. Reisman, "International Law after the Cold War" 84 AJIL 859 (1990)
1751996 ICJ Rep. 67 (WHO Request); 1996 ICJ Rep. 226 (General Assembly Request)
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question was not related to its scope of activities. 176 As for the General Assembly,
the Court co-operated and accepted its request. The General Assembly question
was: "[i]s the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted
under international law?" 177 The Court considered the matter and came to the
conclusion that:
"the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of
international law, and of the elements of fact at its
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of
self-defence, in which the very survival of a State
would be at stake."!"
The opinion raised many interesting questions. Many questioned that
indecisive nature of the Court's opinion, and the Court's involvement in this
highly political volatile question. While others regarded the opinion as an
unprecedented behaviour on the part of the General Assembly and the
International Court of Justice.!"
176 1996 ICJ Rep. 67 (WHO Request) at 74-77
177 1996ICJ Rep. 226 (General Assembly Request) at 228
178 Ibid. at 266
179 D. Akande, "The Competence ofInternational Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice" 9 EJIL437 (1998); R. Falk, "Nuclear Weapons, International
law and the World Court: a Historical Encounter" 91 AJIL 417 (1997); L. Heffernan, "The Nuclear
Weapons Opinions: Reflections on the Advisory Procedures of the International Court of Justice"
28 Stetson L. Rev. 133 (1998); E. Kristjansdottir, "The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons Under Current International Law: the Arguments behind the World Court's Advisory
Opinion" 30 N. Y. U. J. Int'!. L. & Po!' 291 (1997-1998); K. Keith, "The Advisory Jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice: Some Comparative Reflections" 17 Aust. YB. Int'!. L. 39 (1996);
K. Ouchi, "The Threat or Use of the Nuclear Weapons Discernible Legal Policies the Judges of
the International Court of Justice" 13 Conn. J. Int'!. L. 107 (1998)
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However, the opinion showed a rather different approach to a request for
an advisory opinion. This request did not arise from any specific situation but
rather it presented a wholly hypothetical question. Previous requests to the IC] for
advisory opinions had typically related to specific situations in which concrete
legal issues had arisen among states or within an international organisation. For
example, in the Namibia opinion, the Court dealt with the dispute over the South
African occupation and administration of the territory of Namibia. The previous
requests were related to a specific question about the interpretation of a particular
agreement or instrument rather than to a very abstract and vague question about
international law in general. Previous requests had typically focused on specific
provisions of an international agreement, or of the statutes and rules of an
international organisation. For example, in Certain Expenses opinion, the Court
dealt with the specific question of the application of Article 17(2) of the UN
Charter to certain expenses incurred by the organisation.
However, the question posed by the Legality ofNuclear Weapons request
was much more like an invitation to the Court to discourse generally on an
abstract field of law as a means of achieving a political objective than like a
request to resolve a concrete operational legal problem. 180 The Court could not
apply the law to any specific set of facts, because none was indicated by the
question posed. Nonetheless, the Court did not reject this request.
In short, the International Court of Justice has shown inconsistency in its
advisory function during the fifty-five years. Its approach to the requests for
advisory opinions differs from that of its predecessor the Permanent Court of
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International Justice, in particular with regard to the preservation of its judicial
character. The PCD was more occupied with the idea of preserving its judicial
character. It shaped the advisory function to defeat the uncertainties by which it
was haunted at the beginning. Whilst the PCIJ tried to get itself away from the
League of Nations stamp, the ICJ has drifted, especially during the Cold War,
toward the organisational stamp. The inconsistency has arisen because the IC] is
not able to establish a clear position for itself, whether it is a court of law or a
United Nations Court."!
However, the requesting organs' approach to the Court's advisory
jurisdiction has also differed in the two eras. The whole picture has changed.
During the League of Nations era, the only authorised organs were the League
Council and Assembly. In the United Nations, authorisation was enlarged but still
safeguards were minimal which opened the door for abuse for this function.
The next section offers an explanation and a comparison between the two
eras. It compares the approach of PCIJ to the issues ofthe consent, and the nature
of the questions. It proceeds to study the behavioural changes in the requesting
organs and their approach toward advisory jurisdiction.
6 Change of behaviour
The discussion of the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and that of the International Court of Justice has pinpointed
changes in the requests for advisory opinions. Two segments of attitude should be
looked at. On the one hand, the International Court of Justice has deviated from
180 See Generally W. M. Reisman, "The Political Consequences ofthe General Assembly
Advisory Opinion" 473 in L.B. De Chazournes & P. Sands (eds.), International Law, the
International Court ofJustice and Nuclear Weapons (1999)
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the practice set by the Permanent Court of International Justice in dealing with the
requests for advisory opinions. On the other hand, changes of attitude in the
requesting organs and in their voting procedures to request advisory opinions
have made the perception of advisory opinions differ in the days of the ICJ from
those of the PCIJ.
6.1. Different Practice:
The first obvious difference in practice between the two Courts is the
"consent" issue. The absence of consent of one member or more characterised
most of the requests addressed to the International Court for advisory opinions. It
was even an issue during the days of the Permanent Court. The Permanent Court,
however, faced the issue only in two requests. The issue is not whether or not the
two Courts faced this dilemma, but rather lies in the two Courts' different
approach to the issue.
The Permanent Court's approach was characterised, to certain extent, with
an overwhelming attempt to preserve the judicial character of the advisory
jurisdiction. It was evident in its dealing with the Eastern Carelia opinion. As was
discussed above!", the Permanent Court tried to avoid appearing as a legal
counsellor to the League of Nations. It stressed its position as ajudicial organ
dealing with legal issues with the consent of States involved. The Permanent
Court refused to render an opinion in this case as it considered that the League
181 See generally L. Gross, "IC] and UN" 120 RDe 313 (1967-1)
182 See the practice of the PCIJ at 226- 242
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Council did not have any competence to deal with the matter and one of the
disputants did not consent to seek the Court's opinion. 183
However, the Permanent Court did render an advisory opinion without the
consent of one party involved in the dispute when it dealt with the Mosul
Question opinion. However, the Court made it clear that its answer was rendered
when it was evident that the League Council had competence to deal with the
issue at the first place.!" What differentiates this opinion from that of Eastern
Carelia was the motive of the League Council, as it was trying in Eastern Carelia
to introduce compulsory jurisdiction in a roundabout approach, which the Court
refused to allow. Besides, the Permanent Court, as Jennings noted, made "the
procedure for advisory opinions as near as possible to the procedure in
contentious jurisdiction cases, as it was anxious not to be regarded as the League
Council's counsellor." 185
The International Court of Justice's approach to the lack of consent has
been controversial. It has been caught between the notion of being "a principal
judicial organ" of the United Nations and its attempt to preserve its judicial
character in the advisory function. In other words, the International Court, to
certain degree, has been under an obligation to participate in the organisation's
activities as a whole. Therefore, it has not considered the attainment of the parties'
consent essential since it was replying to the question put forward by a "fellow"
organ of the United Nations. In the Peace Treaties opinion, the Court pointed this
point out clearly. It stated that:
183 1923 PCIJ, Series B, No.5, 7
184 1925 PCIJ, Series B, No.12, 6
185 R. Y. Jennings, "The Role of the International Court of Justice" 68 BYIL 1 (1997) at 2
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"[t]he consent of States parties to a dispute, is the
basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases.
The situation is different in regard to advisory
proceedings even where the Request for an Opinion
relates to a legal question actually pending between
States. The Court's reply is only of an advisory
character: as such, it has not binding force. It
follows that no State, whether a Member of the
United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an
Advisory Opinion which the United Nations
considers to be desirable in order to obtain
enlightenment as to the course of action it should
take. The Court's Opinion is given not to the States,
but to the organ which is entitled to request it; the
reply of the Court, itself an "an organ of the United
Nations", represents its participation in the
organisation, and, in principle, should not be
refused. "186
The Court has stressed the "organisational" aspects of the requests for
advisory opinions, in order to overcome the objections based on the absence of
consent. It has regarded that the advisory jurisdiction as a means for
enlightenment for the organisation, or a way for "a guidance ... to conduct their
activities in accordance with law." 187 The Court has repeatedly characterised the
requests as organisational in order to deny the consensual basis to deal with the
requests. In the Namibia opinion, the International Court stated that:
"[i]t is not the purpose of the request to obtain the
assistance of the Court in the exercise of the
Security Council's functions relating to the peaceful
settlement of a dispute pending before it between
two or more States. The request is put forward by a
United Nations organ with reference to its own
decisions and it seeks legal advice from the Court
on the consequences and implications of these
decisions. "188
186 1950 ICJ Rep. 65 at 71
187 Applicability ofArticle VI, Section 22, ofthe Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations 1989 ICJ Rep. 177
188 1971lCJ Rep. 16 at 24
279
"The object of this request," the Court continued, quoting from the Reservations
opinion'", "is to guide the United Nations in respect of its action" .190
With this assertion, the International Court of Justice built up a wall
between the advisory and the contentious jurisdictions that the Permanent Court
of International Justice tried to eliminate.!" With this approach, the International
Court deprived the advisory opinions their moral force. It has led Member States
to disregard its opinion in several occasions.!" For the International Court to
consider the absence of consent irrelevant has deprived these judicial
pronouncements the chance to be accepted by the Member States and to solve the
matter peacefully."?
The second difference lies in the question whether the Court should deal
with abstract questions in exercising its advisory function. It has been argued that
unless the Court is consulted on concrete issues, its role becomes "political" and
one related to the legislative function of policy setting. 194
On many occasions, the Permanent Court refrained from answering
hypothetical points in advisory opinions. 195 Nor did the Permanent Court deliver
189 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide,
1951ICJ Rep. 15 at 19
190 Namibia opinion 1971 ICJ Rep. 16 at 24
191 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 169
192 Peace Treaties 1950 ICJ Rep. 65 (Soviet Bloc); Certain Expenses opinion 1962ICJ Rep. 151
(France and Soviet Union); Namibia opinion 1971ICJ Rep. 16 (South Africa)
193 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 163
194 HAC Report, 10 Feberuary 1944 issued as British Parliamentary Paper, Cmd. 6531, Misc. No.2
(1944) reproduced in 39 AJIL 1, Supp. (1945) at para. 69
195 Monastery ofSaint Naoum, 1924 PCIJ, Series B., No.9, 6 at 21; Polish Postal Services in
Danzig, 1925 PCIJ, Series 8., No.ll, 6 at 32; Jurisdiction ofthe European Commission on the
Danube, 1927 PCIJ, Series B, No. 14,6 at 37
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any opinion on an "abstract" question. The League ofNations Council did not
present the Court with abstract questions. Rather, the requests were based on
actual disputes, or related to a given dispute, as in the Nomination ofthe
Netherlands Workers' Delegate 196. Although the dispute had been settled, the
Court gave its opinion in order to fix the facts under which the interpretation
applied. However, in the Eastern Carelia opinion, the Permanent Court referred
to the "abstract question" issue in a way that would imply that it would have
rendered an opinion to an abstract question had it been so asked. It stated that:
"[t]he Court is aware ofthe fact that it is not
requested to decide a dispute, but to give an
advisory opinion. This circumstance does not
modify the above considerations. The question put
is not one of abstract law, but concerns directly the
main point of controversy between Finland and
Russia and can only be decided by an investigation
into the facts underlying the case."'"
The League Council was cautious and exercised a degree of checking before
putting the questions forward to the Court. During its discussion of the Corfu
dispute between Greece and Italy, for example, there were some proposals that
questions on the general nature of the dispute should be referred to the Court.
Nonetheless, these proposals were rejected on the ground that the request would
have the characteristics of an abstract question. In the end, the Council did not
request the opinion. 198
196 1922 PCU, Series B, No.1
197 Status ofEastern Carelia, 1923 PCU, Series B, No.5, 7 at 28-29
198 The League of Nations Official Journal, 1923, at 132I
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In the Interpretation ofthe Statute ofMemel case'", the Permanent Court,
however, answered general theoretical questions that had been placed before it.
The case was between Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan v. Lithuania over
the interpretation of the Memel convention of 1924200 • After the Governor of
Memel removed the President of the Directorate of Memel, the German
government raised the issue in the League Council. A report adopted by the
Council suggested resort to the Court by the parties to the Memel Convention, but
the Council refrained from voting in favour of asking the Court for an advisory
opinion."! The general questions that the Court was asked for judgment were:
whether the Governor was entitled to dismiss the President of the Directorate, if
so in what conditions and under what circumstances; and whether the dismissal of
the President meant the dismissal of the other members of the Directorate. The
Court concluded that the Governor, in order to protect the interests of the State,
was entitled to dismiss the President of the Directorate, but only under serious
circumstances of such a nature that caused prejudice to the sovereignty of
Lithuania. As for the last question, the Court found the dismissal of the President
did not entail the discharge of the other members of the Directorate from their
functions.i"
Although the Court in this contentious case answered abstract questions, it
did relate the questions posed to the actual facts of the case, and it did specify the
199 1932 PCIJ, Series AlB, No. 49, 294
200 29 League of Nations Treaty Series 85
201 League of Nations Official Journal, 1932, at 540
202 1932 PCD, Series AlB, No. 49, 294 at 319-323
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circumstances under which the Governor of Memel could dismiss the President of
the Directorate.?"
As the PCB had to face uncertainties surrounding the advisory
jurisdiction, it was cautious in handling the requests for advisory opinions. The
PCIJ was occupied in preserving its judicial character while dealing with requests
for advisory opinions. That explains why the PCB had to adopt safeguards from
insisting on acquiring the parties' consent to determining the nature of the
question.
The picture has totally changed during the days of the International Court
of Justice. The International Court has been asked to answer abstract questions
brought before it by the UN political organs. However, the International Court has
not declined to answer most of the requests that were stamped with "abstract"
characteristics.
In the Admission opinion, arguments were raised against the Court's
answering abstractly worded questions, but the Court dismissed them by stating
"the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or
otherwise'?", It dealt with the case adopting a very abstract approach, in that it
ignored all the circumstances involved in the case. Judge Zoricic rejected the
Court's manner in this case, he pointed out that:
"[i]n human life, all activity is based on concrete
considerations or facts. To attempt to judge and
explain such acts in the abstract would be to...work
in a vacuum, and to misunderstand the meaning of
real life. This is still more evident in the case of a
203 Ibid. See also J.H.W. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence ofthe World Court: a case by case
Commentary (1965) at 305
204 1948 ICJ Rep. 57 at 61
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Court of Justice whose first duty is to decide
whether certain acts are in accordance with law.'?"
In the Reparations opinion, the Court did not express any opinion on the
statement of the representative ofthe Secretary- General that the questions were
abstract and general questions.i" The Court answered the request and it dealt with
the questions in the abstract without referring to the facts."? In the Reservations
opinion, the Court itself admitted that the questions were "purely abstract'v'" But
the Court had to consider all the circumstances and the concrete reasons leading
to the request. The Court, however, affirmed, citing the Admission opinion, the
fact that it "may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or
otherwise'?",
In Legality ofthe Use ofthe Nuclear Weapons'", the International Court
was faced with objections against the nature ofthe questions put before the Court,
in particular the abstractness and the vagueness of the questions."! The Court in
its discussion of these contentions asserted the difference between the
requirements applicable to contentious proceedings and those applicable to the
advisory opinions. Citing the Peace Treaties opinion, the Court affirmed that the
advisory function "is not to settle- at least directly- disputes between States, but to
205 Ibid. at 96
206 Reparations for Injuries Pleadings at 64
207 1949 ICJ Rep. 174 at215
208 195 1 ICJ Rep. 15 at21
209 Admission opinion 1948 ICJ Rep. 57 at 61
210 1996 ICJ Rep. 226 (General Assembly Request)
211 Ibid. 236
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offer legal advice to the organs and institutions requesting the opinion."?"
Therefore, the Court continued "the fact that the question put to the Court does
not relate to a specific dispute should consequently not lead the Court to decline
to give the opinion requested. ,,2\3
Requesting organs have used the technique of formulating abstract
questions as a means of playing down the political elements involved in the
dispute?", for example in the Legality a/the use a/the Nuclear Weapons.
However, this tendency did not do any good to enhance the general dissatisfaction
with the advisory function. An opinion on an abstract question has a wider and
uncertain scope of application and as such can deter States and organisations from
requesting advisory opinions.i" Further, an abstract consideration of a question,
aloof from reality decreases the likelihood of the resolution of the problem."?
6.2. The Requesting Organs: A Comparison
While the substance of the concept of an advisory opinion remained
unchanged in the League of Nations Covenant and the UN Charter, the aspects of
voting procedures in the requesting organs have suffered drastic change. The
212 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
214 "Trends in the Work of the International Court of Justice" (Notes), 65 Harvard Law Review
(1951-52) at 666
215 L. Gross, "the International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing it
Role in the International Legal Order" 22 at 34 in L.Gross (ed.), The Future ofthe International
Court ofJustice (1976); K. 1. Keith, The Extent ofthe Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International
Court ofJustice (1971) at 237-38; M. Koskenniemi, "Advisory Opinions of the International
Court of Justice as an Instrument of Preventive Diplomacy" 599 at 612-613 in N. AI-Nauimi & R.
Meese (eds.), International Legal issues Arising under the United Nations Decade ofInternational
Law (1995)
216 Admission opinion 1948 ICJ Rep. 57 at 96; see also M. Koskenniemi, "Advisory Opinions of
the International Court of Justice as an Instrument of Preventive Diplomacy" 599 at 602-603, 612-
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twenty-eight requests submitted to the Permanent Court were all made by the
League Council which generally adopted its decision to request an opinion by
unanimous vote, with exception of four cases.!" In these four cases, objections to
the requests were because of the Council's lack of competence or because of
considering the subject matter of the dispute as an internal and domestic issue.
Generally speaking, the practice of unanimity meant to the Permanent Court more
effective advisory opinions. It decreased the chances of having the Court's
advisory opinions disregarded.i" Achieving the approval of Members to request
an opinion meant an acceptance of the Court's opinion ahead, and gaining the
support and co-operation of Member State. This gave the opinion the
authoritativeness needed for it to be implemented?"
Unfortunately, unanimity has been substituted with the system of majority
voting characteristics of the Charter. To date, only two requests for advisory
opinions have been adopted unanimously, namely the Reparations and fMCa
opinions. The UN abandonment of the unanimity rule of voting meant "that the
United Nations now... [had] at its disposal an effective procedure for requesting
advisory opinions but not a procedure for effective advisory opinions"?" As a
consequence of the voting procedures in the UN, the International Court has to
face a situation the Permanent Court never encountered, namely the necessity to
613 in N. AI-Nauimi & R. Meese (eds.), International Legal issues Arising under the United
Nations Decade ofInternational Law (1995)
217 With exception of Eastern Carelia 1923 PCIJ Series B, No.5, 7; Acquisition ofPolish
Nationality 1923 PCIJ Series B, No.7, 6; Mosul Question 1925 PCIJ Series B, No. 12,6;
Expulsion ofOecumenical Patriarch 1925 PCIJ Series E, No.1, 237
218 See generally M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League
and UN Eras (1973) at 164
219 D. Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court (1972) at 99-104
220 L. Gross, "ICJ and UN" 120 RDC 313 (1967-1) at 369
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reply to a contested request of an advisory opinion?" It has also been argued that
the new voting tendency was the critical factor behind having "a large crop of
ineffectual opinions'?".
The voting procedure was not the only difference between the requesting
organs in the days ofthe PCIJ and those in the days of the ICl Another aspect of
difference is the motive of the request itself. What is meant by the motives of the
request is why the requesting organs asked the Court for its advisory opinion.
The typical League request was sought on an avowedly legal question and as part
of a truly problem- solving approach. In seeking the Permanent Court's opinion,
the League Council did not expect or prefer a particular ruling from the Court.f"
However, this has not been the case in the UN. The International Court's
advisory function is frequently sought not for the purpose of real law-
clarification or problem solving, but rather for propaganda advantages, and as a
means of legitimisation of a measure already taken?" The requesting organs have
the tendency to expect a particular and "correct" answer from the Court otherwise
the advisory opinion tends to be ignored?" In addition, in the cases in which the
International Court's opinion was sought post factum regarding a measure already
taken by the requesting organs, the request sometimes appeared to state, rather
221 S. Rosenne, "On the non-use of the Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice"
39 EYlL 1 (1963) at 35-36
222 M. Pomerance, "The Advisory role of the International Court of Justice and its Judicial'
Character: Past and Future Prisms" 271 at 281 in A.S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court
ofJustice (1997)
223 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 166
224 M. Pomerance, "The Advisory role of the International Court of Justice and its Judicial'




than query, the legal premises upon which the Court was to proceed to answer the
questions posed.?"
The abandonment of the old League rules regarding the use of the
advisory jurisdiction was led to a wide range of challenges once the requests
reached the International Court. The abandonment of the unanimity rule of voting,
and the insensible use of the political organs costs the International Court its
effectiveness. The Court lost the confidence of Member States in the advisory
function as a means of peaceful settlement, and as a means of settling a problem
between member States and the UN or any other international organisation?"
7 The Nature of the Advisory Opinions
The above discussion outlines the concept and the procedure of advisory
jurisdiction. However, it has not provided a clear and real contour of the advisory
function of the Court. The advisory function has always been attacked on the
ground that it is nothing but advisory. It is truism that advisory opinions lack
binding force. The Court has been explicit in stating that they have no binding
force.:" There is no obligation on the requesting organs to give effect to them and
nor are States likely to be affected as they are not legally bound to implement
them in action, as was the fate of the Certain Expenses opinionP" However, it
could be argued that advisory opinions could have some binding force when they
226 See for example, Certain Expenses opinion 1962 ICJ Rep. 15 I, Namibia opinion 1971 ICJ Rep.
16
227 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function a/the International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 169
228 Peace Treaties opinion 1950 ICJ Rep. 65 at 71, South West Africa case (Preliminary
Objections) I962 ICJ Rep. 3 19 at 337
229 See for example the unilateral rejection of the Iel advisory opinion by the Soviet Union and
France
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indicate that a certain course of action would be contrary to international law or to
the Charter. In that sense, neither the requesting organs nor the States concerned
could adopt a prohibited action. In the South West Africa opinions, although the
South African government rejected the Court's advisory opinions and refused to
implement them, it refrained from absorbing the territory into that of South
Africa, a course which the International Court had declared illegal."?
Though advisory opinions lack binding force, they do have an
authoritative character. As they are judicial pronouncements of the highest
international tribunal, the statements of law contained in them is of the same high
quality as those contained in judgment. In the Eastern Carelia opinion, the
Permanent Court stated that the effect of an opinion was "substantially
equivalent" of that ofjudgment?" Judge Zoricic, in the Peace Treaties case,
stated that: [i]n practice, an advisory opinion .. .in regard to a dispute between
States is nothing else than an unenforceable judgment'?".
One commentator has pointed out that "although... the framers of the
Charter were careful to stress the non-obligatory nature of advisory opinions,
there has always existed a widespread feeling that such weighty pronouncements
by the Court have some greater moral value and deserve greater attention than is
usually accorded to mere 'legal advice'."233 For instance, the UN General
Assembly has often asserted in the preamble of the resolutions to request advisory
opinions the "authoritativeness" of the opinions. In the Peace Treaties and
230 D. Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court (1972) at 252
231 Eastern Carelia opinion 1923 PCIJ, Series B, No.5, 7 at 29
232 Peace Treaties opinion 1950 ICJ Rep. 65 at 71-72
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Certain Expenses opinions, the Assembly stated its need for the authoritative
advice ofthe Court.?" As a result of the Court's position as the principal judicial
organ ofthe UN, the correctness of its advisory opinions cannot be questioned by
the requesting organs. The opinions are regarded by the requesting organs as an
authoritative expression of existing law?" Advisory opinions are authoritative in
this sense as well?"
The subject- matter of advisory opinions is not res judicata. The doctrine
of res judicata applies only to the Court's judgments. The 1920 Committee of
Jurists, drafting the Statute of the Permanent Court, cited the rule of res judicata
as a clear example of "a general principle oflaw recognised by civilised
nations"?" However, the 1920 Committee of Jurists did not intend that advisory
opinions should have the force of res judicata. The Committee was of the view
that the Court's advisory function was something 'apart from its judicial
competence', and that the opinion should be given in such a way so as not to
restrain the parties from bringing the matter subsequently before the Court; and
for the same reason, the Court itself should not be bound by its own advisory
opinion when a concrete case came before it.23S
233 D. W. Greig, "The advisory jurisdiction of the International Court and the settlement of
disputes between States" 15 ICLQ 325 (1966) at 361
234 1950 ICJ Rep. 65 at 67; 1962 ICJ Rep. 151 at 155
235 H. Lauterpacht, The Function ojLaw in the International Community (1933) at 336
236 D. Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction ojthe International Court (1972) at 232
237 Minutes of the 1920 Committee of Jurists, PCU Series D, No.2 at 294 et seq.; see for more
discussions, e.g., H.c. Gutteridge, "The Meaning of the Scope of Art. 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice" 38 Transactions ofthe Grotius Society 127 (1952); 1. R.
Stevenson, "South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), second
Phase" 61 AJIL 116 (1969) at 166-67
238 Minutes of the 1920 Committee of Jurists, PCU Series D, No.2 at 732
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Even States do not accord the advisory opinions the force of res judicata.
In the Jurisdiction ofthe European Commission ofDanube between Galatz and
Bralia 239, Romania rejected the submission of the dispute to the Permanent Court
for judgment, but it agreed on its submission for an advisory opinion, on the
condition that it would not have a binding force and if subsequent negotiations
had not resolved the dispute, the parties preserved their full liberty of action.i"
Had there been a contentious case subsequent to the advisory opinion, the Court
would have had jurisdiction to deal with the matter anew because of the non-
binding character of the opinion.
However, advisory opinions can be binding and final when the parties to
the disputes agree to this in advance. This happened with the Nationality Decrees
opinion, when France and Britain agreed to respect the advisory opinion as final
and binding.?" But this kind of arrangement does not give advisory opinions any
binding force under Article 59 of the Statute.!" The International Court affirmed
that such an arrangement between the parties does not change the nature of
advisory opinions. It is not something coming from Statute but rather from
temporary arrangement. In the Difference relating to immunity from legal process
ofa Special Rapporteur ofthe Commission on Human Rights 243, the International
239 1927 PCIJ, Series B, No.14, 6
240 J.H.W. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence ofthe World Court: a case by case Commentary (1965) at
121
241 1923 PCIJ, Series B, No.4, 7; see also Delimitation ofthe Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier
(Question ofJaworzina) 1923 PCIJ, Series B., No.8, 6 (the parties agreed in advance to recognise
the finality of the opinion)
242 S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice ofthe International Court, 1920-/996 (3'd ed.) (1997) at
1656; for general discussion on the issue of res judicata arising from arrangement aliens to the
Statute see R. Ago, '''Binding' Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice" 85 AJIL
439 (1991)
243 April 29th, 1999, <http://www.icj-cij.org> para. 25, 1999 ICJ Rep. 1
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Court ruled that the agreement to refer the dispute to the Court Article VIII,
section 30, of the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, and the binding opinion that would result, "does not change the
advisory nature of the Court's function, which is governed by the terms of the
Charter and of the Statute." The International Court went on to state that:
"A distinction should thus be drawn between the
advisory nature ofthe Court's task and the particular
effects that parties to an existing dispute may wish
to attribute, in their mutual relations, to an advisory
opinion of the Court, which, "as such, ... has no
binding force" ...These particular effects,
extraneous to the Charter and the Statute which
regulate the functioning of the Court, are derived
from separate agreements; in the present case
Article VIII, Section 30, of the General Convention
provides that "[t]he opinion given by the Court shall
be accepted as decisive by the parties"."244
It may be the subject matter of an advisory opinion comes before the
Court subsequently in a contentious case. In the South West Africa cases, Liberia
and Ethiopia, for example, used the Court's 1950 advisory opinion as the legal
basis for their argument. South Africa argued that the earlier advisory opinion did
not have the force of res judicata and the Court should reconsider the advisory
opinion. However, the Court, in its judgment, held that
"the unanimous holding of the Court in 1950 on the
survival and continuing effect of Article 7 of the
Mandate, continued to reflect the Court's opinion
today. Nothing had since occurred which would
warrant the Court reconsidering it. All important
facts were stated or referred to in the proceeding
before the Court in 1950."245
244 Ibid para. 25
245 South West Africa (Ethiopia v. Union of South Africa and Liberia v. Union of South Africa)
1962 ICJ Rep. 319 at 334
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The Court's insistence on the rejection ofre-arguing the earlier advisory opinions
has been interpreted as "the inarticulate affirmation of an equally inarticulate and
innovatory doctrine of res judicata arising from advisory opinions'F",
However, the International Court, in general, maintains that the advisory
opinions are not binding and they do not have the force of res judicata. The logic
behind denying advisory opinions the force of res judicata is that if the subject
matter of an advisory opinion comes up before the Court subsequently in its
contentious proceedings, the Court will have the freedom to deal and settle the
matter with a binding judgment, and with the consent of the parties involved.i" In
that sense, it is not clear whether the judgment will be different from the advisory
opinion already taken. It was, however, argued that the same law could not be
applied differently by the same Court in the same case.?" Therefore, after the
opinion has been given, the same question, addressed in the advisory opinion, is
brought before the Court in its contentious proceedings for a judgment by the
States affected by the earlier opinion, the Court's judgment should be substantially
the same as the opinion. This is, of course, subject to the qualification that no new
and critical evidence has been produced by the parties involved, otherwise, in the
case of new arguments, the judgment might be materially different from the
opinion.i"
246 1. Scobbie, "Res Judicata, Precedent and the International Court" 20 Aust. YB. Int'l. L. 299
(l999)at314
247 See HAC Report, 10 February 1944 issued as British Parliamentary Paper, Cmd. 6531, Misc.
No.2(1944) reproduced in 39 AlIL 1, Supp. (1945) para.68
248 D. Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court (1972) at 255
249 B. F. Sloan, "Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice" 38 California Law
Review 830 (1950) at 852
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8 Conclusion
These problems surrounding advisory opinions have led to the beliefthat
the advisory function was not a function to settle disputes and solve problems.
However, the practice of the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice established
the fact that these problems could be overcome. During the days of the Permanent
Court, the advisory function played an essential role in settling disputes and
giving guidance to the League ofNations organs and other international bodies.
This follows from the sensible use of this important jurisdiction of the Court. The
League Council, after the Eastern Carelia opinion, learned its lesson not to
involve the Court in political tensions. After that episode, the League Council
exercised a sort of check before bringing any dispute or question before the Court.
Unfortunately, the scene has changed during the early days ofthe
International Court of Justice. The role that the requesting organs played in
getting the International Court involved in the Cold War struggle was the main
change. Instead of being used as a forum to solve problems, the Court was used
for propaganda purposes.
In that sense, the problem is not with the advisory jurisdiction itself. There
are some setbacks in the advisory jurisdiction, such as the ineffectual character of
advisory opinions (as they do not contribute to the settlement of the underlying
dispute).250 But this is not related to the advisory jurisdiction, it is rather the
problem of the international community in general, and the requesting organs and
States involved, in particular. The advisory function should be thought of as an
250 M. Koskenniemi, "Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice as an Instrument of
Preventive Diplomacy" 599 at 602 in N. Al-Nauimi & R. Meese (eds.), International Legal issues
Arising under the United Nations Decade ofInternational Law (1995)
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asset to dispute settlement. However, the problem rests in the hand of the "clients"
of the Court, as Pomerance has pointed out:
"on the basis of the experience of both World
Courts with the advisory jurisdiction, it would
appear that the key to its constructive revival lies
primarily with the Court's clients and only
secondary with the Court itself.'?"
Changing the attitude toward this jurisdiction rests in the hands of the principal
organs ofthe United Nations. The experience of the United Nations has shown
that a great reluctance by UN organs to use the International Court's advisory
function in comparison with the frequent use of this function by the League
Council and Assembly. One commentator has related this tendency to "the
jealousy of the UN organs with respect to their own decision-making powers'P".
In that sense, reconciliation between the political organs and judicial organ is
needed.
The Secretary-General has called for more co-operation among the UN
organs and he has encouraged the use of the Court's advisory function to promote
the rule of law in international relations,
"[t]he rule of law in international affairs should also
be promoted by a greater recourse to the
International Court of Justice .. .in rendering
advisory opinions on the legal aspects of a
dispute. "253
251 M. Pomerance, "The Advisory role of the International Court of Justice and its 'judicial'
Character: Past and Future Prisms" 271 at 323 in A.S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court
ofJustice (1997)
252 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 171
253 Report of the Secretary- General on the Work of the Organisation, UNGA Doc. A/45/l, 16
September 1990, Part III, at 7
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The Secretary-General linked the use of the International Court to the Charter
system of collective security and pointed out that many disputes that seem
predominantly political have legal components suitable for referral to the Court
for a "fair and objectively commendable settlement and thus defusing an
international crisis situation'?".
The advisory function is useful to attain effective advice in legal problems
that are raised in day-to-day activities of the various organs of the United
Nations.i" The International Court has in fact exercised some kind ofjudicial
review, or a sort of legal advisor function, in handling requests from the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal. The Court reviewed the UNAT judgments?"
Indeed, in these opinions the International Court reviewed the judgments and
examined the competence ofUNAT.
Although the Permanent Court did not face that challenge, to rule on the
validity and the competence of League organs, the practice of the Permanent
Court indicated that its advisory function was used to clarify doubts on legal
issues that arose within the activities of the political organs or other international
organisations. The International Court, on the other hand, has been explicitly
asked to rule on the validity of political organs' resolutions, in the Certain
254 Report of the Secretary- General on the Work of the Organisation, UNGA Doc. A/46/l, 6
September 1991, Part V, at 8
255 M. Pomerance, The Advisory Function ofthe International Court in the League and UN Eras
(1973) at 9
256 See Applicationfor Review ofJudgement No. 158, 1973 ICJ Rep. 166; Application/or Review
ofJudgement No. 273, 1982 ICJ Rep. 325; Applicationfor Review ofJudgement No. 333, 1987
ICJ Rep. 18
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Expenses opinion, the Namibia opinion, and in the Lockerbie cases"? (in the
Court's contentious proceedings). The International Court has maintained that it
lacks the power ofjudicial review, but it reviewed the resolution concerned, as
part of considering all relevant legal data to answer the request. 25& It could be
concluded that, from the discussion advanced in this chapter, the advisory
jurisdiction could be the link to establish a middle way judicial review; i.e.
between compulsory judicial review, as in the domestic legal systems, and no
judicial review at all. In that sense, the UN Security Councilor Assembly could
use the International Court's advisory function to clarify any legal doubts raised
by the Member States on action already taken, as intended for the advisory
jurisdiction and as this function was utilised by the League of Nations' political
organs.?" One commentator has argued that:
"Ultimately, the absence of a power of 'review'
seems to mean no more than this: that the Court has
no initiative in the matter. If requested by a
principal organ to say whether a given decision, to
be taken by that organ or already taken, is valid, it
may give a reply; and if the question of the validity
of a decision arises as a necessary part of the chain
of reasoning required to arrive at a decision in a
contentious case- or on a request for advisory
opinion... , then the Court is bound to satisfy itself
of such validity. "260
The problem is that judicial review will be only exercised under the
discretion of the political organs. In other words, as the International Court cannot
257 Questions ofInterpretation and Application ofthe 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom) 1992 ICJ Rep. 3,
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States ofAmerica) 1992 ICJ Rep. 231
258 Certain Expenses opinion 1962 ICJ Rep. 151 at 157; Namibia opinion 1971 ICJ Rep. 16 at 45
259 See above at 218- 242
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give an advisory opinionpropio motu, (as any court), it cannot exercise judicial
review through the advisory jurisdiction unless the political organs requests its
opinion.i" But the permissive language of Article 96 (1) of the UN Charter should
be understood as mandatory, since "the Charter does not afford any other way for
the legal question to reach the Court in furtherance of justice; its framers must
have intended the [UN political organs] to be under mandate to request the
Court's opinion'Y".
260 H. Thirlway, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989" 67
BYIL 1 (1996) at 51
261 M. O. Hudson, The Permanent Court ofInternational Justice 1920-1942: A Treatise (1943) at
486; P. Szasz, "Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court" 499 at 501 in L. Gross
(ed.), The Future ofthe International Court ofJustice (1976)
262 L. B. Wehle, "The UN bypasses the International Court of Justice as the Council's adviser, A
study in contrived frustration" 98:3 University ofPennsylvania Law Review 285 (1950) at 295
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Conclusion
Judicial review ofthe legality of the acts of international organs is still at a
rudimentary and tentative stage; its outlines are vague, its limits quickly reached.
Nobody doubts that the maintenance of international peace and security must have
priority. But it is important to begin appreciating that "observance oflaws and of
the Charter is not the enemy ofpeace and does not necessarily compromise its
rightful priority:" Nobody should deny the right of international political organs,
especially the Security Council, to the full exercise of their individual powers to
interpret the Charter in their activities from day to day, and to take their decisions
in the light of their own interpretation.
The very first article of the UN Charter gives the absolute priority to peace
and security. And it is the Security Council which has been given a virtual
monopoly in the settlement of questions to do with the maintenance of peace.
There can be no denying the Security Council's need for discretionary power in
the areas entrusted to it by the Charter, especially where it has to decide whether
there is a "threat to peace" or to characterise a "situation".
It should not deny, on the other hand, that Member States have a right to
challenge a decision. The Charter of the United Nations has organised a certain
level of cohesion of international society, but it would be superficial to imagine
that the situation created corresponds to some kind of integration. In fact the
United Nations remains a free association of States. That being so, it must be
considered as an international institution which cannot impose its decisions on its
sovereign member States in every area but only in some very limited, well-defined
1 M. Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality ofits Acts
(1994) at 127 (Emphasis in original)
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and strictly interpreted areas concerning the maintenance of peace. From that very
point, there is nothing unusual in the idea that Member States should have a
"remedy", in the broad sense, against any decision of a political organ of the
United Nations likely to impinge upon the rights or obligations contracted by
Member States under the Charter.
Nowadays, one can often hear voices raised against the legitimacy of the
Security Council resolutions and actions in dealing with an international crisis
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In objecting to a draft Security Council
resolution to impose sanctions on it for failing to extradite the two suspects in the
Lockerbie air crash case, Libya declared:
"What we find today in the draft resolution before
the Council is an example of the abuse of the
Security Council by some permanent members
through the imposition of resolutions that not only
run counter to international legitimacy but also are
in flagrant violation of that legitimacy. This could
lead to a situation in which the very principles and
objectives of the United Nations are threatened.
These are dangers the consequences of which cannot
be predicted. ,,2
In the same debate, Zimbabwe supported Libya's view, stating that Security
Council actions must withstand the scrutiny of the 160 States that are Members of
the United Nations but not of the Security Council, and that
"[t]his is only possible if the Council insists on
being guided in its decisions and actions by the
Charter and other international conventions. Any
approach that assumes that international law is
created by majority votes in the Security Council is
bound to have far-reaching ramifications which
could cause irreparable harm to the credibility and
2 See debate in the Security Council on Res. 748, U.N. Doc. S/1992IPV.3063 (statement of Mr.
Elhouderi, Libya) at 18
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prestige of the Organisation, with dire consequences
for a stable and peaceful world order.u3
The new activities of the Security Council have been apprehended by
many with caution as there has been a fear of abuse of its collective enforcement
powers by its permanent members, in particular the United States. The change of
the world scene from bipolar to unipolar led many to raise the alarm and to call for
a check on the legitimacy of the Security Council actions." In the words of
Professor Abi-Saab,
"[tjhis tendency [the use of the collective security
enforcement measures] bears enormous risks of
'excess' or 'abuse of power' by the executors, given
the Security Council's lack of means of control (or
their paralysis by veto) over execution of the
mandate to act once it has been given. In a wider
political sense, the risk is that of the abuse of
collective legitimisation and the collective
framework to serve the undeclared private ends of
those states carrying out the mandated action or for
legitimating new hegemonies; in other words, the
risk of putting the collective interests at the service
of the private rather than the other way around.t"
On the other hand, others have asserted that law does not have a place in the
Security Council's powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
Adopting the Kelsenian approach, this camp of scholars insists on the fact that the
Security Council is not concerned with law and justice in dealing with "threats to
international peace and Security".'
3 Ibid. at 54-55 (statement ofMr. Mumbengegwi, Zimbabwe).
4 See the literature above in Chapter III on the Limitations on the Powers of the Security Council
5 G. Abi- Saab, "Whither the International Community" 9 EJIL 248 (1998) at 265
6 H. Kelsen, The Law ofthe United Nations: A Critical Analysis ofIts Fundamental Problems
(1951) at 727
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In this controversy, in the words of Koskenniemi, "law and politics keep
deferring to each other in an endless search for authority and normative closure:
texts constrain (law)- but need to be interpreted (politics); interpretative principles
need to be applied (law)- but they are conflicting and ambiguous (politics)."?
In short, the tension between law and politics in international relations and
international community has been transferred to a new forum, the United Nations.
As many have asserted the need to put the Security Council under scrutiny, the
attention turns to the International Court of Justice to be the guardian of the
legitimacy ofthe United Nations system as a whole. As Franck has stated:
"the Court may have to be the last-resort defender of
the system's legitimacy if the United Nations is to
continue to enjoy the adherence of its Members.
This seems to be tacitly acknowledged judicial
common ground, and is an elementary prerequisite
of fairness in the Council's exercise of its newly
ebullient powers."
It is a fair call, however, that what went wrong with these proposals is that they
see the relationship between law and politics as having a hierarchical nature. Law
is sovereign or superior to politics, which if translated into the United Nations
language, means that the International Court of Justice should be superior to the
Security Council. However, throughout this thesis, the argument has been that the
International Court of Justice should exercise a kind ofjudicial review through its
advisory competence.
If the Security Council strayed from following the Charter only in ways
that did not violate the rights of States, as, for example, by devising peacekeeping,
7 M. Koskenniemi, "The Place of Law in Collective Security" 17 Mich. 1. Int'I. L. 455 (1996) at
484
8 T. M. Franck, "Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System" 240 RDC 23 (1993
III) at 220-21
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the harm would not be serious. The problem is that the deviations from the Charter
have largely been at the instigation of, and for the benefit of, a single state." It is
this aspect that most seriously diminishes the legitimacy of the Security Council.
As discussed in chapter IV, a mechanism ofjudicial review could be
employed through the advisory competence of the International Court of Justice.
The Court enjoys competence under the U.N. Charter to issue advisory opinions
"on any legal question," at the request ofthe Security Councilor General
Assembly. Thus, all the issues raised above of conformity of conduct to the
Charter are subject to judicial oversight of a non-binding character. If broader use
were made of this procedure, the legitimacy of Security Council action could be
considerably enhanced. Either the Security Councilor the General Assembly
could, for example, ask the Court for an advisory opinion about the legality of any
controversial resolutions.
The Court's history in issuing advisory opinions gives reason to believe
that the Court would approach such issues seriously and with caution. As
recounted in previous chapters, the Court has given an expansive reading to the
Charter and has been sensitive to the concern that adhering to the Charter's strict
letter may keep the Security Council from taking needed action. At the same time,
the Court could be expected to find limits in the Charter and thus to encourage the
Security Council not to stray so far that it loses legitimacy. The Court, in short,
could provide a corrective mechanism.
Law and politics could operate in an interactive relationship. The Security
Council asks for the International Court's clarification of its position, the Security
9 J. Quigley, "The United Nations Security Council: Promethean Protector or Helpless Hostage?"
35 Tex. Int'!. L. 1. 129 (2000) at 168
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Council, assuming good faith, takes account of the Court's opinion, applies it. As
Rosenne has pointed out:
II [t]he ability of the General Assembly and the
Security Council to ask the IC] for an advisory
opinion on any legal question, if carefully used,
enables legal differences between the United
Nations and a State to be resolved with the
assistance of the Court. II 10
Therefore, The Court could serve a useful function in terms of public perception
of Security Council action. If it were to find lawful a particular Security Council
approach, the Council would be perceived to be acting properly. 11
The role of law relating to the UN organs' decisions and actions in the area
of peace and security is the most controversial and challenging domain of the UN
activities. Understanding the role of law in this kind of setting leads to an inquiry
into the link between effectiveness and legitimacy. It has been argued that the
Security Council cannot observe legal rules while acting in emergency cases,
especially situations under Chapter VII. To illustrate this point, the Security
Council's response to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait elicited a range of differing
responses. Those pre-occupied with the short-run effectiveness tended to be
indifferent to the rule of law considerations", while those more concerned with the
10 S. Rosenne, "The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the United Nations" 35
Indian J Int'l. L. 67 (I 995) at 70
11 See for example V. Gowlland-Debbas, "The Relationship Between The International Court of
Justice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case" 88 AJIL 643 (I994)
12 See for example, 1. E. Alvarez, "Judging the Security Council?," 90 AJIL I (1996); H.
Freudenschul3, "Article 39 of the UN Charter Revisited: Threats to the Peace and the Recent
Practice of the UN Security Council" 46 Aust. J Pub!. Int'l. L. 1 (I993); T. D. GiIl,"Limitations on
UN Enforcement Powers," XXVI NYIL 33 (1995); M. J. Herdegen, "The 'Constitutionalization' of
the UN Security System" 27 Vand. J. ofTransna'l. L. 135 (I994)
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long-term effectiveness were generally distressed by this indifference." In other
words, effectiveness and legitimacy are not easily reconcilable.
However, effectiveness and legitimacy can be reconciled through a closer
relation between UN political organs and the International Court of Justice. Using
the Court as a legal advisor, through its advisory jurisdiction, would provide
guidance for the requesting organs in connection with an action already taken or a
planned course of action, as it was essentially intended for the advisory
competence to provide. Besides, Article 96(1) of the UN Charter and Article 65
(1) of the ICJ Statute do not exclude having the General Assembly asking the
Court whether the Security Council actions conform to the Charter or vice-versa. 14
To ensure legitimacy and therefore effectiveness, the political organs should
establish the constitutionality of their actions to be generally accepted in the
international community. To accomplish this, the political organs could refer legal
issues to the International Court of Justice. A final word, the UN principal organs
should work in harmony and in a complementarily way to ensure legitimacy and
through which effectiveness could be established. Judge Bedjaoui pointed out:
II [i]t is found increasingly inadmissible that international political organs should
take liberties with the Charter or adopt a relaxed attitude towards international law
13 See for example, K. Harper, "Does UN Security Council Have the Competence to Act as Court
and Legislature?" 27 N. Y. U. 1. ofInt'l L. & Pol. 103 (1994-1995); J. Quigley, "The United
Nations Security Council: Promethean Protector or Helpless Hostage?" 35 Tex. Int'!. L. 1. 129
(2000); O. Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict" 85 AJIL 452 (1991); B. H.
Weston, "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious
Legitimacy" 85 AJIL 516 (1991)
14 L. Caflisch, "Is the International Court Entitled to Review Security Council Resolutions Adopted
Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter" 633 at 635 in N.AI- Nauimi & M. Meese (eds.),
International Legal Issues Arising Under the United Nations Decade ofInternational Law (1995)
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when it is they, surely, even more than States, that have been given the duty of
fortifying international law's credibility and reliability." IS





MARBURY v. MADISON, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
5 U.S. 137 (Cranch)
WILLIAM MARBURY
v,
JAMES MADISON, Secretary of State of the United States.
February Term, 1803
AT the December term 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert
Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel [5 U.S. 137, 138]
severally moved the court for a rule to James Madison, secretary of state of the
United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him
to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as justices
of the peace in the district of Columbia.
This motion was supported by affidavits of the following facts: that notice of this
motion had been given to Mr. Madison; that Mr. Adams, the late president of the
United States, nominated the applicants to the senate for their advice and consent
to be appointed justices of the peace of the district of Columbia; that the senate
advised and consented to the appointments; that commissions in due form were
signed by the said president appointing them justices, &c. and that the seal of the
United States was in due form affixed to the said commissions by the secretary of
state; that the applicants have requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their said
commissions, who has not complied with that request; and that their said
commissions are withheld from them; thatthe applicants have made application to
Mr. Madison as secretary of state of the United States at his office, for
information whether the commissions were signed and sealed as aforesaid; that
explicit and satisfactory information has not been given in answer to that inquiry,
either by the secretary of state, or any officer in the department of state; that
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application has been made to the secretary of the senate for a certificate of the
nomination of the applicants, and of the advice and consent of the senate, who has
declined giving such a certificate; whereupon a rule was made to show cause on
the fourth day of this term. This rule having been duly served-- [5 U.S. 137, 139]
Mr. Jacob Wagner and Mr. Daniel Brent, who had been summoned to attend the
court, and were required to give evidence, objected to be sworn, alleging that they
were clerks in the department of state, and not bound to disclose any facts relating
to the business or transactions of the office.
The court ordered the witnesses to be sworn, and their answers taken in writing;
but informed them that when the questions were asked they might state their
objections to answering each particular question, if they had any.
Mr. Lincoln, who had been the acting secretary of state, when the circumstances
stated in the affidavits occurred, was called upon to give testimony. He objected
to answering. The questions were put in writing.
The court said there was nothing confidential required to be disclosed. If there
had been, he was not obliged to answer it, and if he thought any thing was
communicated to him confidentially he was not bound to disclose, nor was he
obliged to state any thing which would criminate himself.
The questions argued by the counsel for the relators were, 1. Whether the supreme
court can award the writ of mandamus in any case. 2. Whether it will lie to a
secretary of state, in any case whatever. 3. Whether in the present case the court
may award a mandamus to James Madison, secretary of state.
[5 U.S. 137, 153]
Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion ofthe court.
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At the last term, on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was
granted in this case, requiring the secretary of state to show cause why a
mandamus [5 U.S. 137, 154] should not issue, directing him to deliver to William
Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington,
in the district of Columbia.
No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The
peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the
real difficulty attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition
of the principles on which the opinion to be given by the court is founded.
These principles have been, on the side of the applicant, very ably argued at the
bar. In rendering the opinion of the court, there will be some departure in form,
though not in substance, from the points stated in that argument.
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions
have been considered and decided.
1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country
afford him a remedy?
3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
The first object of inquiry is,
1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
His right originates in an act of congress passed in February 1801, concerning the
district of Columbia.
After dividing the district into two counties, the eleventh section of this law
enacts, 'that there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties, such
number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the president of the
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United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for
five years. [5 U.S. 137,155] It appears from the affidavits, that in compliance
with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a justice of peace for the
county of Washington was signed by John Adams, then president of the United
States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the
commission has never reached the person for whom it was made out.
In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes
necessary to inquire whether he has been appointed to the office. For if he has
been appointed, the law continues him in office for five years, and he is entitled to
the possession of those evidences of office, which, being completed, became his
property.
The second section of the second article of the constitution declares, 'the president
shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall
appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other officers of
the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for.'
The third section declares, that 'he shall commission all the officers of the United
States.'
An act of congress directs the secretary of state to keep the seal of the United
States, 'to make out and record, and affix the said seal to all civil commissions to
officers of the United States to be appointed by the president, by and with the
consent of the senate, or by the president alone; provided that the said seal shall
not be affixed to any commission before the same shall have been signed by the
president ofthe United States.'
These are the clauses of the constitution and laws of the United States, which
affect this part of the case. They seem to contemplate three distinct operations:
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1. The nomination. This is the sole act of the president, and is completely
voluntary.
2. The appointment. This is also the act of the president, and is also a voluntary
act, though it can only be performed by and with the advice and consent of the
senate. [5 U.S. 137, 156] 3. The commission. To grant a commission to a person
appointed, might perhaps be deemed a duty enjoined by the constitution. 'He
shall,' says that instrument, 'commission all the officers of the United States.'
The acts of appointing to office, and commissioning the person appointed, can
scarcely be considered as one and the same; since the power to perform them is
given in two separate and distinct sections of the constitution. The distinction
between the appointment and the commission will be rendered more apparent by
adverting to that provision in the second section of the second article of the
constitution, which authorises congress 'to vest by law the appointment of such
inferior officers as they think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law,
or in the heads of departments;' thus contemplating cases where the law may
direct the president to commission an officer appointed by the courts or by the
heads of departments. In such a case, to issue a commission would be apparently
a duty distinct from the appointment, the performance of which perhaps, could
not legally be refused.
Although that clause of the constitution which requires the president to
commission all the officers of the United States, may never have been applied to
officers appointed otherwise than by himself, yet it would be difficult to deny the
legislative power to apply it to such cases. Of consequence the constitutional
distinction between the appointment to an office and the commission of an officer
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who has been appointed, remains the same as if in practice the president had
commissioned officers appointed by an authority other than his own.
It follows too, from the existence of this distinction, that, if an appointment was to
be evidenced by any public act other than the commission, the performance of
such public act would create the officer; and if he was not removable at the will of
the president, would either give him a right to his commission, or enable him to
perform the duties without it.
These observations are premised solely for the purpose of rendering more
intelligible those which apply more directly to the particular case under
consideration. [5 U.S. 137, 157] This is an appointment made by the president, by
and with the advice and consent of the senate, and is evidenced by no act but the
commission itself. In such a case therefore the commission and the appointment
seem inseparable; it being almost impossible to show an appointment otherwise
than by proving the existence of a commission: still the commission is not
necessarily the appointment; though conclusive evidence of it.
But at what stage does it amount to this conclusive evidence?
The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The appointment being the
sole act of the president, must be completely evidenced, when it is shown that he
has done every thing to be performed by him.
Should the commission, instead of being evidence of an appointment, even be
considered as constituting the appointment itself; still it would be made when the
last act to be done by the president was performed, or, at furthest, when the
commission was complete.
The last act to be done by the president, is the signature of the commission. He
has then acted on the advice and consent of the senate to his own nomination. The
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time for deliberation has then passed. He has decided. His judgment, on the
advice and consent of the senate concurring with his nomination, has been made,
and the officer is appointed. This appointment is evidenced by an open,
unequivocal act; and being the last act required from the person making it,
necessarily excludes the idea of its being, so far as it respects the appointment, an
inchoate and incomplete transaction.
Some point oftime must be taken when the power of the executive over an
officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of time must be when
the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And this power has
been exercised when the last act, required from the person possessing the power,
has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission. This idea
seems to have prevailed with the legislature, when the act passed converting the
department [5 U.S. 137, 158] of foreign affairs into the department of state. By
that act it is enacted, that the secretary of state shall keep the seal of the United
States, 'and shall make out and record, and shall affix the said seal to all civil
commissions to officers of the United States, to be appointed by the president:'
'provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission, before the
same shall have been signed by the president of the United States; nor to any
other instrument or act, without the special warrant of the president therefor.'
The signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission; and the
great seal is only to be affixed to an instrument which is complete. It attests, by an
act supposed to be of public notoriety, the verity of the presidential signature.
It is never to be affixed till the commission is signed, because the signature,
which gives force and effect to the commission, is conclusive evidence that the
appointment is made.
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The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the secretary of state is
prescribed by law, and not to be guided by the will of the president. He is to affix
the seal of the United States to the commission, and is to record it.
This is not a proceeding which may be varied, if the judgment of the executive
shall suggest one more eligible, but is a precise course accurately marked out by
law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of the secretary of state to conform
to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey the
laws. He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the
authority oflaw, and not by the instructions of the president. It is a ministerial act
which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.
If it should be supposed, that the solemnity of affixing the seal, is necessary not
only to the validity of the commission, but even to the completion of an
appointment, still when the seal is affixed the appointment is made, and [5 U.S.
137,159] the commission is valid. No other solemnity is required by law; no
other act is to be performed on the part of government. All that the executive can
do to invest the person with his office, is done; and unless the appointment be
then made, the executive cannot make one without the co- operation of others.
After searching anxiously for the principles on which a contrary opinion may be
supported, none have been found which appear of sufficient force to maintain the
opposite doctrine.
Such as the imagination of the court could suggest, have been very deliberately
examined, and after allowing them all the weight which it appears possible to give
them, they do not shake the opinion which has been formed.
In considering this question, it has been conjectured that the commission may
have been assimilated to a deed, to the validity of which, delivery is essential.
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This idea is founded on the supposition that the commission is hot merely
evidence of an appointment, but is itself the actual appointment; a supposition by
no means unquestionable. But for the purpose of examining this objection fairly,
let it be conceded, that the principle, claimed for its support, is established.
The appointment being, under the constitution, to be made by the president
personally, the delivery of the deed of appointment, if necessary to its completion,
must be made by the president also. It is not necessary that the livery should be
made personally to the grantee of the office: it never is so made. The law would
seem to contemplate that it should be made to the secretary of state, since it
directs the secretary to affix the seal to the commission after it shall have been
signed by the president. If then the act oflivery be necessary to give validity to
the commission, it has been delivered when executed and given to the secretary
for the purpose of being sealed, recorded, and transmitted to the party.
But in all cases of letters patent, certain solemnities are required by law, which
solemnities are the evidences [5 U.S. 137, 160] of the validity ofthe instrument.
A formal delivery to the person is not among them. In cases of commissions, the
sign manual of the president, and the seal of the United States, are those
solemnities. This objection therefore does not touch the case.
It has also occurred as possible, and barely possible, that the transmission of the
commission, and the acceptance thereof, might be deemed necessary to complete
the right of the plaintiff.
The transmission of the commission is a practice directed by convenience, but not
by law. It cannot therefore be necessary to constitute the appointment which must
precede it, and which is the mere act of the president. If the executive required
that every person appointed to an office, should himself take means to procure his
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commission, the appointment would not be the less valid on that account. The
appointment is the sole act of the president; the transmission of the commission is
the sole act of the officer to whom that duty is assigned, and may be accelerated
or retarded by circumstances which can have no influence on the appointment. A
commission is transmitted to a person already appointed; not to a person to be
appointed or not, as the letter enclosing the commission should happen to get into
the post-office and reach him in safety, or to miscarry.
It may have some tendency to elucidate this point, to inquire, whether the
possession ofthe original commission be indispensably necessary to authorize a
person, appointed to any office, to perform the duties of that office. If it was
necessary, then a loss of the commission would lose the office. Not only
negligence, but accident or fraud, fire or theft, might deprive an individual of his
office. In such a case, I presume it could not be doubted, but that a copy from the
record of the office of the secretary of state, would be, to every intent and
purpose, equal to the original. The act of congress has expressly made it so. To
give that copy validity, it would not be necessary to prove that the original had
been transmitted and afterwards lost. The copy would be complete evidence that
the original had existed, and that the appointment had been made, but not that the
original had been transmitted. If indeed it should appear that [5 U.S. 137, 161] the
original had been mislaid in the office of state, that circumstance would not affect
the operation of the copy. When all the requisites have been performed which
authorize a recording officer to record any instrument whatever, and the order for
that purpose has been given, the instrument is in law considered as recorded,
although the manual labour of inserting it in a book kept for that purpose may not
have been performed.
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In the case of commissions, the law orders the secretary of state to record them.
When therefore they are signed and sealed, the order for their being recorded is
given; and whether inserted in the book or not, they are in law recorded.
A copy of this record is declared equal to the original, and the fees to be paid by a
person requiring a copy are ascertained by law. Can a keeper of a public record
erase therefrom a commission which has been recorded? Or can he refuse a copy
thereof to a person demanding it on the terms prescribed by law?
Such a copy would, equally with the original, authorize the justice ofpeace to
proceed in the performance of his duty, because it would, equally with the
original, attest his appointment.
If the transmission of a commission be not considered as necessary to give
validity to an appointment; still less is its acceptance. The appointment is the sole
act of the president; the acceptance is the sole act of the officer, and is, in plain
common sense, posterior to the appointment. As he may resign, so may he refuse
to accept: but neither the one nor the other is capable of rendering the
appointment a nonentity.
That this is the understanding of the government, is apparent from the whole tenor
of its conduct.
A commission bears date, and the salary of the officer commences from his
appointment; not from the transmission or acceptance of his commission. When a
person, appointed to any office, refuses to accept that office, the successor is
nominated in the place of the person who [5 U.S. 137, 162] has declined to
accept, and not in the place of the person who had been previously in office and
had created the original vacancy.
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It is therefore decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a commission has
been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is
complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the secretary
of state.
Where an officer is removable at the will of the executive, the circumstance which
completes his appointment is of no concern; because the act is at any time
revocable; and the commission may be arrested, if still in the office. But when the
officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not
revocable and cannot be annulled. It has conferred legal rights which cannot be
resumed.
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been
made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the office is
terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The
right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute,
unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the president and sealed
by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office gave
the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the executive, the
appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights which are
protected by the laws of his country.
To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not
warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.
This brings us to the second inquiry; which is,
2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country
afford him a remedy? [5 U.S. 137, 163] The very essence of civil liberty certainly
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consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection. In Great Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of
a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.
In the third volume of his Commentaries, page 23, Blackstone states two cases in
which a remedy is afforded by mere operation of law.
'In all other cases,' he says, 'it is a general and indisputable rule, that where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law
whenever that right is invaded.'
And afterwards, page l09 of the same volume, he says, 'I am next to consider
such injuries as are cognizable by the courts of common law. And herein I shall
for the present only remark, that all possible injuries whatsoever, that did not fall
within the exclusive cognizance of either the ecclesiastical, military, or maritime
tribunals, are, for that very reason, within the cognizance of the common law
courts ofjustice; for it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England,
that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress.'
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government
of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
If this obloquy is to be cast on the jurisprudence of our country, it must arise from
the peculiar character of the case.
It behoves us then to inquire whether there be in its composition any ingredient
which shall exempt from legal investigation, or exclude the injured party from
legal redress. In pursuing this inquiry the first question which presents itself, is,
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whether this can be arranged [5 U.S. 137, 164] with that class of cases which
come under the description of damnum absque injuria-a loss without an injury.
This description of cases never has been considered, and it is believed never can
be considered as comprehending offices of trust, of honour or of profit. The office
ofjustice of peace in the district of Columbia is such an office; it is therefore
worthy of the attention and guardianship of the laws. It has received that attention
and guardianship. It has been created by special act of congress, and has been
secured, so far as the laws can give security to the person appointed to fill it, for
five years. It is not then on account of the worthlessness of the thing pursued, that
the injured party can be alleged to be without remedy.
Is it in the nature of the transaction? Is the act of delivering or withholding a
commission to be considered as a mere political act belonging to the executive
department alone, for the performance of which entire confidence is placed by our
constitution in the supreme executive; and for any misconduct respecting which,
the injured individual has no remedy.
That there may be such cases is not to be questioned; but that every act of duty to
be performed in any of the great departments of government constitutes such a
case, is not to be admitted.
By the act concerning invalids, passed in June 1794, the secretary at war is
ordered to place on the pension list all persons whose names are contained in a
report previously made by him to congress. If he should refuse to do so, would the
wounded veteran be without remedy? Is it to be contended that where the law in
precise terms directs the performance of an act in which an individual is
interested, the law is incapable of securing obedience to its mandate? Is it on
account of the character of the person against whom the complaint is made? Is it
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to be contended that the heads of departments are not amenable to the laws of
their country?
Whatever the practice on particular occasions may be, the theory of this principle
will certainly never be main- [5 U.S. 137, 165] tained. No act of the legislature
confers so extraordinary a privilege, nor can it derive countenance from the
doctrines ofthe common law. After stating that personal injury from the king to a
subject is presumed to be impossible, Blackstone, Vol. III. p. 255, says, 'but
injuries to the rights of property can scarcely be committed by the crown without
the intervention of its officers: for whom, the law, in matters of right, entertains
no respect or delicacy; but furnishes various methods of detecting the errors and
misconduct of those agents by whom the king has been deceived and induced to
do a temporary injustice.'
By the act passed in 1796, authorizing the sale of the lands above the mouth of
Kentucky river, the purchaser, on paying his purchase money, becomes
completely entitled to the property purchased; and on producing to the secretary
of state the receipt of the treasurer upon a certificate required by the law, the
president of the United States is authorized to grant him a patent. It is further
enacted that all patents shall be countersigned by the secretary of state, and
recorded in his office. If the secretary of state should choose to withhold this
patent; or the patent being lost, should refuse a copy of it; can it be imagined that
the law furnishes to the injured person no remedy?
It is not believed that any person whatever would attempt to maintain such a
proposition.
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It follows then that the question, whether the legality of an act of the head of a
department be examinable in a court ofjustice or not, must always depend on the
nature of that act.
If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some rule of law to
guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
In some instances there may be difficulty in applying the rule to particular cases;
but there cannot, it is believed, be much difficulty in laying down the rule.
By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain
important political powers, in the [5 U.S. 137, 166] exercise of which he is to use
his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these
duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in
conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of
the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can
exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect
the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision
of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by
adverting to the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs.
This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to
the will of the president. He is the mere organ by whom that will is
communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable
by the courts.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he
is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are
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dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is
amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the
vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the
political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the
president, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a
constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that
their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by
law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems
equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort
to the laws of his country for a remedy.
If this be the rule, let us inquire how it applies to the case under the consideration
of the court. [5 U.S. 137, 167] The power of nominating to the senate, and the
power of appointing the person nominated, are political powers, to be exercised
by the president according to his own discretion. When he has made an
appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been
completely applied to the case. If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of
the president, then a new appointment may be immediately made, and the rights
of the officer are terminated. But as a fact which has existed cannot be made
never to have existed, the appointment cannot be annihilated; and consequently if
the officer is by law not removable at the will of the president, the rights he has
acquired are protected by the law, and are not resumable by the president. They
cannot be extinguished by executive authority, and he has the privilege of
asserting them in like manner as if they had been derived from any other source.
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The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must
be tried by the judicial authority, If, for example, Mr. Marbury had taken the
oaths of a magistrate, and proceeded to act as one; in consequence of which a suit
had been instituted against him, in which his defence had depended on his being a
magistrate; the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial
authority.
So, ifhe conceives that by virtue of his appointment he has a legal right either to
the commission which has been made out for him or to a copy of that
commission, it is equally a question examinable in a court, and the decision of the
court upon it must depend on the opinion entertained of his appointment.
That question has been discussed, and the opinion is, that the latest point of time
which can be taken as that at which the appointment was complete, and
evidenced, was when, after the signature of the president, the seal of the United
States was affixed to the commission.
It is then the opinion of the court,
1. That by signing the commission ofMr. Marbury, the president of the United
States appointed him ajustice [5 U.S. 137, 168] of peace for the county of
Washington in the district of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States,
affixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of the verity of
the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment
conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years.
2. That, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the
commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which
the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
It remains to be inquired whether,
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3. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on,
1. The nature of the writ applied for. And,
2. The power of this court.
3. The nature of the writ.
Blackstone, in the third volume of his Commentaries, page 110, defines a
mandamus to be, 'a command issuing in the king's name from the court ofking's
bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court ofjudicature
within the king's dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing therein
specified which appertains to their office and duty, and which the court ofking's
bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant to right
and justice.'
Lord Mansfield, in 3 Burrows, 1266, in the case of The King v. Baker et al. states
with much precision and explicitness the cases in which this writ may be used.
'Whenever,' says that very able judge, 'there is a right to execute an office,
perform a service, or exercise a franchise (more especially if it be in a matter
of public concern or attended with profit), and a person is kept out of
possession, or dispossessed of such right, and [5 U.S. 137, 169] has no other
specific legal remedy, this court ought to assist by mandamus, upon reasons of
justice, as the writ expresses, and upon reasons of public policy, to preserve
peace, order and good government.' In the same case he says, 'this writ ought
to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific
remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one.'
In addition to the authorities now particularly cited, many others were relied on at
the bar, which show how far the practice has conformed to the general doctrines
that have been just quoted.
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This writ, if awarded, would be directed to an officer of government, and its
mandate to him would be, to use the words of Blackstone, 'to do a particular thing
therein specified, which appertains to his office and duty, and which the court has
previously determined or at least supposes to be consonant to right and justice.'
Or, in the words of Lord Mansfield, the applicant, in this case, has a right to
execute an office of public concern, and is kept out of possession of that right.
These circumstances certainly concur in this case.
Still, to render the mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is to be
directed, must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may be directed;
and the person applying for it must be without any other specific and legal
remedy.
1. With respect to the officer to whom it would be directed. The intimate political
relation, subsisting between the president of the United States and the heads of
departments, necessarily renders any legal investigation of the acts of one of those
high officers peculiarly irksome, as well as delicate; and excites some hesitation
with respect to the propriety of entering into such investigation. Impressions are
often received without much reflection or examination; and it is not wonderful
that in such a case as this, the assertion, by an individual, of his legal claims in a
court ofjustice, to which claims it is the duty of that court to attend, should at first
view be considered [5 U.S. 137, 170] by some, as an attempt to intrude into the
cabinet, and to intermeddle with the prerogatives of the executive.
It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to such a
jurisdiction. An extravagance, so absurd and excessive, could not have been
entertained for a moment. The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers,
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perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political,
or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never
be made in this court.
But, if this be not such a question; if so far from being an intrusion into the secrets
of the cabinet, it respects a paper, which, according to law, is upon record, and to
a copy of which the law gives a right, on the payment of ten cents; if it be no
intermeddling with a subject, over which the executive can be considered as
having exercised any control; what is there in the exalted station of the officer,
which shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, or
shall forbid a court to listen to the claim; or to issue a mandamus, directing the
performance of a duty, not depending on executive discretion, but on particular
acts of congress and the general principles of law?
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under colour of his
office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his
office alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding,
and being compelled to obey the judgment of the law. How then can his office
exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct, if
the case be such a case as would, were any other individual the party complained
of, authorize the process?
It is not by the office ofthe person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of
the thing to be done, that the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus is to
be determined. Where the head of a department acts in a case in which executive
discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive will; it is
[5 U.S. 137, 171] again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any
respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation.
328
But where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of
individuals, in the performance of which he is not placed under the particular
direction of the president, and the performance of which the president cannot
lawfully forbid, and therefore is never presumed to have forbidden; as for
example, to record a commission, or a patent for land, which has received all the
legal solemnities; or to give a copy of such record; in such cases, it is not
perceived on what ground the courts of the country are further excused from the
duty of giving judgment, that right to be done to an injured individual, than if the
same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a department.
This opinion seems not now for the first time to be taken up in this country.
It must be well recollected that in 1792 an act passed, directing the secretary at
war to place on the pension list such disabled officers and soldiers as should be
reported to him by the circuit courts, which act, so far as the duty was imposed on
the courts, was deemed unconstitutional; but some of the judges, thinking that the
law might be executed by them in the character of commissioners, proceeded to
act and to report in that character.
This law being deemed unconstitutional at the circuits, was repealed, and a
different system was established; but the question whether those persons, who had
been reported by the judges, as commissioners, were entitled, in consequence of
that report, to be placed on the pension list, was a legal question, properly
determinable in the courts, although the act of placing such persons on the list was
to be performed by the head of a department.
That this question might be properly settled, congress passed an act in February
1793, making it the duty of the secretary of war, in conjunction with the attorney
general, to take such measures as might be necessary to obtain an adjudication of
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the supreme court of the United [5 U.S. 137, 172] States on the validity of any
such rights, claimed under the act aforesaid.
After the passage of this act, a mandamus was moved for, to be directed to the
secretary at war, commanding him to place on the pension list a person stating
himself to be on the report of the judges.
There is, therefore, much reason to believe, that this mode of trying the legal right
of the complainant, was deemed by the head of a department, and by the highest
law officer of the United States, the most proper which could be selected for the
purpose.
When the subject was brought before the court the decision was, not, that a
mandamus would not lie to the head of a department, directing him to perform an
act, enjoined by law, in the performance ofwhich an individual had a vested
interest; but that a mandamus ought not to issue in that case-the decision
necessarily to be made if the report of the commissioners did not confer on the
applicant a legal right.
The judgment in that case is understood to have decided the merits of all claims of
that description; and the persons, on the report of the commissioners, found it
necessary to pursue the mode prescribed by the law subsequent to that which had
been deemed unconstitutional, in order to place themselves on the pension list.
The doctrine, therefore, now advanced is by no means a novel one.
It is true that the mandamus, now moved for, is not for the performance of an act
expressly enjoined by statute.
It is to deliver a commission; on which subjects the acts of congress are silent.
This difference is not considered as affecting the case. It has already been stated
that the applicant has, to that commission, a vested legal right, of which the
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executive cannot deprive him. He has been appointed to an office, from which he
is not removable at the will of the executive; and being so [5 U.S. 137, 173]
appointed, he has a right to the commission which the secretary has received from
the president for his use. The act of congress does not indeed order the secretary
of state to send it to him, but it is placed in his hands for the person entitled to it;
and cannot be more lawfully withheld by him, than by another person.
It was at first doubted whether the action of detinue was not a specific legal
remedy for the commission which has been withheld from Mr. Marbury; in which
case a mandamus would be improper. But this doubt has yielded to the
consideration that the judgment in detinue is for the thing itself, or its value. The
value of a public office not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained; and the
applicant has a right to the office itself, or to nothing. He will obtain the office by
obtaining the commission, or a copy of it from the record.
This, then, is a plain case of a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a
copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be inquired,
Whether it can issue from this court.
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the supreme
court 'to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages
of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of
the United States.'
The secretary of state, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the
United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is
not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because
the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the
authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
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The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one
supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time,
ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under
the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised
over the present [5 U.S. 137, 174] case; because the right claimed is given by a
law ofthe United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that 'the supreme court shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme
court shall have appellate jurisdiction.'
It has been insisted at the bar, that as the original grant ofjurisdiction to the
supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause, assigning original
jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or restrictive words; the
power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that court in
other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided
those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion
the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will
of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than
to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested.
The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without
meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give
this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their
jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has
332
declared it shall be appellate; the distribution ofjurisdiction made in the
constitution, is form without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than
those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to
them or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without
effect; and therefore such construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.
[5 U.S. 137, 175] If the solicitude ofthe convention, respecting our peace with
foreign powers, induced a provision that the supreme court should take original
jurisdiction in cases which might be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would
have proceeded no further than to provide for such cases, if no further restriction
on the powers of congress had been intended. That they should have appellate
jurisdiction in all other cases, with such exceptions as congress might make, is no
restriction; unless the words be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction.
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into
one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and
establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to
define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it
shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate
jurisdiction, the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases
its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not
original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an
additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to the
obvious meaning.
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To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate
jurisdiction.
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a
variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus
should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true; yet the
jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an
officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original
action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to [5 U.S. 137, 176]
appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this,
to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the
judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers,
appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to
inquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law
of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not
of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognise
certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government,
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is
the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of
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this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently
repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And
as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they
are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different
departments their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain
limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or
forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to
what purpose is that limitation committed to writing; if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a
government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not
confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts pro- [5 U.S. 137, 177]
hibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be
contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that
the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a
superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the
constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.
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Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the
theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature repugnant
to the constitution is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to
be considered by this court as one ofthe fundamental principles of our society. It
is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it,
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts and oblige them to give it effect?
Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if
it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory;
and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall,
however, receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide
on the operation of each. [5 U.S. 137, 178] So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that
the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the
constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the
very essence ofjudicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and he constitution is superior to
any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act,
must govern the case to which they both apply.
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Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered,
in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that
courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It
would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and theory of our
government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would
declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act,
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving
to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which
professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and
declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on
political institutions-a written constitution, would of itself be sufficient, in
America where written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence,
for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of
the United States furnish additional arguments in favour of its rejection.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the
constitution. [5 U.S. 137, 179] Could it be the intention of those who gave this
power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a
case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the
instrument under which it arises?
This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if
they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey?
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There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this
subject.
It is declared that 'no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.'
Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit
instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the
judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law.
The constitution declares that 'no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be
passed.'
If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under
it, must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution
endeavours to preserve?
'No person,' says the constitution, 'shall be convicted oftreason unless on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open
court.'
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It
prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the
legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of
court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the
legislative act?
From these and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent, that
the framers of the consti- [5 U.S. 137, 180] tution contemplated that instrument as
a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath
certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character.
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How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments,
and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of
the legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words: 'I do solemnly swear
that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the
poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the
duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and
understanding, agreeably to the constitution and laws ofthe United States.'
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of
the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is
closed upon him and cannot be inspected by him.
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To
prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the
supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws
of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of
the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.
The rule must be discharged.
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Mr. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign State, denies the
obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the Union, and the plaintiff, on
his part, contests the validity of an act which has been passed by the legislature of
that State. The constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts, is
to be considered; the conflicting powers of the government of the Union and of its
members, as marked in that constitution, are to be discussed; and an opinion
given, which may essentially influence the great operations ofthe government.
No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of its importance,
and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it must be decided
peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of hostility of a still
more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal alone can the
decision be made. On the Supreme Court of the United States has the constitution
of our country devolved this important duty.
The first question made in the cause is, has Congress power to incorporate a
bank?
It has been truly said that this can scarcely be considered as an open question,
entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation respecting it. The
principle now contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has
been recognized by many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the
judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted
obligation....
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The power now contested was exercised by the first Congress elected under the
present constitution. The bill for incorporating the bank ofthe United States did
not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principle was
completely understood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability. After being
resisted, first in the fair and open field of debate, and afterwards in the executive
cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced,
and being supported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and as
intelligent as this country can boast, it became a law. The original act was
permitted to expire; but a short experience of the embarrassments to which the
refusal to revive it exposed the government, convinced those who were most
prejudiced against the measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the
present law. It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assert that a
measure adopted under these circumstances was a bold and plain usurpation, to
which the constitution gave no countenance.
These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under the
impression that, were the question entirely new, the law would be found
irreconcilable with the constitution.
In discussing this question, the counsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it
of some importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider that
instrument not as emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign and
independent States. The powers of the general government, it has been said, are
delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in
subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion.
It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The Convention which framed the
constitution was indeed elected by the State legislatures. But the instrument, when
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it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation, or pretensions
to it. It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States, with a
request that it might "be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each
State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their
assent and ratification." This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the
convention, by Congress, and by the State legislatures, the instrument was
submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which they can
act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in convention.
It is true, they assembled in their several States -- and where else should they have
assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down
the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into
one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But
the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the
people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments.
From these conventions the constitution derives its whole authority. The
government proceeds directly from the people; is "ordained and established" in
the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained, "in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, and secure the
blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity." The assent of the States,
in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a convention, and thus submitting
that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or
reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be
negatived, by the State governments. The constitution, when thus adopted, was of
complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties....
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Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not find the word
"bank," or "incorporation," we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to
borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise
and support armies and navies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations,
and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation, are entrusted to its
government. It can never be pretended that these vast powers draw after them
others of inferior importance, merely because they are inferior. Such an idea can
never be advanced. But it may with great reason be contended, that a government,
entrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness
and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample
means for their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to
facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and cannot be presumed to
have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its execution by withholding the
most appropriate means ... require it) which would impute to the framers of that
instrument, when granting these powers for the public good, the intention of
impeding their exercise by withholding a choice of means? If, indeed, such be the
mandate of the constitution, we have only to obey; but that instrument does not
profess to enumerate the means by which the powers it confers may be executed;
nor does it prohibit the creation of a corporation, if the existence of such a being
be essential to the beneficial exercise of those powers. It is, then, the subject of
fair inquiry, how far such means may be employed....
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and
that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of
the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect
to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution,
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which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. ...
It being the opinion of the Court, that the act incorporating the bank is
constitutional; and that the power of establishing a branch in the State of
Maryland might be properly exercised by the bank itself, we proceed to inquire --
Whether the State of Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax that
branch?
That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is retained by the
States; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the government of
the Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two governments: are
truths which have never been denied. But, such is the paramount character of the
constitution, that its capacity to withdraw any subject from the action of even this
power, is admitted. The States are expressly forbidden to lay any duties on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their
inspection laws. If the obligation of this prohibition must be conceded, the same
paramount character would seem to restrain, as it certainly may restrain, a State
from such other exercise of this power; as is in its nature incompatible with, and
repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the Union....
On this ground the counsel for the bank place its claim to be exempted from the
power of a State to tax its operations. There is no express provision for the case,
but the claim has been sustained on a principle which so entirely pervades the
constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven
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with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated
from it, without rending it into shreds.
This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective
States, and cannot be controlled by them. From this, which may be almost termed
an axiom, other propositions are deduced as corollaries, on the truth or error of
which, and on their application to this case, the cause has been supposed to
depend. These are, 1st. that a power to create implies a power to preserve. 2nd.
That a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and
incompatible with these powers to create and to preserve. 3d. That where this
repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that
over which it is supreme....
Ifwe apply the principle for which the State of Maryland contends, to the
constitution generally, we shall find it capable of changing totally the character of
that instrument. We shall find it capable of arresting all the measures of the
government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the States. The American people
have declared their constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, to be
supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy, in fact, to the States....
The Court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The
result is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested
in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that
supremacy which the constitution has declared ....
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Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign State, denies the
obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the Union, and the plaintiff, on
his part, contests the validity of an act which has been passed by the legislature of
that State. The constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts, is
to be considered; the conflicting powers of the government of the Union and of its
members, as marked in that constitution, are to be discussed; and an opinion
given, which may essentially influence the great operations of the government.
No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of its importance,
and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it must be decided
peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of hostility of a still
more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal alone can the
decision be made. On the Supreme Court of the United States has the constitution
of our country devolved this important duty.
The first question made in the cause is, has Congress power to incorporate a
bank?
It has been truly said that this can scarcely be considered as an open question,
entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation respecting it. The
principle now contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has
been recognized by many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the
judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted
obligation....
The power now contested was exercised by the first Congress elected under the
present constitution. The bill for incorporating the bank of the United States did
not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principle was
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completely understood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability. After being
resisted, first in the fair and open field of debate, and afterwards in the executive
cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced,
and being supported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and as
intelligent as this country can boast, it became a law. The original act was
permitted to expire; but a short experience of the embarrassments to which the
refusal to revive it exposed the government, convinced those who were most
prejudiced against the measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the
present law. It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assert that a
measure adopted under these circumstances was a bold and plain usurpation, to
which the constitution gave no countenance.
These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under the
impression that, were the question entirely new, the law would be found
irreconcilable with the constitution.
In discussing this question, the counsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it
of some importance, in the construction of the constitution, to consider that
instrument not as emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign and
independent States. The powers of the general government, it has been said, are
delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in
subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion.
It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The Convention which framed the
constitution was indeed elected by the State legislatures. But the instrument, when
it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation, or pretensions
to it. It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United States, with a
request that it might "be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each
347
State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their
assent and ratification." This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the
convention, by Congress, and by the State legislatures, the instrument was
submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which they can
act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in convention.
It is true, they assembled in their several States -- and where else should they have
assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down
the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American people into
one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But
the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the
people themselves, or become the measures of the State governments.
From these conventions the constitution derives its whole authority. The
government proceeds directly from the people; is "ordained and established" in
the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained, "in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, and secure the
blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity." The assent of the States,
in their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a convention, and thus submitting
that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or
reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be
negatived, by the State governments. The constitution, when thus adopted, was of
complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties....
of this fact on the case), is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people.
In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them,
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.
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This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The
principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, [is] now universally
admitted. But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is
perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system
shall exist. ...
Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a bank or
creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the
articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which
requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even
the 10th amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive
jealousies which had been excited, omits the word "expressly," and declares only
that the powers "not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States,
are reserved to the States or to the people"; thus leaving the question, whether the
particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to
the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of
the whole instrument. The men who drew and adopted this amendment had
experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the
articles of confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments.
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the
public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects be deduced from the nature ofthe objects themselves. That
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this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only
to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language. Why else
were some of the limitations, found in the ninth section of the 1st article,
introduced? It is also, in some degree, warranted by their having omitted to use
any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just
interpretation. In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding.
Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not find the word
"bank," or "incorporation," we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to
borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise
and support armies and navies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations,
and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation, are entrusted to its
government. It can never be pretended that these vast powers draw after them
others of inferior importance, merely because they are inferior. Such an idea can
never be advanced. But it may with great reason be contended, that a government,
entrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness
and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample
means for their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to
facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and cannot be presumed to
have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its execution by withholding the
most appropriate means ... require it) which would impute to the framers of that
instrument, when granting these powers for the public good, the intention of
impeding their exercise by withholding a choice of means? If, indeed, such be the
mandate of the constitution, we have only to obey; but that instrument does not
profess to enumerate the means by which the powers it confers may be executed;
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nor does it prohibit the creation of a corporation, if the existence of such a being
be essential to the beneficial exercise of those powers. It is, then, the subject of
fair inquiry, how far such means may be employed.
It is not denied, that the powers given to the government imply the ordinary
means of execution. That, for example, of raising revenue, and applying it to
national purposes, is admitted to imply the power of conveying money from place
to place, as the exigencies of the nation may require, and of employing the usual
means of conveyance. But it is denied that the government has its choice of
means; or, that it may employ the most convenient means, if, to employ them, it
be necessary to erect a corporation....
The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of
performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select
the means; and those who contend that it may not select any appropriate means,
that one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves
the burden of establishing that exception.... The power of creating a corporation,
though appertaining to sovereignty, is not like the power of making war, or
levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent
power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means
of executing them. It is never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a
means by which other objects are accomplished.... The power of creating a
corporation is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting
something else. No sufficient reason is, therefore, perceived, why it may not pass
as incidental to those powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct mode of
executing them.
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But the constitution ofthe United States has not left the right of Congress to
employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the
government, to general reasoning. To its enumeration of powers is added that of
making "all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution, in the
government of the United States, or in any department thereof."
The counsel for the State of Maryland have urged various arguments, to prove
that this clause, though in terms a grant of power, is not so in effect; but is really
restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be implied, of selecting
means for executing the enumerated powers....
Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense,
would convey a meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It is
essential to just construction, that many words which import something excessive
should be understood in a more mitigated sense -- in that sense which common
usage justifies. The word "necessary" is of this description. It has not a fixed
character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison; and is often
connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression the mind
receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary,
absolutely or indispensably necessary. To no mind would the same idea be
conveyed by these several phrases. This comment on the word is well illustrated
by the passage cited at the bar, from the 20th section of the 1st article of the
constitution. It is, we think, impossible to compare the sentence which prohibits a
State from laying "imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws," with that which authorizes
Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
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execution" the powers of the general government, without feeling a conviction
that the convention understood itself to change materially the meaning of the
word "necessary," by prefixing the word "absolutely." This word, then, like
others, is used in various senses; and, in its construction, the subject, the context,
the intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into view.
Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject is the execution of
those great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must
have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as
human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done
by confiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the
power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were
conducive to the end. This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs. To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future
time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the
instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an
unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen
at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they
occur. To have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone
without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive
the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason,
and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. If we apply this principle of
construction to any of the powers of the government, we shall find it so pernicious
in its operation that we shall be compelled to discard it. ...
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The result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed upon this
clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers
of Congress, or to impair the rights of the legislature to exercise its best judgment
in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of
the government. If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient
one is found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on
that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution, if
that instrument be not a splendid bauble.
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and
that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of
the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect
to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution,
which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. ...
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are
prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing
its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of
the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any
of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the
degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
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department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all
pretensions to such a power.
After this declaration, it can scarcely be necessary to say that the existence of
State banks can have no possible influence on the question. No trace is to be
found in the constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the government
of the Union on those of the States, for the execution of the great powers assigned
to it. Its means are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was it expected
to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To impose on it the necessity of
resorting to means which it cannot control, which another government may
furnish or withhold, would render its course precarious, the result of its measures
uncertain, and create a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint
its most important designs, and is incompatible with the language of the
constitution. But were it otherwise, the choice of means implies a right to choose
a national bank in preference to State banks, and Congress alone can make the
election.
After the most deliberate consideration, it is the unanimous and decided opinion
of this Court, that the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States is a law
made in pursuance of the constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the
land....
It being the opinion of the Court, that the act incorporating the bank is
constitutional; and that the power of establishing a branch in the State of
Maryland might be properly exercised by the bank itself, we proceed to inquire --
2. Whether the State of Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax that
branch?
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That the power of taxation is one ofvital importance; that it is retained by the
States; that it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the government of
the Union; that it is to be concurrently exercised by the two governments: are
truths which have never been denied. But, such is the paramount character of the
constitution, that its capacity to withdraw any subject from the action of even this
power, is admitted. The States are expressly forbidden to lay any duties on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their
inspection laws. If the obligation of this prohibition must be conceded, the same
paramount character would seem to restrain, as it certainly may restrain, a State
from such other exercise of this power; as is in its nature incompatible with, and
repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the Union....
On this ground the counsel for the bank place its claim to be exempted from the
power of a State to tax its operations. There is no express provision for the case,
but the claim has been sustained on a principle which so entirely pervades the
constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven
with its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated
from it, without rending it into shreds.
This great principle is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof are supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective
States, and cannot be controlled by them. From this, which may be almost termed
an axiom, other propositions are deduced as corollaries, on the truth or error of
which, and on their application to this case, the cause has been supposed to
depend. These are, 1st. that a power to create implies a power to preserve. 2nd.
That a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and
incompatible with these powers to create and to preserve. 3d. That where this
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repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that
over which it is supreme....
That the power of taxing by the States may be exercised so as to destroy it, is too
obvious to be denied. But taxation is said to be an absolute power, which
acknowledges no other limits than those expressly prescribed in the constitution,
and like sovereign power of every other description, is trusted to the discretion of
those who use it. But the very terms of this argument admit that the sovereignty of
the State, in the article of taxation itself, is subordinate to, and may be controlled
by, the constitution of the United States. How far it has been controlled by that
instrument must be a question of construction. In making this construction, no
principle not declared, can be admissible, which would defeat the legitimate
operations of a supreme government. It is of the very essence of supremacy to
remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every
power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from
their own influence. This effect need not be stated in terms. It is so involved in the
declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the expression of it
could not make it more certain. We must, therefore, keep it in view while
construing the constitution.
The argument on the part of the State of Maryland is, not that the States may
directly resist a law of Congress, but that they may exercise their acknowledged
powers upon it, and that the constitution leaves them this right in the confidence
that they will not abuse it.
Before we proceed to examine this argument, and to subject it to the test of the
constitution, we must be permitted to bestow a few considerations on the nature
and extent of this original right of taxation, which is acknowledged to remain with
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the States. It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and their property is
essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised
on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which the
government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this
power, is found in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the
legislature acts upon its constituents....
The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own
authority, or is so introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means
which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that
body by the people of the United States? We think it demonstrable that it does
not. Those powers are not given by the people of a single State. They are given by
the people of the United States, to a government whose laws, made in pursuance
of the constitution, are declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a
single State cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over them.
If we measure the power of taxation residing in a State, by the extent of
sovereignty which the people of a single State possess, and can confer on its
government, we have an intelligible standard, applicable to every case to which
the power may be applied. We have a principle which leaves the power of taxing
the people and property of a State unimpaired; which leaves to a State the
command of all its resources, and which places beyond its reach, all those powers
which are conferred by the people of the United States on the government of the
Union, and all those means which are given for the purpose of carrying those
powers into execution. We have a principle which is safe for the States, and safe
for the Union. We are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty;
from interfering powers; from a repugnancy between a right in one government to
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pull down what there is an acknowledged right in another to build up; from the
incompatibility of a right in one government to destroy what there is a right in
another to preserve. We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the
judicial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use, and what degree
may amount to the abuse of the power. The attempt to use it on the means
employed by the government of the Union, in pursuance of the constitution, is
itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a
single State cannot give.
We find, then, onjust theory, a total failure of this original right to tax the means
employed by the government of the Union, for the execution of its powers. The
right never existed, and the question whether it has been surrendered, cannot
anse.
But, waiving this theory for the present, let us resume the inquiry, whether this
power can be exercised by the respective States, consistently with a fair
construction of the constitution?
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy
may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain
repugnance, in conferring on one government a power to control the
constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very
measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are
propositions not to be denied. But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the
magic of the word CONFIDENCE. Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and
unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess of destruction would be an abuse, to
presume which, would banish that confidence which is essential to all
government.
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But is this a case of confidence? Would the people of anyone State trust those of
another with a power to control the most insignificant operations of their State
government? We know they would not. Why, then, should we suppose that the
people of anyone State should be willing to trust those of another with a power to
control the operations of a government to which they have confided their most
important and most valuable interests? Inthe legislature of the Union alone, are
all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the
people with the power of controlling measures which concern all, in the
confidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a case of confidence, and
we must consider it as it really is.
Ifwe apply the principle for which the State of Maryland contends, to the
constitution generally, we shall find it capable of changing totally the character of
that instrument. We shall find it capable of arresting all the measures of the
government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the States. The American people
have declared their constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, to be
supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy, in fact, to the States.
If the States may tax one instrument, employed by the government in the
execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instrument. They may
tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent rights; they may tax the
papers of the custom-house; they may tax judicial process; they may tax all the
means employed by the government, to an excess which would defeat all the ends
of government. This was not intended by the American people. They did not
design to make their government dependent on the States....
The Court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The
result is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to
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retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested
in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that
supremacy which the constitution has declared.
We are unanimously of opinion, that the law passed by the legislature of
Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is unconstitutional
and void.
This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which they originally
possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the real property ofthe bank, in
common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the
interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common
with other property of the same description throughout the State. But this is a tax
on the operations of the bank, and is, consequently, a tax on the operation of an
instrument employed by the government of the Union to carry its powers into
execution. Such a tax must be unconstitutional.
Source: 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and
that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of
the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect
to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution,
which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. ...
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Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are
prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing
its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case
requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of
the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any
of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the
degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all
pretensions to such a power.
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